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Summary 
 
Various explanations have been put forward as to why the „Keynesian‟ Revolution 
occurred. Some of these point to the temporal relevance of the General Theory while 
others highlight the importance of more anecdotal evidence, such as Keynes‟s 
relations with the Cambridge „Circus‟. However, no systematic effort has been made 
to bring together these and other factors under one recognised framework of analysis. 
This thesis attempts to fill this gap by making use of a well-established tradition of 
work within the history of science literature devoted to identifying the factors which 
help to explain why certain research schools are successful and why others fail. This 
body of work is based primarily on the ideas of Jack Morrell and Gerald Geison. 
More specifically, Morrell and Geison make use of a combination of 14 intellectual, 
technical, institutional, psychological and financial factors which, they argue, help 
determine the relative performance of research schools. 
 
We apply the research school approach to the development very specifically of 
macroeconomics in the 1930s and 1940s. Our findings suggest that it does indeed 
provide a reasonably coherent explanation as to why the revolution in 
macroeconomics witnessed during this period was specifically labelled „Keynesian‟, 
this despite the fact that Keynes was far from being the only economist attempting to 
gain dominance for his ideas. Thus, as well as Keynes, we apply the same research 
school analysis to the cases of Hayek and Kalecki and use it to explain why they were 
overshadowed by Keynes. On a final note, although it is clear that Keynes 
independently possessed a number of the attributes necessary to establish a successful 
and sustainable research school, the thesis also identifies the theories and activities of 
Marshall as providing an important foundation from which Keynes was able to mount 
his own revolution. 
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The Keynesian Revolution: A Research School Analysis 
 
 
Section 1. Introduction 
 
„The Keynesian Revolution is one of the most remarkable episodes in 
the entire history of economic thought: certainly never before and 
perhaps never since has the economics profession been won over so 
rapidly and so massively to a new economic theory‟ (Blaug 1991: 
171). 
 
„[N]o sign in the pre-1936 literature warned how quickly and 
completely Keynesian economics would come to dominate the 
discipline‟ (Laidler 1991: 295). 
 
Historians of economic theory have posited a variety of explanations in their attempt 
to account for the success of John Maynard Keynes‟s (1883-1946) The General 
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (1936). These range from its supposedly 
revolutionary nature to the idea that the timing of the General Theory‟s appearance 
was fortunate as it took place when the world was struggling with the „most severe 
and widely diffused…contraction of modern times‟ (Friedman and Schwartz 1963a: 
299). Other accounts rely on more anecdotal evidence. For example, stress is often 
placed on the relationship between Keynes and the „Circus‟, a group of able, young 
Cambridge economists who dissected Keynes‟s ongoing work over a number of 
months from November 1930 to the spring of 1931 and whom, some argue – although 
it has been a matter of some controversy – played a key role in helping Keynes to 
develop crucial ideas in the years leading up to 1936. This emphasis on anecdote has 
been influenced by the „oral tradition‟ at Cambridge, „a style which relies heavily on 
allusion to and caricaturization of the work of a few eminent contemporaries and 
predecessors rather than on meticulous documentation of sources‟ (Johnson and 
Johnson 1974: 261). 
 3 
Taken together, these explanations should, one might hope, provide a reasonably 
coherent account of why, in the 1930s and 1940s, the emerging Keynesian School – 
centred on Cambridge, England, but with prominent outposts, notably in the United 
States – was successful and thus why the revolution in macroeconomics which took 
place during this period was specifically labelled „Keynesian‟. However, little attempt 
has been made to bring these explanations under one analytical framework. The main 
aim of this thesis is to provide such a framework. To do this, it is necessary to adopt a 
more innovative approach than those typically employed by historians of economic 
theory. More specifically, we will use the body of work pioneered by Jack Morrell 
(1972) and formalised by Gerald Geison (1981) within the history of science literature 
which examines why „research schools‟ succeed or fail. Morrell-Geison (as it shall be 
referred to) draws together a range of intellectual, technical, institutional, 
psychological and financial factors that help determine the relative performance of a 
school. Despite its heuristic appeal, the application of Morrell-Geison as a means of 
better understanding the „rapid and massive‟ success of Keynes‟s masterpiece has 
received almost no attention from those interested in the history of economic theory.
1
 
 
We will proceed as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature which has 
attempted to explain why Keynesian economics emerged when it did and why it rose 
to prominence in such a relatively short period of time. Even though there are 
overlaps between the evidence presented in Section 2 and in the main section, it is 
clear that there is no pre-existing systematic and convincing account of why Keynes 
was successful. Section 3A very briefly identifies links between economics and 
„science‟, while Section 3B details the research school approach before discussing the 
development of the relevant literature since Morrell-Geison. 
 
Section 4 is the main focus of the thesis. It explains each of the criteria postulated by 
Morrell-Geison and shows how, when considered as a whole, they provide a coherent 
explanation of why the Keynesian School was victorious in the 1930s and 1940s. (The 
thesis does not attempt to apply the Morrell-Geison criteria outside of the period in 
                                                 
1
 Coats (1993: 55) suggests the possible utility of the research school approach in helping to explain 
key episodes in the history of economic theory but stops short of any further analysis. Harry Johnson 
(1975: 95-97) and Walker (1986) look at various intellectual and sociological factors behind Keynes‟s 
success; however, there is no attempt in either case to present these factors within a unified whole. 
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question, although it is acknowledged that the ideas of Hayek and Kalecki have 
become more prominent over recent decades.) As will become clear, a key element in 
Keynes‟s success was the many research school-type benefits conferred on him and 
his immediate followers by the work and activities of Alfred Marshall (1842-1924). 
 
The Morrell-Geison approach also helps to explain why research schools fail. Taking 
this a step further, where a school is emerging and may have a chance of succeeding, 
it is vital for any competitor thinkers to not only establish their own school but a 
successful one if they are to have an improved chance of challenging the emerging 
school. This is important in the Keynesian case as the 1930s were „the years of high 
theory‟ (Shackle 1967) for macroeconomics, underpinned by a burst of theoretical 
innovation partly driven by the inability of classical theory to provide a convincing 
explanation of and solution to the mass and sustained unemployment created by the 
Great Depression.
2
 In Kuhnian terminology, the existing paradigm had been „both 
accentuated and laid bare‟ (Sweezy 1953: 258), thereby opening the way for new 
theories to battle it out until one became dominant. Keynes was but one participant in 
this battle, and, as it happened, the „winning economist‟ (Klein 1966: 94). 
 
The work of Friedrich August von Hayek (1899-1992) and Michal Kalecki (1899-
1970) was also important at the time. Both men conceived their own theoretical 
systems. With regard to Hayek, his appointment to a professorship at the London 
School of Economics (LSE) in 1931 had an added resonance as he was there in part to 
„fight Keynes‟ (Hayek in Kresge and Wenar 1994: 77). This formed part of a wider 
battle between Cambridge and the LSE for supremacy in English economics, a battle 
which, during the period under consideration here, was unambiguously won by the 
former. Within the context of research school analysis, the Hayek case is therefore 
particularly interesting given his failure to establish a rival school to the Cambridge 
Keynesians. 
 
As he was mostly a lone thinker during the early years of his career, the case of 
Kalecki is more difficult. Despite producing a system which anticipated and was 
                                                 
2
 As Shackle (1967) notes, „the years of high theory‟ were marked not only by significant changes in 
macroeconomic theory but also by innovations in value theory and the theory of imperfect competition. 
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technically superior to that contained in the General Theory
3
 and although he amassed 
something of a following in later years, Kalecki seems to have made little effort to 
establish a research school in the 1930s and 1940s. In such circumstances and up 
against a man with the influence and authority of Keynes, it is little wonder that 
Kalecki was overshadowed. Nevertheless, he is a good example of the dangers of 
being outside the academic mainstream. The implication of the analysis to be offered 
here is that Kalecki‟s ideas failed to stimulate a revolution because he did not enjoy 
the benefits conferred by a successful research school. Had he benefited from the 
various personal, social and institutional advantages enjoyed by Keynes, there is some 
reason to believe that it would have been Kalecki‟s name on the lips of subsequent 
generations of economists rather than Keynes‟s. 
 
Section 5 will summarise the performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki as 
measured against the Morrell-Geison criteria and conclude by examining potential 
avenues for future research. 
 
 
Section 2. Review of the Literature 
 
The existing literature which attempts to explain the emergence and rapidity of the 
Keynesian Revolution is somewhat haphazard, the consequence being that there 
continues to be considerable debate over the issue. Before we attempt to consolidate 
these explanations, it is worth reviewing the literature in question. This will not only 
help to set the scene but will also highlight the advantages of employing research 
school methodology as a means of more properly separating out the various factors 
which contributed to the Keynesian story. 
 
A key focus for explanations of the Keynesian Revolution has been on the 
appropriateness of the policy prescriptions supposedly implied by the General Theory. 
This springs from the fact that the book appeared just a handful of years after the 
                                                 
3
 Harcourt (2006a: 163) argues that Kalecki has „a strong claim to be regarded as the greatest all-round 
economist of the twentieth century‟, citing not only his anticipation of the General Theory but also his 
work on planning in democratic socialist countries and on development. 
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onset of the Great Depression.
4
 Some basic facts highlight the severity of the 
downturn: in the United States, unemployment equalled 8.7% of the non-agricultural 
labour force in 1930, well up from 3.2% in 1929, while consumer demand collapsed, 
with sales of new cars falling from nearly 4.5 million in 1929 to around 1.0 million in 
1932. At the sectoral level, iron and steel output declined by 59% between 1929 and 
1932 (Badger 1989: 18, 20-22). The situation in Europe was just as bad: in Britain, 
national income contracted by 3% a year between 1929 and 1931 (M. Thomas 1994: 
343). On the Continent there were bank collapses in a number of countries and 
significant monetary contractions in Austria and Germany (ibid.). 
 
Given the broadly temporal correspondence between the Depression and the 
appearance of the General Theory, the „policy appropriateness‟ argument has become 
the leading explanation of the Keynesian Revolution. Amongst those who place a 
significant emphasis on this factor, one of the most succinct is Deane (1978: 184): 
„No doubt the principal reason why the General Theory had such a powerful 
impact…was that the time was ripe. Its abstractions seemed more relevant to the 
conditions of the 1930s than the competing theories.‟ Others who attach a similar 
importance to this explanation include Shackle (1967), Winch (1969) and Clarke 
(1998). Shackle argues that the „profound intellectual shock‟ (ibid., 128) of the 
Depression was one of the catalysts not only for Keynes, but also Kalecki and, more 
contentiously, Myrdal, of the Stockholm School.
5
 Winch (ibid., 171) identifies some 
of the theoretical novelties contained in the General Theory and whether any of them 
were the motive force behind Keynes‟s success. Amongst these supposed innovations 
was Keynes‟s „proof‟ of underemployment equilibrium, his treatment of saving and 
investment, and his emphasis on changes in output rather than changes in prices. 
Winch argues that the underlying importance of the General Theory lies in the link it 
makes between saving and investment and how this enabled Keynes to construct his 
theory of income determination and effective demand from which policy prescriptions 
could be derived. Finally, Clarke (ibid., 185) notes that Keynes is „often accused by 
monetarists (led by Hayek) of writing the General Theory „as a tract for the times‟ – a 
                                                 
4
 The causes of the Depression have been well documented. Important treatments include Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963b), Galbraith (1955), Kindleberger (1973), and Temin (1976). 
5
 Laidler (1999: chap. 3) considers in detail the development of Swedish macroeconomic theory during 
the 1930s. 
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legitimation of his immediate policy proposals in the context of the mid 1930s but 
without real theoretical significance.‟ Clarke inverts this argument by suggesting that 
Keynes was, in fact, „tactically unwise‟ (ibid.) to publish when he did: if the General 
Theory did have any theoretical importance, it was bound to be diluted as 
governments concentrated on its implications for policy. As far as the analysis in this 
thesis is concerned, our main focus will be on the primary role played by the 
multiplier and stable forms of IS-LM in the forging of the revolutionary status secured 
by the General Theory in the 1930s and 1940s. At the same time, it will also become 
clear that during this same period, major objections to IS-LM emerged, not least from 
some of Keynes‟s closest followers, who argued that IS-LM failed to properly account 
for factors such as uncertainty and expectation formation, a view which, in turn, has, 
over the years, arguably got the upper hand against that which sees stable forms of IS-
LM in particular as central to the Keynesian Revolution. 
 
As we have seen, Keynes‟s theories far from enjoyed a monopoly position when it 
came to explaining and addressing the Depression. Hayek‟s Prices and Production 
(Hayek 1931a) was a major work in the field of business cycle theory. Laidler (1991: 
299) goes as far to argue that, for contemporary observers, Hayek‟s ideas represented 
„a line of inquiry at least as likely to come to dominate the discipline as anything 
being developed at Cambridge.‟ There were important similarities between Prices and 
Production and the General Theory, including a concern for the place of monetary 
theory within orthodox economic theory and a stress on the importance of historical 
time and uncertainty. But these theoretical connections were overshadowed by 
contrary stances on approaches to policy: whereas Keynes provided policy-makers 
with a rationale for intervention, Hayek‟s position was that the authorities should be 
„hands off‟. Given the economic conditions of the 1930s, it is hardly surprising that a 
„theory that taught that the [D]epression simply had to be waited out could [not] 
withstand the arrival of Keynesian analysis‟ (ibid., 319). 
 
It goes without saying that the policy appropriateness argument is a very important 
and interesting one, and, as a result, it should be afforded due consideration in any 
serious examination of the nature and causes of the Keynesian Revolution. But even 
given these sentiments, the issue of temporal relevancy does leave a number of 
questions unanswered. Despite the 1937 downturn in the United States, the worst 
 8 
effects of the Depression had been ridden out by 1936.
6
 Moreover, as with some of its 
theoretical claims, many of the policy initiatives associated with the General Theory – 
even if they were not explicitly mentioned in its pages, itself a reflection of the fact 
that the book was primarily a theoretical investigation, with policy considerations 
being secondary – had a long history prior to Keynes. Most notable was the call for 
government to institute public works programmes. As far back as 1924, Lloyd George 
had advocated greater government involvement in the economy through increased 
spending on infrastructure; cheap money was another idea with a pre-Keynesian 
provenance. Meanwhile, in the United States, Leon Keyserling and Herbert Stein, 
both former heads of the Council of Economic Advisers, have argued that the General 
Theory had little or no impact on fiscal policy in the years following its publication 
(see Salant 1988: 61). Instead, under the auspices of the New Deal, policy was driven 
by the „political and humanitarian necessity to provide relief for labor and agriculture‟ 
(Smithies 1951: 596). 
 
It would, of course, be churlish to completely reject Keynes‟s theoretical framework 
on these grounds, not least because of its important role in helping to bring more 
attention to ideas previously suggested by others, notably the effective demand or 
under-consumption theories of Malthus and Hobson.
7
 Nevertheless, the arguments 
above make it more difficult to assign to Keynes a major role in helping to relieve the 
worst effects of the Depression either in Europe or the United States. Instead, there 
seems to have been a feedback mechanism at work between the General Theory and 
the economic conditions of the time, the same being true of Prices and Production 
and Kalecki‟s theories: each of these sets of ideas was a response to the slump and 
provided guidance on what should be done when another recession or depression 
occurred. Evidence from the sociology of science literature provides some explanation 
                                                 
6
 Krugman (2007: xxxvii) makes the point that: „It would be a wonderful story if [the] General Theory 
showed the world the way out of depression. Alas for romance, that is not quite what happened. The 
giant public works programme that restored full employment, otherwise known as the Second World 
War, was launched for reasons unrelated to macroeconomic theory.‟ 
7
 Keynes considered Malthus to be the „first of the Cambridge economists‟ (Keynes in The Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes (hereafter CW) X: 107). Blaug (1994: 1,210) notes that „what 
Keynes took from Malthus was a name for a new concept – effective demand – in the effort to invent a 
pedigree for his own ideas.‟ 
 9 
for this feedback process, Robert Merton (cited in Simonton 2004: 10) maintaining 
that „discoveries and inventions become virtually inevitable (1) as prerequisite kinds 
of knowledge accumulates in man‟s cultural store; [and] (2) as the attention of a 
sufficient number of investigators is focused on a problem – by emerging social 
needs, or by developments internal to the particular science, or by both.‟ 
 
The parts played by Keynes, Hayek and Kalecki in this unfolding story were wholly 
different. Keynes was the archetypal insider, a man at home both at Cambridge and in 
Whitehall, even if he did combine this with a reputation for being an establishment 
maverick. Unusually for an economist, he also had a high public profile, founded on 
the controversy that surrounded The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919) as 
well as his journalism. Meanwhile, on the back of his growing reputation in Austria 
and with the support of Lionel Robbins – who had become head of the LSE‟s 
Department of Economics in 1929 – Hayek made the journey to London with the aim 
of becoming a world authority on the cycle. Hicks (1967: 203) confirms the part 
played by Hayek: „When the definitive history of economic analysis during the 
nineteen-thirties comes to be written, a leading character in the drama (it was quite a 
drama) will be Professor Hayek… [T]here was a time when the new theories of 
Hayek were the principal rival of the new theories of Keynes.‟ 
 
The Keynes/Hayek rivalry also „enveloped their respective 
institutions…and…determined the research programmes of their colleagues‟ 
(McCormick 1992: xi). As a result of Marshall‟s earlier endeavours, Cambridge had 
become England‟s leading centre for economics teaching and research. It was not 
surprising then that teaching at the LSE had come to be dominated by Marshallian 
theory: even if Professor Edwin Cannan – the School‟s most eminent economist 
before the Robbins/Hayek era – did not always agree with Marshall, he was at heart a 
Marshallian (see Maloney 1985: 72). All the same, his retirement in 1926 meant that 
there was an opportunity to challenge Cambridge.
8
 In fact, the first salvo in the LSE‟s 
                                                 
8
 Even if there was an emerging rivalry between Cambridge and the LSE, this did not stop the 
establishment in 1923 of the London and Cambridge Economic Service (LCES). It was founded by the 
economics departments at Cambridge and the LSE with the aim of improving the measurement of 
business indicators. Based at the LSE, the LCES was for a number of years overseen by an executive 
committee made up of Keynes and Henderson from Cambridge and Beveridge and Bowley from the 
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doomed assault on Cambridge had been fired the year before when Robbins had 
attacked Keynes‟s views on monetary policy (see O‟Brien 1988: 106). Robbins 
realised relatively early on that he had to create a new tradition of thinking, one that 
would establish the LSE as an institution with different ideas from Cambridge. It was 
this realisation which provided much of the motivation behind Hayek‟s recruitment. 
 
Meanwhile, Kalecki was working more or less alone in Poland, seeming to have 
„sprung, full-grown, from his own brow‟ (Solow 1975: 1,331). Asimakopulos (1976: 
365) goes further in describing Kalecki‟s contributions to understanding the cycle: 
„[His] achievement would have been remarkable in any case, but that it came from a 
young man who had been unable to complete his formal education, and who was 
largely self-taught in economic theory, makes it awe-inspiring.‟ While Hayek‟s 
description of the economic situation during the 1930s was unquestionably distinct 
from Keynes‟s, Kalecki was „independently approaching the same goal‟ (A. Robinson 
1947: 42) as Keynes. This was one of the first formal recognitions of Kalecki‟s work 
coming, as it did, more than a decade after his articles on the cycle were published in 
Polish and French. Klein (1951: 447) also helped to put Kalecki on the map, arguing 
that he had created theories that contained „everything of importance in the Keynesian 
system, in addition to other contributions‟, while Joan Robinson (1952: 159) provided 
further ammunition for Kalecki‟s case.9 But even if Kalecki was not in direct 
competition with Keynes in the same way as Hayek, „How did it happen that [he] 
remained relatively obscure, hidden behind Keynes for so long despite his 
originality?‟ (Steindl 1981: 596). In trying to answer this question, Steindl identifies 
Kalecki‟s personal background (the fact that he was „a Jew, a newly arrived “outcast” 
from the east‟) (ibid.), his lack of influence on the powers that be (academic and 
governmental), and his reformist socialist zeal, as being important. 
 
LSE, and continued operations right through the Keynes/Hayek period. The detailed history of the 
LCES is still to be compiled. 
9
 The question of whether Kalecki anticipated Keynes has received extensive coverage (see, for 
example, Asimakopulos 1983 and Chapple 1991). This body of work was triggered mostly by Patinkin 
(1982), which itself partly draws on Merton‟s (1957, 1961) ideas on how recognition influences the 
reward system in science and the role of multiple discoveries respectively. The preponderance of 
opinion appears to favour the view that Kalecki did indeed independently discover the principal 
propositions contained in the General Theory (see Harcourt 2006a: 63). 
 11 
Returning to Keynes, given that the influence of the General Theory‟s theoretical 
innovations was limited by the fact that some of them had already been suggested, it 
must have been the case that other factors were important in explaining the 
„Keynesian avalanche‟. Leijonhufvud (1968: 397) acknowledges this when he states 
that if we accept the basic premise that the Keynesian Revolution was indeed a 
revolution – itself a contentious claim – „the Sociology of Economic Knowledge 
would seem to acquire a priority on the efforts of economists that one would be loath 
to accord it.‟ 
 
Not all practitioners have been as reluctant as Leijonhufvud to draw on other 
disciplines. One of these is A.W. Coats, whose work strongly reflects a recognition of 
the interaction between economics and sociology. Despite its length, the following 
passage from Coats (1993: 25) sums up both the significant lacuna that remains to be 
filled in the sociology of the history of economic theory and why, regarding the 
development and influence of macroeconomics in the 1930s and 1940s, such a subject 
is worthy of more attention: „In the case of economics…even such hackneyed subjects 
as the Ricardians, Marxians, Austrians, and Keynesians, have not yet been examined 
from a systematic sociological standpoint, partly because historians of economics 
have usually been unwilling to go beyond the conventional history of ideas. 
Consequently, even in such a heavily worked-over topic as J.M. Keynes and 
Cambridge, on which there is a vast literature of theoretical analysis, interpretation, 
and textual exegesis, casual empiricism, obiter dicta, and personal reminiscence have 
tended to predominate in accounts of the origins, evolution, reception, influence, and 
scientific importance of the General Theory, although it is widely acknowledged that 
a fascinating combination of personality, beliefs, behaviour, social background, 
academic location, career experience, sociopolitical attitudes, colleagues in 
Cambridge, and contemporary events, all played a significant part. If, as seems clear, 
there has been no comprehensive and systematic investigation of the historical and 
sociological, as well as the intellectual context of the most important single economics 
book published in [the 20th] century, the case for the sociology of economic science 
requires no further support.‟ 
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Section 3A. Some Common Ground between Economics and Science 
 
If we are to employ a recognised methodological approach from the history of science 
to explain an important episode in the history of economic theory, it is worth briefly 
considering whether there is any existing common ground between economics and 
science. At least three such connections can be identified: i. At a very basic level, 
various authors have claimed that economics is, in fact, a science. Thus, there is 
Thomas Carlyle‟s famous coining of the term “dismal science” to describe economics 
in the context of the Malthusian population hypothesis. At the other extreme is the 
position adopted by, for example, Simon (1981) who argues that as the Earth‟s 
population has increased, per capita consumption of food has also risen as a result of 
technological advances. Economics should therefore be known as the “happy 
science”. Keynes stopped short of putting economics on the same footing as the 
natural sciences, describing it instead as a “moral science” (see The Collected 
Writings of John Maynard Keynes (hereafter CW) XIV: 297). Contrast this with the 
word “Scientific” to be found in the title of Paul Samuelson‟s Collected Papers (e.g. 
Samuelson 1966). 
 
ii. A second and more sophisticated link relates to the investigative methods used by 
economists and scientists. The closest economists come to thinking about their subject 
as a science is when they ask positive questions, i.e. questions about how the economy 
actually works. But economists are also concerned with policy-making. The primary 
methodological objective for those who devise policy is to achieve as much alignment 
between positive economics and normative economics, the latter being judgements 
about what should be rather than what is. 
 
There is a strong chance that economics will never achieve the status of a natural 
science, rigorously employing empirical investigative methods to accept or reject 
theories. Some might argue that economics is almost an exact science alongside, say, 
physics: both use speculation, observation and experiment to explain aspects of the 
world. However, physics wins out against economics as it has identified „objective‟ 
laws, something that still eludes economists. There have been attempts to establish 
greater objectivity in economics, an example being Kaldor‟s „stylised facts‟ in relation 
to growth theory. Perhaps more controversially, at least from a methodological point 
 13 
of view, is Friedman‟s (1953) claim that a solid economic theory is one which makes 
good predictions and that the realism of any assumptions underlying these theories 
should only be of secondary importance. Of course, there are those who might hold 
that the chance of making good predictions is directly correlated with the presence of 
realistic assumptions. However, this is not a matter for this thesis. What we can at 
least say here is that if the likelihood of the discovery of objective laws is directly 
related to the time a particular discipline has been in existence, the chances of such 
laws being found in economics would appear to have already receded to zero. 
Economics may, after all, have to settle for being a moral science. 
 
iii. The two links noted above are important insofar as they have encouraged debate 
within and between economics and the sciences. Recent efforts specifically aimed at 
bringing the history of economic theory and the history of science closer together 
have concentrated on actual intellectual crossovers. Weintraub (1992: 185) states that: 
„The two subdisciplines, each somewhat marginalized within their respective larger 
scholarly communities of historians and economists, are beginning to meet in journal 
issues, cross-citations, and conferences.‟ At a sociological and philosophical level, 
Schabas (1992: 198-199) adds that this merging process constitutes an important step 
in the Comtean-style evolution of the history of science literature: dedicated research 
in the field began in the 1950s with work on the history of the exact sciences, 
followed by a focus on the history of chemistry. The history of biology became a 
distinct discipline in the second half of the 1960s, followed by a greater interest in 
evolutionary theory in the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, the 1980s saw the emergence of 
the history of the social sciences.
10
 The work of Philip Mirowski, among others, can 
be viewed as part of this last trend. In discussing the marginalist revolution of the 
1870s, Mirowski (1984: 364) notes the „unity of technique [between] physics and 
economics‟, but also argues that economics suffers from „physics envy‟ (see 
Mirowski 1989). 
                                                 
10
 If the case for historians of economic theory to make greater use of the methods employed by 
historians of science is accepted, then the application of research school analysis to the history of 
economic theory can also be seen as a valuable addition to the recent increase in interest in 
“interdisciplinary” studies. As Weingart and Stehr (2000: xi-xii) point out: „Observers note a growing 
pluralism both in the locations of knowledge production and in the patterns of initiation, production, 
and use of knowledge as well as its disciplinary combinations.‟ 
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Mirowski was not the first to argue the case for a close link between economics and 
physics: Osiatynski (1999: 262) notes how Kalecki believed that „economic laws 
could be formulated similar to laws in thermodynamics‟ and that, in the late 1920s 
and early 1930s, Ragnar Frisch „sought general analogies between economics and 
physics‟ (ibid.). However, with the contents of economics journals looking 
increasingly like exercises in pure mathematics, a more accurate view is that of 
Hodgson (2001: 5), who asserts that economics „suffers perhaps more from 
mathematics envy rather than physics envy.‟ 
 
Section 3B. Research School Analysis 
 
The lineage of the research school literature is an important one. As Schabas (2002: 
210) notes, the study of the history of science up to the 1970s was characterised by an 
internalist approach. The subsequent abandonment of internalism, however, brought 
with it the disadvantage of largely ignoring the content of scientific theories, although 
a simultaneous recognition of the importance of institutional factors, as exemplified 
by research school analysis, was one of the more useful outcomes of this shift in 
focus. Another rebalancing then took place which synthesised the earlier emphasis on 
scientific theory with broader explanations from the social sciences – notably 
sociology and philosophy – as to why the sciences have developed as they have. 
 
i. Research School Analysis: Morrell and Geison 
 
The use of the word “school” to describe collective research has a long history. Servos 
(1993: 5) points out that, „Among those scientists and observers of science who used 
the term school in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, none was fonder of it 
than…Scottish polymath John Theodore Merz. His History of European Thought in 
the Nineteenth Century…deploys the term promiscuously.‟ Prior to Morrell, little 
attempt was made to systematically study research schools, surprising given the 
growth in their popularity in 19th century science. 
 
At a broader level, the study of research schools is surely a worthwhile endeavour as 
it teaches us that the work produced by such collectives generally has „a better chance 
of surviving and flourishing in the crowded environment of modern intellectual life 
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than do the ideas put forth by individual “mutant” scientists, whether cranks or 
geniuses‟ (Geison 1993: 234). Moreover, „some research schools are bound to lose 
out in competition with others. The point…is to identify which factors are responsible 
– and to what extent – for these differential outcomes‟ (ibid.). Enter Morrell. 
 
Morrell‟s opening remark in Section 1 of his 1972 groundbreaking paper on research 
schools sets the scene for what is to come: „In trying to postulate and analyse the most 
propitious conditions under which a laboratory-based research school could flourish 
in the first half of the nineteenth century, we must clearly take account of the chief 
elements of such an on-going [sic] enterprise whether they were intellectual, 
institutional, technical, psychological, or financial‟ (Morrell 1972: 3). The 
methodological approach adopted by Morrell is a simple one: he uses relevant 
evidence to compare the chemistry schools created by Justus von Liebig at the 
University of Giessen and Thomas Thomson at the University of Glasgow. Utilising a 
mixture of factors, Morrell is able to provide a convincing explanation as to why 
Liebig‟s school succeeded and Thomson‟s failed. 
 
Morrell‟s work was made more formal and extended by Geison (1981). Geison 
identified a set of 14 criteria which he then applied to nine different research schools, 
including Liebig‟s and Thomson‟s, but also Michael Foster‟s school of physiology at 
Cambridge in the late 19th and early 20th centuries and Enrico Fermi‟s school of 
nuclear physics at Rome, which existed from the mid-1920s to the mid-1930s. As 
Geison argues, Morrell‟s work did not represent a finely tuned „model‟ for the 
assessment of schools. However, it was the case that it could be „quite easily 
converted into a sort of checklist of factors‟ (ibid., 26) for such an assessment. The 
result is that Geison is able to demonstrate that the relative success or failure of a 
school can be approximated by how many of the 14 criteria it fulfils, with a school 
meeting all 14 criteria classified as “ideal”. (For reasons of readability, the 14 criteria 
are listed in the opening part of Section 4.) 
 
ii. Research School Analysis since Morrell and Geison 
 
The research school literature has been significantly expanded and strengthened since 
Morrell-Geison. Morrell (1993: 124) himself has described surprise at the fact that his 
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original article has secured a reputation „as one of the most influential publications in 
history of science in the last twenty years.‟ The surprise should not be so great: his 
1972 paper provided a means of deciphering the history of science in a way that was 
„historically sensitive and eminently teachable‟ (Servos 1993: 9) whilst also 
presenting rich pickings as it implied numerous avenues for further research. 
 
One such avenue has been a focus on how the term “school” should itself be defined 
and deployed. Broadly speaking, a school can mean one of two things, identified by 
Rocke (1993: 77) as the institutional type or the cognitive type of school. Research in 
an institutional school is carried out in a locality, usually a university department. All 
the workers know each other and regularly interact. Conversely, cognitive schools are 
characterised by workers who support the school‟s research programme but are 
geographically dispersed; the scope for interaction is naturally much lower than in an 
institutional-type school. 
 
We will see when we look at some of the Morrell-Geison criteria – for example, 
„Leader with institutional power‟ – that the distinction between institutional and 
cognitive schools is a useful one regarding the Keynesian Revolution as Keynes 
enjoyed the benefits of both types in the 1930s and 1940s: his institutional school was 
based at Cambridge, England, while his cognitive school encompassed important 
centres of support at both the LSE and Oxford in Britain as well as in the United 
States (especially at Harvard) and Canada. Hayek, on the other hand, only ever had 
the very limited initial support (if that) of an institutional school at the LSE, while 
Kalecki had neither an institutional school nor a cognitive school. In spite of Geison‟s 
(1993: 230) claim that „such close attention to matters of terminology can become an 
obsession‟, the obsession can sometimes yield meaningful results. 
 
Another terminological debate revolves around the use of “research school” to 
describe small collectives of research. Some historians of science, notably Fruton 
(1990: 1-2), prefer the term “research group” on the grounds that “research school” is 
often used to describe a group of scientists geographically dispersed but driven by a 
common research interest. Thus, according to Rocke‟s categorisation noted 
previously, Fruton‟s focus is more on cognitive schools. In operational terms, it seems 
to make little difference whether we employ “research school” or “research group” to 
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describe what we are interested in as the criteria identified by Morrell-Geison are 
sufficiently all-encompassing and malleable to largely preclude the possibility of any 
other major criteria from being ignored or forgotten. That said, there are some areas 
which, although not specifically relevant to the case studies considered by Morrell-
Geison, are identified in this study as being important in explaining the Keynesian 
Revolution, Keynes‟s influence at the political level being one of these. 
 
The relative importance of the 14 criteria outlined by Geison is a further point of 
interest. Geison (1981: 24) simply lists each criterion, starting with „„Charismatic‟ 
leader(s)‟ and ending with „Adequate financial support‟, with no attempt being made 
at a ranking. However, it is clear that some factors are more important than others. 
Geison himself has subsequently acknowledged that a school‟s leader plays a key role 
in determining its success: „When a research school is led by a talented, effective, and 
charismatic individual…“institutional” advantages are vastly more likely to come its 
way‟ (Geison 1993: 235). Conversely, the absence of such a leader dramatically 
reduces the chances of success. Keynes‟s magnetic personality played an important 
part in his triumph, but it was by no means the only factor at work. Discipleship also 
played a decisive role. The general point is that while charismatic leadership will 
more often than not play a leading role in influencing the performance of research 
schools, it may sometimes be difficult to predict which of the other criteria will be 
important in determining success or failure. 
 
On a penultimate note, Morrell‟s original study was concerned chiefly with 
laboratory-based research schools. Subsequent investigations have, however, also 
focused on schools which operate outside the confines of the laboratory. As part proof 
of this, a major review of the state of research school analysis published in the journal 
Osiris in 1993 contained three detailed case studies of non-laboratory-based schools. 
Furthermore, one of the most notable investigations into research schools post-Morrell 
– Secord‟s (1986) analysis of the British Geological Survey in the mid-19th century – 
is set outside the laboratory. 
 
A final aspect of research school analysis not considered by Morrell but which has 
been a welcome subsequent addition to the literature is an emphasis on the 
characteristics of the students or workers around a leader. For instance, Hagen (1993: 
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178-179) explains that, „In the abstract an ideal student must be sufficiently 
independent to nurture and develop the leader‟s nascent ideas. By doing so the student 
expands the scope of the research program, perhaps extending it into areas that the 
leader never imagined at the outset.‟ Here again, there is some relevance to the 
Keynesian case, Joan Robinson, in particular, meeting many of the characteristics of 
the “ideal student”, even though Keynes had a closer intellectual relationship with 
Richard Kahn. 
 
 
Section 4. Research School Analysis: Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki 
 
Having established the pedigree of the research school literature, we now turn to our 
main focus of attention. Our primary objective here is to consider the Keynesian 
Revolution within the framework of the Morrell-Geison criteria and to show that they 
do, in fact, provide a coherent explanation of that revolution. As part of this, we will 
also examine to what extent Marshall – again from the viewpoint of the Morrell-
Geison criteria – laid the groundwork for Keynes‟s success. Our other main goal will 
be to assess the work and careers of Hayek and Kalecki in the years prior to and after 
the publication of the General Theory. (As a cautionary note, Kalecki‟s early career in 
Poland has not been well documented. A number of useful observations can still be 
made about his life and work during this period, but they are necessarily more limited 
than those relating to Keynes, Marshall and Hayek.) 
 
We will proceed as follows. Immediately below are the 14 criteria identified by 
Geison as a result of his and Morrell‟s work on research schools. Each criterion will 
be considered in turn: To begin with, there will be a short explanation of the criterion 
being examined. This is followed by an examination of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and 
Kalecki respectively within the context of that criterion. Concluding each criterion 
will be a short summary drawing out the main aspects and results of the preceding 
discussion. 
 
The 14 criteria cited by Geison (1981: 24) as determining the success or failure of 
research schools are as follows: 
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i. „Charismatic‟ leader(s) 
ii. Leader with research reputation 
iii. „Informal‟ setting and leadership style 
iv. Leader with institutional power 
v. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, „discipleship‟ 
vi. Focused research program 
vii. Simple and rapidly exploitable experimental techniques 
viii. Invasion of new field of research 
ix. Pool of potential recruits (graduate students) 
x. Access to or control of publication outlets 
xi. Students publish early under own names 
xii. Produced and „placed‟ significant number of students 
xiii. Institutionalization in university setting 
xiv. Adequate financial support 
 
 
i. ‘Charismatic’ leader(s) 
 
„The creation, maintainance and growth of [a] school‟s loyalty, 
cohesion and confidence [depends]…on the director‟s charismatic 
powers, which at best [reinforce] his institutional power‟ (Morrell 
1972: 6). 
 
As well as the above, Morrell also notes how a charismatic leader is able to attract a 
large number of high-quality students which, in turn, increases the chances of a 
research school becoming self-sustaining. Once part of the school, students often 
display fanatical devotion to the leader, especially during times of intellectual 
disappointment. This helps to reinforce the school‟s identity and cements the teacher-
pupil relationship when the teacher successfully leads his pupils into areas of 
intellectual endeavour not previously explored. 
 
On a more abstract note, it remains the case that charisma is a notoriously slippery 
concept. Despite attempts to define it (see, in particular, Weber 1947 [1922]), „Few 
personality traits are more resistant to precise definition than is charisma. To be 
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charismatic is to possess some mysterious attribute that provides the foundation of 
exceptional influence, whether that influence is exerted in intimate interpersonal 
contacts or before immense crowds of people‟ (Simonton 1984: 121). Charisma 
therefore appears to be one of those personality traits which it is hard to describe, but 
which is nevertheless recognisable when we come across it.
11
 
 
Keynes: 
 
Although Keynes‟s various personality faults – most notably, his intellectual 
arrogance, particularly in the early years of his career, and his snobbishness – are 
known about, there is little doubt that he possessed charisma. Keynes had a broadly 
benign approach when dealing with students and members of the Circus. His attitude 
towards colleagues was, however, often more combative, reflecting his view that they 
“should know better.” Even though it would be difficult to disagree with Klein‟s 
(1966: 224) point that, „The dramatic weight of Keynes‟ personality undoubtedly 
added much to the speedy acceptance of [the General Theory]‟, it is clear that he was 
not always sweetness and light. Among his supposed friends, Leonard Woolf „did not 
really like him‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 708) while Woolf‟s wife, Virginia, was „constantly 
critical of JMK, and his relationship with Lydia [Lopokova], in her diary‟ (ibid.). The 
joint opinion of the Woolfs was that although Keynes had a „brilliant, even great, 
mind‟, he was of „bad character – selfish, domineering, unreflective‟ (ibid.). 
 
It was not only Keynes‟s friends who found fault. Subsequent observers have noted 
his less engaging side. Harry Johnson (1972: 419) describes thus Keynes‟s approach 
to financial negotiations with the United States shortly after his appointment as head 
of the newly formed „A‟ Division at the Treasury in early 1917: „[H]is haughtiness 
and impatience toward the Americans, which sometimes had to be restrained by his 
official and political seniors, gave him a reputation for rudeness that made him less 
effective than he might have been‟, a reflection of Keynes‟s belief that „he was always 
right‟ (E. Johnson 1974: 100). At the same time, this „haughtiness and impatience‟ 
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 For an interesting attempt to examine the role played by charisma in the advancement of science, 
Thorpe and Shapin (2000) looks at how J. Robert Oppenheimer‟s charisma was brought to bear on the 
Manhattan Project. 
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does not, for the most part, seem to have carried over into Keynes‟s dealings with 
students after the war. For example, we have Austin Robinson‟s portrayal of Keynes‟s 
behaviour in the Political Economy Club around 1919-1920: „It would be easy to say 
that Keynes dominated those meetings. But I think that would be wrong, or at least 
very much too simple. It was never impossible for us undergraduates to argue with 
him. He did not lay down the law and frighten us into agreeing with him… If he 
dominated us, it was in quite a different way. We gradually came to see things very 
much as he would see them…‟ (A. Robinson 1975: 10). What is apparent here is 
Keynes‟s awareness, even at this early stage of his career, of the importance of 
building a following amongst the student population, an awareness that would pay off 
in later years. Moreover, Robinson has argued that Keynes „seemed to mellow over 
the later twenties‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 28). His marriage to Lydia in 1925 
undoubtedly played a part in this mellowing process and also helped to release the 
„energies of a truly creative original thinker/genius‟ (Harcourt and Turnell 2005: 
4,933). It is also worth noting that this softening in Keynes‟s personality occurred 
before he started to interact with the Circus. This was in stark contrast to A Treatise 
on Money, which was more or less „composed in solitude‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 282) from 
1924 to 1930. Two of Keynes‟s strongest critics, Robertson and Hawtrey, spent 
significant periods away from Cambridge during the 1920s; moreover, in contrast to 
the 1930s, Keynes had „no graduate students able or willing to engage with him on 
points of theory‟ (ibid.) whilst he was writing the Treatise. 
 
Even if Keynes had an exceptionally powerful personality, he was not always able to 
convince his colleagues that his thoughts and ideas were correct. He would often fail 
to win the day when arguing intellectual points with Pigou and Hawtrey, even if 
Pigou, for one, did eventually acknowledge the importance of Keynes‟s contribution 
(see Pigou 1950). However, it was the breakdown of Keynes‟s relationship with 
Dennis Robertson which was the most telling instance of personality failing to 
succeed where pure brain power had failed. Despite his absences from Cambridge, 
Robertson was Keynes‟s main intellectual stimulus during the 1920s and thereby 
became the keeper of Keynes‟s conscience when it came to economics. Having been 
the first person outside of Keynes‟s immediate circle to receive the proofs of the 
General Theory in 1935, Robertson broadly rejected its ideas, regarding them as an 
explanation only of a one-off slump and not a „general‟ theory of macroeconomics. 
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Robertson was also „extremely confused as to Keynes‟s definitions of terms, making 
much heavier weather of the problems in Keynes‟s draft than would a sympathetic 
critic‟ (Moggridge 1973: 84). These disagreements led to a souring of the friendship 
between the two men, even though in later years, Keynes was still generous towards 
Robertson, commenting that, „It was an absolute blessing to have one person [at 
Bretton Woods] with a completely first-class mind‟ (Keynes in A. Robinson 1975: 
14). Further reflecting his respect for Robertson, Keynes had stood aside in 1944 to 
allow Robertson to be elected as Pigou‟s successor as Professor of Political Economy 
at Cambridge (see Moggridge 1992: 603). 
 
Keynes liked high standards and, in contrast to popular perceptions, he possessed a 
marked degree of self-doubt regarding his own work. Kahn (1978: 550) writes: 
„Keynes was not a man who easily got worried or lacked confidence in himself. But 
without allowing his spirits, which were normally buoyant, to be affected, he was at 
no stage satisfied with his accomplishment.‟ Part confirmation of this was Keynes‟s 
view that A Treatise on Money was an „artistic failure‟, while in a reply to a letter 
from Joan Robinson shortly before the completion of the General Theory, Keynes 
stated that he felt that he had „not been worthy of [his] task‟ (ibid.). Notwithstanding 
all of this, Keynes never seemed to have had qualms about publishing, realising that 
the sooner he got his ideas into print, the more likely that they would be discussed 
and, where appropriate, modified, often by Keynes himself. Keynes and Marshall 
could not have been further apart in this respect, Marshall‟s procrastination in 
publishing probably costing him an even greater reputation than the one he actually 
secured. 
 
Despite his inherent self-confidence, Keynes was not averse to calling on others when 
he needed intellectual assistance, somewhat contradicting Elizabeth Johnson‟s view 
that Keynes thought that „he was always right‟. First of all there was Keynes‟s 
relationship with the Circus, and we shall examine this in more detail later on. Then 
there were those more specific examples which highlighted Keynes‟s weaknesses in 
certain areas. To take one of these, in the following extract we find him writing to his 
brilliant Cambridge colleague, Frank Ramsey, in which he displays his limitations as 
a mathematician, despite the fact that he had once been a Wrangler: „The point about 
Maxwell I find more difficult. If he can deduce his result without assuming that F(v) 
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is the probability of v, but some unknown function, then I have certainly 
misunderstood him. But I have not got Bertrand [Russell] here, and must wait until I 
get to Cambridge to look it up. In the meantime, could you tell me how from 
Q(x)Q(y)Q(z)=F(v) you deduce Q(x)=be
-K2 x2
 (Keynes to Ramsey, 1 February 1922, 
Keynes Papers (hereafter JMKP) (King‟s College, Cambridge) TP/1/1/98).12 
 
On a penultimate note, the evidence documenting the beguiling effect of Keynes‟s 
personality is plentiful. Most telling in this respect are the views of Keynes‟s 
intellectual opponents, not least Hayek. In spite of their academic rivalry, the two men 
remained on good personal terms, much of which, it has to be said, was the result of 
Keynes‟s generosity of spirit: he helped Hayek to find a house in Cambridge during 
the Second World War and supported his election to the British Academy. For his 
part, Hayek was in no doubt as to the strength of Keynes‟s personality and the part it 
played in delivering the Keynesian Revolution: „[T]he magnitude of [Keynes‟s] 
influence as an economist is probably at least as much due to the impressiveness of 
the man, the universality of his interests, and the power and persuasive charm of his 
personality as to the originality or theoretical soundness of his contribution to 
economics. He owed his success largely to a rare combination of brilliance and 
quickness of mind with a mastery of the English language in which few 
contemporaries could rival him‟ (Hayek in Caldwell 1995: 227-228). Hayek was also 
fond of saying how Keynes‟s voice was „bewitching‟ and „musical‟ and how people 
became „enchanted by merely listening to his words‟ (Hayek in Kresge and Wenar 
1994: 92). 
 
Other economists were not immune to Keynes‟s magnetism. Of these, Schumpeter‟s 
(1946: 504) comments are interesting as he hints at the fact that even though Keynes 
could be abrasive, he was also courteous and gave the overwhelming impression of a 
warm, gregarious individual: „He was affectionate. He was always ready to enter with 
friendly zest into the views, interests, and troubles of others. He was generous, and 
not only with money. He was sociable, enjoyed conversation, and shone in it. And, 
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friendship between the two men and Ramsey‟s reputation as was one of the most intellectually gifted 
individuals of his generation. In a life spanning just 26 years, he made important contributions to 
mathematics, economics, and philosophy. 
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contrary to a widely spread opinion, he could be polite, polite with an old-world 
punctilio that costs time.‟ 
 
The power of Keynes‟s personality grew over the years, extending to his work as 
Britain‟s chief representative during financial negotiations with the United States in 
the latter part of the Second World War, this despite increasing problems with his 
health. An extract from the diary kept by Robbins at Bretton Woods provides us with 
an almost poetic vision of Keynes in action: „Keynes was in his most persuasive 
mood; and the effect was irresistible. At such moments I often find myself thinking 
that [he] must be one of the most remarkable men that has ever lived – the quick 
logic, the birdlike swoop of intuition, the vivid fancy, the wide vision, above all the 
incomparable sense of the fitness of words, all combine to make something several 
degrees beyond the limit of ordinary human achievement‟ (Robbins in M. Keynes 
1975: xiv). These words are impressive enough but become even more so when we 
remember that Robbins had a history of tensions with Keynes, including quarrels in 
the early 1930s over free trade on the Economic Advisory Council‟s (EAC) 
Committee of Economists. What is more, Robbins‟s opinion of Keynes did not seem 
to be diminished by the passage of time. In his 1971 autobiography, Robbins, like 
Hayek, noted the irresistible „cadences of [Keynes‟s] voice‟ and the „life-enhancing 
quality of his presence‟ (Robbins 1971: 193). 
 
Part of Keynes‟s attractiveness lay in the inherent optimism which underpinned his 
work. Most strikingly, the General Theory argued that governments need not be 
helpless in the face of downturns and that economic policy could be pro-actively used 
to induce a recovery. Even after the tumult of the Second World War, Keynes was 
confident that the ravaged British economy could quickly get back on its feet (albeit 
with the help of American and Canadian money). This would be followed by a 
„golden age‟, characterised by „increased leisure, more holidays (which are a 
wonderfully good way of getting rid of money) and shorter hours‟ (Keynes in CW 
XXVII: 323). Even if the future was uncertain, Keynes maintained, „the best policy is 
to act on the optimistic hypothesis until it has been proved wrong‟ (ibid., 446). 
 
Finally, on a more light-hearted theme, Keynes had a mischievous side to his 
character – witness his 1905 remark to Lytton Strachey that he would like to „swindle 
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the investing public‟ – and was not averse to poking fun at others, this sometimes 
turning into personal attacks à la Bloomsbury. For example, in a January 1919 note to 
Sir John Bradbury, the Joint Permanent Secretary at the Treasury, Keynes wrote: „The 
blockade on fats to neutral countries is being raised and Germany is to receive fat 
supplies on a very generous scale… [T]he underlying motive of the whole thing is Mr. 
Hoover‟s [US president 1929-33] abundant stocks of low-grade pig products at high 
prices which must at all costs be unloaded on someone… When Mr. Hoover sleeps at 
night visions of pigs float across his bedclothes…‟ (Keynes to Bradbury, 14 January 
1919, JMKP RT/1/39-40). Here then, we get a foretaste of what was to come just a 
few months later with the publication of the Economic Consequences, where Keynes 
was at his ridiculing best in his portrayals of the Allied chiefs at the Paris Peace 
Conference. 
 
Keynes‟s charisma is not in dispute. What is perhaps more difficult to pin down is 
what Keynes thought of himself. One of the more melancholic descriptions we have 
in this respect is that of Keynes‟s biographer, Robert Skidelsky. He argues that there 
was „a lot of self-hate in Keynes. He was not a man at peace…and rather than be 
alone with himself, he preferred any stage, any occupation, however trivial. I have a 
vivid image, to my mind very sad, of the great and fascinating Keynes sitting alone in 
the King‟s College Combination Room playing patience, night after night, often until 
past midnight, „very much bored and unable to stop‟ as he himself described it‟ 
(Skidelsky 1988: 159). This depiction of Keynes constantly in search of stimulation 
certainly rings true with his habit of changing his mind over important issues and 
always wanting to rewrite his latest theoretical offering. If we accept that Keynes did 
not indeed like certain aspects of his personality, the suggestion that he worked 
incessantly as a means of distraction does not seem to be too far-fetched. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Alfred Marshall was a different personality from Maynard Keynes, the differences 
between the doyen of British economics and his most famous pupil being greater than 
the similarities. A key focus of Marshall‟s life was to establish economics as a subject 
worthy of serious study. Given some of his personal characteristics, the success he 
attained in this process of professionalisation might come as something of a surprise. 
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According to Keynes (1924: 345) in his obituary of Marshall, „Economics all over the 
world might have progressed much faster and Marshall‟s authority and influence 
would have been far greater, if his temperament had been a little different.‟ What 
Keynes was referring to was first, Marshall‟s tendency, as we have already noted, to 
delay the publication of his work – the late appearance of his theory of money was the 
most notable manifestation of this – and second, his dislike of controversy. This latter 
aspect did not have much impact on Marshall‟s influence at Cambridge, but it did 
mean that he had a much lower public profile than might otherwise have been the 
case. This, his associated desire to please and a „rather disdainful hauteur‟ (Maloney 
1985: 51), meant that his influence on the public mood was sometimes blunted when 
he was asked for his view on important issues, such as free trade. 
 
One of the best examples of Marshall‟s desire to avoid confrontation is to be found in 
his response to comments made by reviewers of the first edition of his magnum opus, 
the Principles of Economics (Marshall 1890). Maloney (ibid.) makes the point that it 
must have been hard to take on a man who could write: „I can only express briefly my 
thanks for the goodwill, fairness and generosity of interpretation of those who on the 
whole condemned the book (as well as of those who on the whole approved it).‟ It has 
been suggested that Marshall „might have found controversy irresistible‟ (Collard 
1990: 167) had he been in his prime in the 1920s, a time, much like the 1930s, when 
economics was having some fierce internal debates. This is a valid point, although 
what might have been more interesting would have been Marshall‟s reaction to the 
Keynesian Revolution and how he would have dealt with Keynes‟s attack on classical 
theory, especially the ideas of Pigou – Keynes‟s straw man13 – whom Marshall 
thought very highly of. Unfortunately, Marshall‟s death in 1924 precluded this 
possibility. 
 
Even though he did not possess Keynes‟s magnetism, it would be wrong to categorise 
Marshall as a shy and retiring academic. Maloney (ibid., 24) draws on Weber‟s (1947) 
[1922] concept of the routinisation of charisma as an important part of the 
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 Ambrosi (2003) convincingly shows that, contrary to common belief, Keynes‟s attack on Pigou was 
not an unfair one (see also Harcourt 2006b) and that Keynes was correct when he claimed that it was 
his theory which was the general case while classical theory was only a special case. 
 27 
professionalisation process to suggest that historians of economic theory should 
„never [be] in a moment‟s doubt as to whose charisma stood to be routinised‟ in late 
19th century economics, i.e. Marshall‟s. Even if this is probably an exaggeration of 
the positive features of Marshall‟s personality – in the charisma stakes, he was not in 
the same league as either Arnold Toynbee or T.H. Green, his contemporaries at 
Oxford who „won the hearts as well as the minds of a generation of undergraduates‟ 
(Coats 1993: 109) – it was still very much the case that without Marshall‟s drive in 
establishing the Economics and Politics Tripos at Cambridge and his optimism as to 
the uses to which economics could be put, it would have been far more difficult, as we 
will see, for Keynes to have achieved his own success. 
 
As with Keynes, Marshall had differing relations with his colleagues on the one hand 
and his students on the other. With regard to his peers, Marshall‟s personality is seen 
at its worst. In fact, his „talent for generating antagonism among his contemporaries 
[was] remarkable. [John Neville] Keynes, Cannan, Nicholson (and latterly) Foxwell – 
four economists all of whom to varying degrees aligned themselves with Marshall‟s 
conception of what economics was, and should do – [adopted], respectively, notes of 
boredom, hostility, condescension and bitterness towards Marshall the man‟ (Maloney 
ibid., 65). One instance of this was Cannan telling C.R. Fay, one of Marshall‟s 
favourite pupils, that „I‟ll show up Marshall before I‟ve done‟ (Cannan in ibid., 72). 
Meanwhile, Nicholson‟s view of Marshall as condescending was driven to some 
extent by Marshall‟s tendency to moralise in his writings. Levitt (1976: 435) goes as 
far to say that „Marshall unhesitatingly intruded normative and moral prescripts into 
his discussion… [T]hey show again that Marshall, each time he faced an 
impasse…was forced, and had no hesitation in returning, to strictly personal 
judgments of moral rightness and social oughtness.‟ 
 
The evidence from Marshall‟s relationship with Neville Keynes is particularly 
damning. Marshall regarded Maynard Keynes‟s father as „one of the two or three best 
students he had ever had‟ (Skidelsky 1983: 13). However, these generous feelings 
were not reciprocated. Neville Keynes was irritated by Marshall‟s attempts to 
persuade him to move to Oxford, no doubt suspecting that Marshall hoped that, once 
there, Keynes would propagate the Marshallian gospel. Keynes was also disturbed by 
Marshall‟s shenanigans in administering economics at Cambridge: „No careful reader 
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of Keynes‟ diaries can fail to conclude that he disliked Marshall as much as Marshall 
liked him. Irritation with Marshall‟s behaviour on committees is a constant theme‟ 
(Maloney ibid., 64), Keynes describing Marshall as „a dreadful bore‟, „exceedingly 
irrelevant‟ and „the most exasperating talker I know‟ (J.N. Keynes 1894, 1899). As 
hinted at above, Marshall was also a „schemer who relentlessly pressured his disciples 
to structure their careers and plan their lectures in ways that would promote the new 
economics that he aspired to develop‟ (Deane 2001: 231). At the same time, he must 
have been aware that he could get away with such behaviour given his unrivalled 
prowess in theoretical economics, a situation which held true in the final decades of 
the 19th century and for the first two decades of the 20th. No other economist from 
this period had the competence to seriously question him. 
 
If Maynard Keynes‟s recollections are anything to go by, Marshall‟s relations with his 
pupils were somewhat better than those with his colleagues. Granted, Keynes (1924: 
366) states that, „It must not be supposed that Marshall was undiscriminating towards 
his pupils. He was highly critical and even sharp-tongued.‟ But Keynes adds that 
Marshall „managed to be encouraging‟ (ibid.) and was to his pupils „a true sage and 
master, outside criticism, one who was their father in the spirit and who gave them 
such inspiration and comfort as they drew from no other source‟ (ibid., 365). Sadly, as 
we shall see, it seems that Marshall‟s interest in his pupils only stretched to the male 
of the species, his derogatory attitude towards women being well documented (see 
McWilliams-Tullberg 1975, e.g. 125). 
 
Hayek: 
 
Hayek is again different from both Keynes and Marshall. Hayek‟s was a complex 
personality, which Caldwell (1998: 567) has described as „formal and reserved‟ but 
„hiding many layers beneath‟ (ibid.). Milton Friedman confirms this view: „[Hayek] 
was by no means a simple person. He was very outgoing in one sense but at the same 
time I would say very private. He did not like criticism, but he never showed that he 
didn‟t like criticism‟ (Friedman in Ebenstein 2001: 269). One is minded to recall here 
the quote from Austin Robinson above where he mentions that, „It was never 
impossible for us undergraduates to argue with [Keynes]‟: it remains an open question 
what Hayek thought of those undergraduates who may have had the temerity to 
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question his authority. Another clue to Hayek‟s personality is to be found in his 
writing. While Keynes maintained that words should be a little “wild”, Hayek‟s 
approach was more reserved. Thus, Schumpeter described The Road to Serfdom as „a 
polite book that hardly ever attributes to opponents anything beyond intellectual error‟ 
(Schumpeter in Harcourt 1984: 491). The similarity here between Hayek and Marshall 
is notable and is arguably an instance of taking the concept of academic gentlemanly 
conduct too far; one can certainly never imagine Keynes adopting such a tone. 
Besides, Keynes‟s published work did not have the inherently pessimistic feel which 
often features in Hayek. For instance, reviewing one of Hayek‟s later works, Law, 
Legislation and Liberty, Gordon (1981: 486-487) remarks that, „There is a heaviness 
of spirit which pervades [Hayek‟s] writings, not merely because his style is devoid of 
grace or wit or because of his pessimism concerning western civilization, but because 
his own ideal society wears a grim-God aspect.‟ Given the noble causes that Hayek 
stood for and amply displayed in his writing – perhaps most famously in The Road to 
Serfdom – pessimistic interpretations of his work are unfortunate, but, nevertheless, 
justified. 
 
On a different note, Hayek‟s former LSE student, George Shackle, once described 
him as „aristocratic in temper and origins; physically, morally and intellectually 
fearless‟ (Shackle in Ebenstein 2001: 284-285). Hayek‟s time as a soldier in the First 
World War goes some way to account for his physical fearlessness, and, possibly, his 
moral and intellectual courageousness. This last feature of Hayek‟s personality may 
also help to explain his bravery – or arrogance? – when he so harshly attacked 
Keynes‟s A Treatise on Money. But there were other, more obvious reasons: Hayek 
saw an opportunity to take on arguably the world‟s most famous economist in the 
hope of strengthening the credibility of his own theories. Moreover, it should be 
remembered that Hayek was still a relatively young man when he first went up against 
Keynes, his intellectual daring also being reflected in the private correspondence he 
had with Keynes concerning the Treatise. 
 
Meanwhile, Hayek‟s relations with his colleagues at the LSE may have started off 
well only to gradually worsen. The existing staff must have been pleased with 
Hayek‟s arrival in 1931 as he gave the Department of Economics a chance to shine 
rather than having to constantly live in Cambridge‟s shadow; the popularity amongst 
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both staff and students of the four lectures that Hayek delivered in the last week of 
January 1931 and which helped him secure the Tooke Professorship were an early 
testament to this. But despite his undoubted talents as an economist, Hayek‟s often 
domineering personality was instrumental in alienating his colleagues. Given this and 
the difficulty that many had in understanding his convoluted theories, it becomes easy 
to see why the other participants in the „Robbins-Hayek‟ Seminar may have been put 
off by Hayek. A microcosm of this was Nicholas Kaldor‟s strained relations with 
Hayek, Kaldor describing how Hayek became „frightfully annoyed with [him]. At first 
he was terribly for me. But then when I discovered he was so silly I sort of teased 
him, made him look ridiculous, contradicted him in seminars‟ (Kaldor in ibid., 63). It 
is difficult to imagine Keynes being subjected to the same kind of treatment at 
Cambridge – or anywhere else for that matter – as that dished out by Kaldor to Hayek. 
As will become clear later on, some of the students at the LSE were also less than 
complimentary about Hayek. 
 
Despite Hayek‟s dominance of the seminar that he and Robbins presided over, any 
leadership credentials that can be (generously) assigned to him were more a reflection 
of the intrinsic sophistication of his theories – when they were understood – as 
opposed to his ability to persuade others through the power of personality. In fact, it 
was Robbins who was the charismatic leader amongst the LSE economists: „It was 
inevitable that those of us who were fortunate to have been among his [Robbins‟s] 
first pupils – and there were barely a dozen of us then specialising at LSE in the 
subject of “analytical economics” – should fall completely under his spell (Kaldor 
1986: 4). But despite the strength of his own personality, Robbins failed to assert 
intellectual leadership at the LSE, to a certain extent due to the fact that, by his own 
admission, he made „no outstanding intellectual discoveries‟ (Robbins 1971: 11). 
 
Clearly, the ideal combination of intellectual originality and personal charisma which 
seem to play a key role in determining a leader‟s influence and, as a result, a research 
school‟s success or failure, were split at the LSE between Hayek and Robbins 
respectively. The combination of these two characteristics in a single individual – be 
it Hayek, Robbins, or anyone else in the Economics Department at the School – 
would have made the clash between London and Cambridge much more interesting 
and equal. 
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Kalecki: 
 
The evidence relating to Kalecki‟s personality paints a strong picture of integrity 
combined with a streak of terseness; charisma is not a predominant feature. Kalecki is 
often presented as a role model of academic uprightness, a man who sacrificed a 
number of promising career opportunities for the sake of taking a stand against 
governments and his other employers who had either treated him or his colleagues 
unfairly. Josef Steindl, who was Kalecki‟s friend for a number of years and one of his 
most important followers, has noted how Kalecki could be „quite uncompromising 
when his convictions were involved. Witness to this were the clashes with 
personalities and institutions which led to disruptions in his life and entailed heavy 
personal cost‟ (Steindl 1981: 595). 
 
Possibly the clearest demonstration of Kalecki‟s integrity was his silence after the 
publication of the General Theory about his own very strong claim of having 
discovered the essentials of the Keynesian system before Keynes. At the same time, 
we can try to explain the lack of acknowledgement afforded to Kalecki for his work 
on the cycle by citing Joan Robinson‟s (1966: 339) point that „the “Keynesian 
Revolution” in Western academic economics is rightly so called. For without Keynes‟ 
wide sweep, his brilliant polemic, and, above all, his position within the orthodox 
citadel, in which he was brought up, the walls of obscurantism would have taken 
much longer to break.‟ This is a powerful argument and one Kalecki himself 
recognised. Nevertheless, it seems that Keynes and his inner circle still have a case to 
answer regarding Kalecki‟s achievements. Bland (1976: 333) makes an accurate 
assessment, claiming that „Kalecki‟s reticence, and his acceptance that Keynes‟s name 
would “sell” [the new] ideas better than an unknown spinner‟s son from Lodz, 
contrasts with the failure of Keynes‟s clique to grant Kalecki any recognition at all in 
the Englishman‟s lifetime.‟14 
                                                 
14
 Although Keynes and Kalecki did not have any correspondence relating to the General Theory or 
Kalecki‟s early work on the cycle, Keynes did express irritation with Kalecki‟s unexplained 
assumptions, as Keynes saw them, in an article on technical progress submitted by Kalecki in early 
1941 for publication in the Economic Journal: the annoyance is seen in Keynes‟s correspondence with 
Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor after he had asked them for their opinions on the submission (see 
CW XII: 829-841). Keynes eventually rejected the piece and it appeared instead in the Review of 
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Personal integrity was to play an important part in Kalecki‟s and Keynes‟s respective 
careers, especially regarding the institutional power that each man was able to 
command. It was clear that Kalecki had „no wish to ingratiate himself with any of the 
powers that be‟ (Steindl ibid.) even though, it has to be said, a little ingratiation would 
probably have got him a long way. This contrasts with the young Keynes, whose 
behaviour in the period leading up to the First World War and in its opening months 
„present[s] him in a not altogether attractive light as a young man anxious to obtain an 
important job in wartime economic management and not too scrupulous about taking 
sides with the Treasury and the Bank of England against the commercial banks and 
the City of London to further his ambitions‟ (H. Johnson 1972: 418; see also CW 
XVI: 20). Keynes‟s association with the Treasury during this period was, of course, to 
provide the springboard for the later activities which helped to make him a household 
name. 
 
To a certain degree, Kalecki‟s less appealing personality traits overshadow his 
reputation for integrity. The views of Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa are instructive 
here. Granted, Cambridge cared enough about Kalecki to find him a job in the late 
1930s, whilst Keynes himself described Kalecki as “something of a genius”. On the 
other hand, Robinson (1977: 8) found that Kalecki „cared little for party manners or 
small talk and plunged directly into the subject.‟ Sraffa, on hearing Kalecki described 
as a difficult man, defined a difficult man as one who does not want to do what he is 
told to do (see Feiwel 1975: 16). 
 
In a somewhat similar vein, Sraffa wrote the following to Robinson in December 
1938: „We have a board of directors, of which Maynard is chairman, and Austin, 
Kahn, Kalecki, Champ [David Champernowne] and myself members…15 Kalecki 
does not take too much notice of [its] resolutions‟ (Sraffa to J. Robinson, 28 
December 1938, Robinson Papers (hereafter JVRP) (King‟s College, Cambridge) 
vii/431/50). Brzeski‟s (1976: 618) description of Kalecki as „blunt and stubborn‟ 
confirms Sraffa‟s view. 
 
Economic Studies in June 1941. Keynes did, however, accept other articles submitted by Kalecki, 
notably Kalecki (1937). 
15
 Sraffa is referring here to the Cambridge Research Scheme of the National Institute of Economic and 
Social Research into Prime Costs, Proceeds and Output. 
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On another point, Feiwel (1970: 28), whilst noting that Kalecki „often electrified his 
interlocutors and commanded boundless respect (even from people of opposite 
opinions) for the iron-clad logic of his arguments‟, highlights the fact that Kalecki 
was also „laconic, austere, and concise in his presentation.‟ This reflected itself in his 
writing, which made significant use of mathematics, an approach which, during the 
1930s and 1940s, limited his appeal amongst those economists (the majority) with 
little or no mathematical training. Kalecki‟s enthusiasm for employing mathematics 
contrasted with Keynes‟s distrust of it, at least within the realm of economics, a 
difference that is intriguing given that both men had an educational background in 
which mathematics played a very strong part. 
 
There is other evidence regarding Kalecki‟s personality. On the positive side, we have 
Sraffa commenting in the same letter to Joan Robinson cited above that Kalecki had 
„settled down to work quite happily, with his two research students (Tew and Hsu, of 
whom only one is a Chinese): he certainly is a great success with them, and they are 
very devoted to him‟ (Sraffa ibid., 50-51). It is important to note that Sraffa‟s 
observation was written more than two and a half years after the publication of the 
General Theory. As such, the emergence of any Kaleckian disciples at this stage 
would have come too late to stop the Keynesian onslaught. Also, Kalecki‟s 
relationship with Tew and Hsu seems to have been more or less a one-off, even if 
Tew, for one, regarded Kalecki as a role model for economists. For example, whilst 
he was in Sweden in 1936, Kalecki „kept himself apart partly due to his character, but 
also because he was “angry with the bourgeois attitude of the economists in Sweden”‟ 
(Lundberg in Targetti and Kinda-Hass 1982: 244). Given that he had specifically 
travelled to Sweden to work with Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil Ohlin on the theory of 
economic crises and business cycles, this was an ideal opportunity for Kalecki to have 
made a name for himself and to propound the work he had already published. 
However, his character again seems to have got in the way, a matter of some regret 
for the Swedes, Erik Lundberg noting that he could see the greatness of Kalecki‟s 
contribution ex post but not ex ante (see Lundberg 1996: 120). 
 
On a final note, Bronfenbrenner (1976: 466) declares that, later on in Kalecki‟s career 
in the mid-1940s, his prospective students at Chicago were wary of him: „It is my 
distinct impression that…graduate students contemplated with extreme dread the 
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possibility of Kalecki‟s appointment to a professorship…to replace his gentle, affable, 
helpful and tolerant fellow countryman Oskar Lange, then on leave as Polish 
ambassador in Washington.‟16 The students at Chicago must indeed have been aware 
of Kalecki‟s reputation for being unforgiving in discussing economics. Against this 
background, it is not surprising that Solow (1975: 1,335) described Kalecki as „an 
outsider to the end.‟ 
 
Summary: 
 
In summary, Table 1 shows how Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki perform with 
respect to the criterion „„Charismatic‟ leader(s)‟. As is clear, Keynes comes out on 
top. Although the evidence with respect to Marshall is more ambiguous, he is still 
ahead of both Hayek and Kalecki. 
 
Table 1. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘i. ‘Charismatic’ leader(s)’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
i. 'Charismatic' leader(s) + ± - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
Charismatic leadership is arguably the most important of all the Morrell-Geison 
criteria. Regarding our own analysis, it is hard to disagree with Blaug (1994: 1,206) 
when he says: „If we want to explain the Keynesian Revolution, the astonishing speed 
with which Keynesian economics won professional approval, it would be difficult to 
deny that Keynes‟s personal biography was extremely relevant‟ and that „Keynes‟s 
siren-like charisma had much to do with his professional success and to deny it is just 
puritanism of an intellectual sort‟ (ibid., 1,207). There were less favourable aspects to 
Keynes‟s personality, but as he matured, these were outweighed by the positives. 
 
Meanwhile, even though he did not enjoy Keynes‟s charisma, Marshall possessed 
enough charm and determination to command the respect of both his colleagues 
                                                 
16
 Lange was Polish ambassador to the United States from 1945 to 1947. 
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(albeit with major caveats) and his pupils. Additionally, both Marshall and Keynes 
were broadly optimistic in outlook and were confident that economics could solve 
many of the world‟s ills. Anyone doubting this with respect to Marshall must provide 
a plausible explanation as to why he dedicated so much time and effort to 
professionalising the subject. 
 
In contrast, it was difficult to find evidence of charisma when we considered Hayek 
and Kalecki. In Hayek‟s case, it is true that he „exerted considerable influence through 
his profound knowledge of economic theory, the example of his own high standards 
of scholarship, and the power of his ideas‟ (Coase 1994: 210). But one wonders how 
much greater this influence might have been had Hayek possessed a more likeable 
personality. His often gloomy outlook was reflected in his writing, his „dark, sobering, 
sober‟ (Caldwell 1995: 48) view of the world giving rise to his advocacy of minimal 
policy intervention during the Depression, this at a time when the advanced world was 
crying out for a pro-active solution to the worst economic decline it had ever seen. 
Lastly, Kalecki‟s extremely strong moral code and sometimes gruff manner meant 
that it was harder for him to form lasting bonds with colleagues and students. As a 
result of this and other factors, his independent discovery of the main propositions 
contained in the General Theory never received the recognition it deserved and partly 
explains why the revolution in macroeconomics in the 1930s and 1940s never had a 
chance of being known as „Kaleckian‟. 
 
 
ii. Leader with research reputation 
 
„Generally speaking the most favourable situation [is] one in which the 
director‟s reputation in his subject advance[s] neither in front of nor 
behind his ambitions for his school‟ (Morrell 1972: 4). 
 
According to the research school literature, a leader with a research reputation often 
secures such a position in his early years of research, thus making this period crucial 
to the success of the research school that he later becomes associated with. Without a 
research reputation, a leader may be subject to sustained attacks on his authority and 
ability. In turn, a crucial determinant of whether a research reputation is seen to be 
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properly established centres on a leader‟s publication record. Publication in respected 
and widely disseminated research journals and in books could turn a well-known local 
researcher into a figure with an international standing. 
 
Keynes: 
 
Keynes‟s reputation as a leader with a serious research agenda was already beginning 
to take shape as early as 1909 when he secured a Fellowship (at his second attempt) at 
his beloved King‟s College, Cambridge.17 His Fellowship dissertation, which had 
actually been written in 1907, dealt not with economics but with the principles of 
probability and supported the objectivist theory that knowledge is not the property of 
an individual but rather has a separate existence. The impact of Keynes‟s theory is 
apparent from a written comment made by one of his examiners at King‟s, the noted 
mathematician and philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead: „Mr Keynes‟ dissertation is 
a contribution to knowledge of great importance. It is not a mere academic exercise, 
and when published, will seriously affect future investigations in the subjects with 
which it deals. If Mr Keynes publishes much other work of this character, he will 
attain considerable eminence as a man of science‟ (Alfred North Whitehead, 1909, 
JMKP TP/4/8). Keynes‟s work was the first serious attempt at a new theory of 
probability since John Venn‟s The Logic of Chance (1866), a fact which aroused the 
interest of statisticians. Even though Frank Ramsey would convincingly argue that 
Keynes had overemphasised objectivity at the expense of subjectivity, the objectivist 
perspective reached a wider audience as a result of it being discussed in Bertrand 
Russell‟s The Problems of Philosophy, published in 1912. The first building block of 
Keynes‟s research reputation had been put in place.18 
 
Keynes‟s intellectual audacity was clear even at an early stage: „One of the most 
striking things about the [Fellowship] dissertation was the boldness of Keynes‟s 
claims. Implicit in his argument was the view that probability should be rightly 
considered as the general theory of logic, of which deductive logic was a special case, 
                                                 
17
 Apart from attending Eton, Keynes spent all of his early years in Cambridge. As such, he was 
„completely a product of Cambridge‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 2). 
18
 See Aldrich (2008) for a detailed examination of Keynes‟s contributions to statistics. 
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applying only to cases of certainty‟ (Skidelsky 1983: 184). This particular enthusiasm 
for „general‟ over „special‟ theories was an early manifestation of a tendency that 
would reveal itself once again in the General Theory, where Keynes would maintain 
that it was his theory which provided an explanation of why output in the short period 
is sometimes significantly below that which occurs at full employment, with the 
classical explanation being merely a special case. This has led to speculation that 
Keynes‟s preference for big picture theories was influenced, in particular, by 
Einstein‟s general theory of relativity which appeared in 1915, not beyond the realms 
of possibility given the worldwide prominence of Einstein‟s ideas.19 
 
Keynes was never one to sit on his laurels. Just two weeks after he started lecturing at 
Cambridge in January 1909, he made a note to himself (see JMKP A/09/1) outlining 
the research problems and issues he wished to address going forward. Granted, 
economics was still very much a developing subject – this despite the fact that Adam 
Smith‟s The Wealth of Nations had been published over 130 years previously – with a 
number of areas ripe for investigation. Keynes‟s note shows that he had already set a 
high bar for himself: 
 
Papers to be written 
The „Long Run‟ in Economics         [The element of doubt in the 
             determination of value] 
The Indian Gold Standard Reserve 
Proposals for an International Currency 
Mathematical Notes on the Median 
English Gold Reserves 
The Logical Basis of the Theory of Correlation 
A plea for a new official index number of prices 
The Riskless Rate of Interest 
Monographs 
The Method of Index Numbers 
The Theory of Crises and Commercial Fluctuations 
                                                 
19
 Togati (2001) looks at the intellectual links between the General Theory and Einstein‟s theory of 
relativity. 
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[Papers to be written contd] 
Treatises 
The Principles of Probability 
Methods of Statistics 
Textbooks 
The Principles of Money 
The Mathematical Organon of Economics 
 
Keynes‟s constantly changing interests meant that his research focus inevitably 
shifted over the years. His predilection for big projects was nonetheless something 
that remained with him throughout his life. O‟Donnell (1992: 769) presents an 
extended version of Keynes‟s 1909 list based on Keynes‟s subsequent ideas for books 
together with approximate dates as to when he thought of them: 
 
Essays on the Economic Future of the World [early 1920s] 
Prolegomena to a New Socialism   June 1924 
An Examination of Capitalism 
   First version      November 1924 
   Second version     April 1926 
A Programme of Economic Change   [1927] 
Footnotes to the General Theory   August 1936 
An Introduction to Economic Principles (10 vols) [1938] 
 
O‟Donnell (ibid., 769-770) observes that the two lists can be conveniently split by the 
First World War. In the first list, Keynes‟s concern is more with academic 
publications, such as monographs and treatises, formats which would not usually be 
read by the general public, suggesting, in turn, that Keynes was not yet concerned 
about influencing popular opinion. The change in his thinking to an approach more 
likely to get him noticed outside of academia was brought about by events at the Paris 
Peace Conference, his resignation from which prompted the writing of the Economic 
Consequences. 
 
Before we consider the Economic Consequences in greater detail, it is worth 
examining Keynes‟s writings and activities relating to India. Keynes‟s first contact 
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with Indian economic affairs came in 1906 when he secured a job as a clerk at the 
India Office. Despite serving less than two years, the time Keynes spent working on 
Indian matters played an important part in helping to establish his reputation as a 
serious economist. This was initially demonstrated in May 1910, when Keynes, who 
had already left Whitehall, delivered a series of lectures at the LSE entitled, 
„Currency, finance and the level of prices in India‟. The lectures reflected Keynes‟s 
inside knowledge of the workings of the Indian economy and were the inspiration for 
a speech on the Indian currency question given by him at the Royal Economic Society 
in May 1911. More importantly, his exposure to Indian issues provided the backdrop 
for his first book, Indian Currency and Finance (1913). 
 
Indian Currency and Finance marks the beginning of Keynes‟s ascent as an important 
economist. As the following extract from a review in the 1 November 1913 issue of 
The Spectator shows, this climb was, from the beginning, founded not on speculation 
on Keynes‟s part but by his careful and objective consideration of the evidence: 
„[Keynes] is to be congratulated [for] submitting his theories to the criticism of 
practised administrators and men of business, nor are his colleagues to be less 
congratulated on having the help of a theorist who keeps an open mind and is fully 
aware that monetary developments must be adapted to the habits and even to the 
prejudices of ordinary men… His careful and disinterested study of the monetary facts 
of twenty years, and his methodical marshalling of facts and figures, will be useful 
even to those, and they will probably be few, who are not convinced by his reasoning‟ 
(JMKP IC/9/2-3). Sayers (1972: 591) confirms the often sophisticated nature of the 
book, describing some of its chapters as „extraordinarily mature‟. 
 
In spite of its maturity, Indian Currency and Finance sold less than a thousand copies 
in its first year. More importantly, however, Keynes‟s analysis, whilst giving little 
indication of his later „brilliance and cleverness‟ (Klein 1966: 2), was enough to 
attract the notice of the appropriate authorities and led to him being asked in 1913 to 
join the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, headed by Austen 
Chamberlain, a previous Chancellor of the Exchequer and future leader of the 
Conservative Party. The fact that Keynes was the Commission‟s youngest member – 
he was just 29 when it first sat – and was in bad health for part of its deliberations, 
made little difference: he took up his appointment with gusto, quickly outshining his 
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older colleagues. In fact, in some instances, he was the only questioner of the expert 
witnesses called to give evidence. This was not just youthful exuberance, as the rest of 
the Commission ended up accepting many of Keynes‟s arguments. At a broader level, 
Keynes‟s position on the Commission gave him an excellent opportunity to build a 
network of political contacts, a network which he would be able to call on in 
subsequent years when he became more heavily involved in government work. 
 
Keynes‟s Fellowship dissertation and his work on India were important in establishing 
his early credentials. But it was the Economic Consequences which was to make his 
name recognisable to a popular audience. The book was a strongly worded protest 
against the reparations settlement agreed between the Allies at Paris. By publishing, 
Keynes must have been aware that he was putting his growing reputation at risk, 
although this was not enough to stop him. In wider terms, the Economic 
Consequences also marked the arrival of Keynes‟s „full moral and intellectual 
maturity‟ (Harcourt and Turnell 2005: 4,934). 
 
Somewhat inevitably, the book generated plaudits and criticism, a steady flow of the 
latter leading Keynes to publish A Revision of the Treaty in January 1922. His 
opponents focused on Keynes‟s alleged political naivety and his supposed pro-
German sympathies. However, nobody seemed capable of mounting a serious 
challenge to his economic arguments. Indeed, a convincing broadside had to wait a 
quarter of a century and the appearance of The Carthaginian Peace, or the Economic 
Consequences of Mr. Keynes (1946), written by the French economist Étienne 
Mantoux, whose father had been Prime Minister Clemenceau‟s interpreter at Paris. 
Mantoux showed that Keynes had been wrong on a number of counts, especially with 
respect to his predictions about Germany‟s coal, iron, and steel production after the 
First World War and its level of national saving. Particularly striking was Germany‟s 
capacity to massively rearm under Hitler, suggesting that it had been in a stronger 
position to pay reparations than made out by Keynes. Of course, Mantoux‟s attack 
came far too late to do any real damage to Keynes‟s reputation: the Economic 
Consequences had quickly become an influential book and cemented Keynes‟s 
growing reputation „not just in Britain but all over Europe and in the United States‟ 
(Blaug 1994: 1,207). Of the many accounts of the Paris talks which appeared at the 
time, it is the only one which has „not sunk without a trace‟ (Skidelsky 1983: 399). 
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Important theoretical work flowed from Keynes‟s pen over the following years. A 
Tract on Monetary Reform was published in 1923 – a book thought by some (notably 
Milton Friedman) to be Keynes‟s best – followed in 1930 by A Treatise on Money. 
Keynes‟s output during the 1920s was characterised not only by books but also 
pamphlets and newspaper articles. Thus, The Economic Consequences of Mr 
Churchill (1925) was important as it again demonstrated Keynes‟s enthusiasm for 
controversy – even though he and Churchill were on friendly terms – this time over 
the future prime minister‟s decision to return Britain to the Gold Standard at pre-First 
World War parity. Keynes argued that the pound would be too strong and that 
exporters would suffer as a result. Although it took six years, Keynes‟s prognosis 
proved right and Britain paid the price by being forced off gold in September 1931. 
 
Meanwhile, in May 1929, Keynes co-authored Can Lloyd George Do It? with Hubert 
Henderson, a former pupil and then editor of The Nation and Athenaeum, a magazine 
part owned by Keynes. Keynes had made the case for public works as a remedy for 
unemployment in the mid-1920s, although his analysis had been hampered by the 
widely held „Treasury view‟, which, in its simple form, asserted that the supply of 
savings and, in turn, capital was limited and that any effort to create jobs through a 
capital injection would, as a consequence, crowd out private investment; the 
sophisticated „Treasury view‟ argued that any increase in investment carried out by 
the government would be sub-optimal as the public sector is less efficient, in 
economic terms, than the private sector (see Harcourt and Turnell 2005: 4,938 and 
Clarke 1998: 81-83). But in a sign that his research was taking him in a new direction, 
Keynes (and Henderson) maintained in Can Lloyd George Do It? that a „cumulative 
force of activity‟ would occur on the back of an injection of government investment: 
successive rounds of spending would be generated which would increase effective 
demand and lower unemployment. Keynes would not have to wait long for Kahn‟s 
multiplier article (Kahn 1931), where the „cumulative force of activity‟ was given a 
quantitative framework. 
 
Although Keynes sometimes had extensive discussions on matters of economic theory 
with, for example, Dennis Robertson during the 1920s, A Treatise on Money was, as 
we have already noted, written virtually in isolation: Keynes was still a long way from 
founding a Keynesian School at Cambridge and beyond. Besides the Treatise being an 
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artistic failure according to Keynes, it was certainly not revolutionary. It did, 
nevertheless, contain some novelties (e.g. liquidity preference, animal spirits, the 
banana plantation parable), which helped to further raise Keynes‟s profile amongst his 
peers. All the same, Hayek, for one, took exception to the book, and embarked on 
what turned out to be a rather bitter exchange of views with Keynes in the pages of 
Economica, Keynes calling up reinforcements in the shape of Sraffa to attack Prices 
and Production in the Economic Journal. Within the context of the Keynesian 
Revolution, it nevertheless remained the case that Keynes was still over-emphasising 
the role of prices and, as a result, had not dealt adequately with those factors which 
„determine changes in the scale of output and employment as a whole‟ (Keynes in 
CW VII: xxii). The intuitive leap to a variable output model would have to wait until 
the General Theory. 
 
In his early career, Keynes was still very much a Marshallian. For instance, Klein 
(1966: 2) points out that Keynes‟s analysis in Indian Currency and Finance was 
„derived entirely from classical theory.‟ At the same time, it is difficult to agree with 
McCormick‟s (1992: 3) view that the „rumblings [of revolution began] with [A] 
Treatise on Probability (1921) – with its critique of Hume and its heavy emphasis 
upon a logical theory of probability‟. A more accurate assessment would be that 
Keynes had indeed built a solid research reputation in the years leading up to the 
General Theory, but that any inkling of revolution was not apparent until Can Lloyd 
George Do It? at the very earliest, an inkling that would turn into something more 
concrete with the appearance of Kahn‟s work on the multiplier. 
 
Testament to Keynes‟s research reputation as of 1936 and subsequently was the large 
degree of interest generated by the appearance of the General Theory. Over 125 
English-language reviews had appeared by the end of 1936 (see Backhouse 1999: 2) 
in a host of academic and literary journals and newspapers. Whilst some reviewers 
were positive, others were less complimentary. The communist Morning Star ran its 
review under the title, „What Does Mr Keynes Want – Poison Gas?‟ (ibid., 26-28), 
accusing Keynes of supporting British imperialism; others were bemused by Keynes‟s 
suggestion that people could be put to work by digging up bottles filled with money. 
On a more serious note, not all of Keynes‟s economist colleagues were convinced that 
he was a master of his own subject. Notable in this respect was Hayek, who was of the 
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opinion that Keynes was neither „a full master of the body of economic theory then 
available [i.e. in the 1930s], nor really cared to acquaint himself with any 
development which lay outside the Marshallian tradition‟ (Hayek in Caldwell 1995: 
248). On reflection, Hayek was no doubt unhappy that his own theories had not 
received the kind of recognition he thought they deserved. Notwithstanding this, 
Hayek‟s assessment of Keynes as not being a very good economist is a little harsh 
given Keynes‟s achievements. At the same time, Hayek may have something of a 
point regarding the breadth of Keynes‟s economic knowledge. To begin with, 
Keynes‟s formal training in economics was very much restricted to Marshall and 
Jevons. Second, there is Shove‟s well-known observation about Keynes not bothering 
to take the twenty minutes required to master the theory of value (see Patinkin 1980: 
22); had he done so, his dismissal of Marx may not have been so outright. Finally, 
Keynes played little part in the imperfect competition revolution that was taking place 
in Cambridge in the 1930s, this despite Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn being at its 
forefront. Indeed, the General Theory assumed perfect competition, Keynes 
maintaining that he did not see „how on earth‟ (Keynes in CW XIV: 190) imperfect 
competition entered into his schema (see also Hayes 2008, Marris 1997 and Shapiro 
1997). In fact, Kalecki was of the same view with respect to his own work on the 
cycle (see Targetti and Kinda-Hass 1982). 
 
Marshall: 
 
Marshall‟s research reputation is beyond doubt. His early promise as a mathematician 
– he was Second Wrangler in the 1865 Mathematical Tripos behind John Strutt, later 
Lord Rayleigh – and his subsequent groundbreaking work in economics made him not 
only one of the world‟s most important economists during his own lifetime but of any 
period since Adam Smith. For the purposes of our own analysis, the important issue is 
what part this reputation played in helping to buttress the Keynesian Revolution. 
There are two ways of answering this. The first concerns Marshall‟s „Organon‟ or 
research programme. Marshall‟s aim was to provide future generations of economists 
with an „engine of analysis‟ by which they could resolve economic problems. As 
Keynes (1924: 345) acknowledged, „The building of this engine was the essential 
achievement of Marshall‟s peculiar genius‟. The Organon was many faceted and 
included an acute concern for „core theory, its motivation and style, its professional 
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orientation, its ability to discover “concrete truth” and finally, its method of 
propagation‟ (Collard 1990: 165). Marshall‟s Principles was his own, very successful 
attempt at laying down the foundations of the Organon. His research reputation was, 
in addition, built on his innovation of certain analytical techniques, including 
elasticity and quasi-rent, as well as his popularisation of others, notably supply and 
demand curves and producer and consumer surpluses. It was also no coincidence that 
Keynes himself was to be the founder of a research programme which would fill in 
one of the gaps in the Organon. 
 
A second way in which Marshall‟s research reputation aided the Keynesian 
Revolution (albeit indirectly) was his achievement in getting economics recognised as 
a Tripos at Cambridge in 1903. Without Marshall‟s status as a brilliant theorist 
coupled with his quiet tenacity and persistence, it is highly unlikely that economics 
would have secured its own Tripos when it did. Although it took time, the new Tripos 
increased the profile of economics teaching and research within the University which, 
in turn, helped to produce a clutch of students who would go on to provide Keynes 
with crucial support in the construction of the General Theory. 
 
Hayek: 
 
In contrast to Keynes, Hayek did not have the benefit of learning economics at the 
feet of the master Marshall. However, this is not to say that Hayek‟s training in 
economics was in any way rudimentary. On the contrary, the University of Vienna 
was one of the „three best places to study economics [in the 1920s] (the others being 
Stockholm and Cambridge, England)‟ (Craver 1986: 2). As part of his training, Hayek 
would have been fully aware of the Austrian School‟s reputation for controversy and 
its preference for alternative research programmes. This was a legacy of the School‟s 
founding father, Carl Menger, whose Principles of Economics (1871) was the 
cornerstone of subsequent Austrian analysis. Tieben and Keizer (1997: 3-4) identify 
some of the main controversies involving the Austrians and other schools, including: 
Menger and Schmoller over methodology; Böhm-Bawerk and the Marxists over the 
Marxian theory of value; Mises/Hayek and various socialists over economic 
calculation in a socialist society; Hayek and neoclassical economists over 
methodology and epistemology; and, finally, Hayek and Keynes over business cycles 
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and government intervention. Concerning the last of these, the Austrian School‟s 
attempt to set the agenda for cycle research went back to at least 1927 when another 
great Austrian, Ludwig von Mises, created the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle 
Research in Vienna. The Austrian star was very much in the ascendant during this 
period, such that by 1928 Mises was confident enough to claim primacy for the 
Austrian explanation of the cycle. Hayek joined the Institute when it was founded in 
January 1927, becoming its first director; other well-known staffers included Gottfried 
von Haberler and Oscar Morgenstern. Hayek‟s own reputation as a leading authority 
on the cycle was underpinned by the publication in 1929 of a set of his essays on the 
subject entitled Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie.
20
 Published in German, the essays 
drew interest from beyond Austria, most notably in the guise of Lionel Robbins. 
 
With his research reputation growing, Hayek cemented his status by „essentially 
[writing] a new book‟ (Vaughn 1994: 47) for his audience at the LSE and beyond, 
which would be published as Prices and Production. Thus, after seven years of 
research in Austria, becoming an authority on the analysis of cycles, and building the 
Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research into a „European center for…cycle 
research‟ (Leube 1984: xix), Hayek arrived at the LSE in 1931. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
When considering Kalecki‟s research reputation in the 1930s and 1940s, it is 
important to note that he had few, if any, of the benefits enjoyed by Hayek and 
especially by Keynes in the early part of their careers: in particular, there was no 
major tradition of economic analysis in Poland and, as a result, no recognised school 
of thought that Kalecki could attach himself to (although he had read Marx, 
Luxemburg and Tugan-Baranovsky). This meant that he was unable to derive any of 
the advantages that often flow from being the pupil of a noted master. 
 
Regardless of this, Kalecki‟s early writings meant that he still had enough of a 
reputation to secure a place as a speaker at the September-October 1933 meeting of 
                                                 
20
 Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie was published in English in 1933 under the title Monetary 
Theory and the Trade Cycle. 
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the Econometric Society in Leyden in the Netherlands. This meeting could have 
changed the history of economic theory as it provided Kalecki with an excellent 
opportunity to present his innovative ideas on the cycle to an audience which 
included, amongst others, John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor, Oscar Lange, and Jan 
Tinbergen. But Kalecki‟s paper – which was subsequently published in French 
(Kalecki 1935a) and then shortly after in English (Kalecki 1935b) and was a 
reworking of material he had already published in Polish in 1933 (Kalecki 1933) – 
arguably did not receive the attention it deserved, in part, because it was highly 
technical.
21
 
 
It would appear therefore that Kalecki‟s reputation as an important economist during 
this period was accompanied by a proclivity for over-sophistication: despite his 
analysis being more rigorous than that which would appear in the General Theory, 
Kalecki‟s less technically able colleagues, not to mention policy-makers, were put off 
by the relatively advanced level of mathematical understanding needed to „translate‟ 
his work. Moreover, Kalecki was still very much in the „lone thinker‟ phase of his 
career and so had little claim to being a leader. It is also interesting to note that 
Kalecki had to wait until 1938 before any of his contributions to economics „first 
reached a wide audience‟ (Harcourt 1992: 1,266), when he published an article in 
Econometrica dealing with the factors that determine national income distribution 
(Kalecki 1938). Tellingly, this piece was a lot less mathematically sophisticated than 
his 1935 contribution in the same journal. 
 
Summary: 
 
Each of Keynes, Marshall and Hayek perform relatively strongly with respect to the 
„Leader with research reputation‟ aspect of research school success or failure, while 
Kalecki, notwithstanding his presence at the meeting of the Econometric Society in 
the latter part of 1933, was often hampered in this regard in the early part of his 
career. 
                                                 
21
 Although it is not entirely clear, it is possible that Kalecki may have delivered his paper to the 
Econometric Society in French, a factor which would have further hindered understanding for a 
significant part of the audience. 
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Table 2. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘ii. Leader with research reputation’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
ii. Leader with research reputation + + + ±  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
While the presence of a leader with a research reputation is, it seems, not as crucial as 
a leader with charisma, it is still an important element in determining the relative 
success of a research school. In Keynes‟s case, his reputation as a serious researcher 
began with his Fellowship dissertation, was helped by Indian Currency and Finance 
and membership of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance, was 
further bolstered by his editorship of the Economic Journal (an issue which we will 
cover in more detail later on), and by the appearance of the Economic Consequences, 
the Tract and A Treatise on Money. Without this track record, it is possible that had 
the General Theory been Keynes‟s first book, „it would probably have been dismissed 
as the work of a clever but pretentious crank. Recognition would certainly have been 
much slower‟ (Winch 1969: 177). At the same time, Marshall‟s Organon 
demonstrated to Keynes that certain areas of economics were still in need of 
development. There is also a case for arguing that Keynes benefited from Marshall‟s 
own research reputation insofar as Marshall‟s success in establishing the Economics 
Tripos at Cambridge subsequently provided Keynes with a group of students who 
were to play a key part in the Keynesian Revolution. 
 
Hayek‟s educational background was a fundamentally strong one, firmly based, as it 
was, in the Austrian tradition of economics. This led on to a productive early 
professional period in Austria, where Hayek made his name as a leading business 
cycle theorist, the result being an invitation to work at the LSE and the publication of 
Prices and Production. Kalecki‟s reputation was such that, although he was able to 
present his ideas to an influential audience in 1933, he was otherwise isolated partly 
because he had not been part of a formal school or the pupil of a master economist. 
Any research reputation which he may have had in the years leading up to 1936 was, 
moreover, overshadowed by the excessively mathematical nature of his theoretical 
output. 
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Broadly speaking then, Keynes and Hayek had the upper hand over Kalecki when it 
came to research reputations in the early 1930s, while Keynes would, in turn, quickly 
pull away from Hayek in the following few years. Of course, this is not to say that 
Keynes had it all his own way – far from it. For example, on the Committee of 
Economists he failed to achieve a consensus over how the government should best 
proceed in its efforts to overcome the Depression. 
 
Nevertheless, Keynes was able to go on and generate a revolution in economic 
thinking not very long thereafter. It seems that he may have been the beneficiary of 
what sociologists of science have referred to as the „Matthew Effect‟. This 
phenomenon, first identified by Merton (1968: 58), is derived from a quote in chapter 
25 of the Gospel According to St. Matthew: “For unto every one that hath shall be 
given, and he shall have abundance: but from him that hath not shall be taken away 
even that which he hath.” Roughly translated, this says that the rich get richer and the 
poor get poorer. With respect to macroeconomics in the 1930s and 1940s, the 
Matthew Effect meant that the General Theory had a greater chance of succeeding as 
it was proposed by a leader who, inter alia, already possessed a solid research 
reputation. 
 
 
iii. ‘Informal’ setting and leadership style 
 
„Liebig‟s influence on his laboratory students was exerted through 
close physical and mental contact with them in an informal atmosphere 
and situation. These were propitious conditions in which his charisma 
could operate: matters would have been different had Liebig from the 
start been an encapsulated professor whom his students rarely met or 
saw‟ (Morrell 1972: 37). 
 
Keynes: 
 
There is a considerable body of evidence supporting Keynes‟s preference for 
informality, especially in his dealings with the Circus and some of his closer 
colleagues. At heart, Keynes was a social animal, preferring to be around others but 
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also loving the limelight. By way of example, meetings of the Political Economy Club 
took place on Monday evenings during term in his rooms at King‟s, where talented 
students with something sensible to say were allowed to speak without fear of being 
made to look like an upstart, unlike Keynes‟s colleagues who, as we have noted, were 
frowned upon by Keynes if they advocated beliefs which he considered to be extreme 
or plainly wrong. Over the years, the Club became part of the established landscape at 
Cambridge, providing generations of students with the chance to cut their teeth in 
front of both their peers and their seniors, all the while presided over by the benign 
Keynes. 
 
Meanwhile, even though he was not part of the Circus‟s inception, Keynes quickly 
accommodated the informal manner in which its ideas and suggestions were fed back 
to him and vice versa, Kahn taking on the role of „messenger-angel‟. The Circus 
formed in November 1930 to discuss A Treatise on Money and its meetings, which 
grew bigger and more formal, continued every week until May 1931.
22
 The way in 
which Keynes accepted the Circus said a lot about the man: he had just spent six years 
working on a book which most economists would have been happy to consider as 
their magnum opus and was also still involved in government work. Under such 
circumstances, it would not have been surprising had Keynes given the Circus the 
cold shoulder on discovering that they were dissecting the finer points of his latest 
publication. However, Keynes knew that the Treatise was faulty and that the Circus 
contained enough brainpower to be of some considerable help in overcoming these 
faults. As Moggridge notes, Keynes saw the Circus as an opportunity and „picked up 
[its] ideas, sometimes only after extensive discussion, incorporated them into his own 
thinking and went ahead‟ (Moggridge in CW XIII: 342).23 
                                                 
22
 Even though meetings of the Circus ceased in May 1931, its core members continued to hold Keynes 
to account. Thus, Richard Kahn, Joan Robinson and Piero Sraffa „spied‟ on Keynes at a lecture he gave 
at Cambridge on 25 April 1932, prompting them and Austin Robinson to send Keynes a „Manifesto‟, 
which raised a number of theoretical issues which they felt he had to answer (see CW XIII: 376-380 
and CW XXIX: 38-48). 
23
 Keynes‟s pro-active approach to the Circus was in stark contrast to how some notable others in 
Cambridge viewed it. According to Joan Robinson, Dennis Robertson attended only one meeting and 
looked on it with some sarcasm (see Feiwel 1989: 40) while Pigou regarded the Circus as nothing more 
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In addition to the informality which characterised some of his close intellectual ties at 
Cambridge, Keynes also liked to use this way of working when he was away from the 
town. He would regularly invite colleagues down to Tilton, his country home near 
Lewes in East Sussex. Richard Kahn was the most frequent guest, he and Keynes 
„[talking] over problems as they arose, whether in the study or over the morning‟s task 
of picking vegetables for lunch‟ (Clarke 1988: 298). Keynes was extremely grateful 
for these tête-à-têtes, describing one of Kahn‟s visits in September 1934 as 
„extraordinarily helpful‟ (Keynes in CW XIII: 484). This close working relationship 
between the two men was underpinned by a vast written correspondence, with a total 
of 611 letters exchanged between them from 1928 to 1946 (see Marcuzzo 2002: 422). 
 
Keynes also had no qualms about extending his informality to others not within his 
immediate Cambridge group. We see evidence of this in a September 1935 letter from 
Keynes to Roy Harrod: „I am content! If the classical theory could not be made, even 
by you, to make more coherent sense than that, it does not deserve very many 
compliments. However, you must see my re-draft… It would be very nice if you 
could come to Tilton this weekend, the 28th‟ (Keynes to Harrod, 25 September 1935, 
CW XIII: 561). Keynes displays the same relaxed approach in a June 1930 letter to 
Hubert Henderson, this after Henderson had sent him a note proposing the need for 
the British government to secure a large new revenue source to finance a programme 
of capital expenditure: „Your argument is too much of an affair to deal with in a letter. 
You will have to come down to Tilton for a weekend for us to thrash the whole matter 
out‟ (Keynes to Henderson, 3 June 1930, JMKP EA/1/19). Henderson replies in the 
same vein: „Many thanks for your letter. I should be very glad to thrash the whole 
question out at leisure‟ (Henderson to Keynes, 5 June 1930, JMKP EA/1/25). 
 
Keynes would make every effort to convince others of his argument. When he failed 
to make headway against his opponents, he would sometimes ask for the informal 
opinion of members of the Circus as to whether he was right or wrong on a particular 
issue. In the following, Keynes writes to Joan Robinson regarding a difficult ongoing 
correspondence he was having with Ralph Hawtrey over drafts of the General Theory: 
 
than „adolescent frivolities‟ (Moggridge in CW XIII: 338) and ignored it with „Olympian detachment‟ 
(ibid.). 
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„Unless it would bore you, I would be rather grateful if you would look through this 
voluminous correspondence with Hawtrey… By the time you have got to the end of it, 
you will see that we are recurring over and over again to two or three points where I 
am indisposed to give way… I should rather like to know whether, looking at it 
impartially, you feel that there are any further concessions which he can justly claim 
from me‟ (Keynes to J. Robinson, 29 November 1935, CW XIII: 612). 
 
Unusually for an academic, Keynes was happy to discuss his ideas with the general 
public. This to some extent confirms our picture of Keynes as a man of action. Based 
on letters written, Keynes‟s most extensive correspondence with the public was 
probably generated by How to Pay for the War, which was popularised by a radio 
broadcast made by Keynes on 11 March 1940. In connection with this, the following 
two notes display his willingness to listen and sympathise with the common man: 
„Dear Sir, Thank you for your letter and the copy of your own scheme. I consider it 
much more important that there should be a drastic remedy than that my particular 
scheme should be adopted. And I am glad to say that in that matter we are in 
agreement. Yours faithfully [Unsigned]‟ (Keynes to Trott, 18 March 1940, JMKP 
HP/5/147). And: „Dear Sir, In my opinion, anyone whose income has been reduced by 
20 per cent or more since the war should be exempt from my scheme. I hope this will 
meet your case. Yours faithfully, JMK‟ (Keynes to Couldery, 21 March 1940, JMKP 
HP/5/109). Keynes‟s informality also extended to when he was conducting official 
business for the British government: „The missions which he led [to the US] were all 
happy parties… He was utterly informal, almost without sense of hierarchy, 
approachable by everyone who had a problem on which to brief him, or a difficulty in 
his own particular negotiations‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 67-68). 
 
To the uninitiated, the danger exists that the evidence above may present Keynes in a 
light which portrays him as perhaps being over-casual in his dealings with others, 
with little underlying sense of urgency. But nothing could be further from the truth. 
Granted, the General Theory could probably have been written more quickly had 
Keynes not made the effort to seek out the judgment of others. However, it is likely 
that without its long gestation period, the General Theory would have been a lesser 
book and it is questionable whether it would have created the revolutionary stir that it 
did. Moreover, any doubt as to Keynes‟s commitment to hard work should recall 
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Robbins‟s depiction, upon the occasion of Keynes‟s death, of him literally giving „his 
life for his country, as surely as if he had fallen on the field of battle‟ (Robbins in 
Skidelsky 2000: 472). 
 
How can Keynes‟s informality be explained? His natural gregariousness no doubt 
played a part. But he was also part of Cambridge‟s „oral tradition‟. More specifically, 
Cambridge economists were known for their preference of passing on knowledge to 
pupils through the medium of discussion rather than via textbooks. Marshall in 
particular had an enthusiasm for this means of communication and it was through 
such a channel that many of his views on economic theory were first disseminated. 
(This aspect of Marshall‟s persona helps, in part, to account for his procrastination in 
getting his ideas down on paper.) 
 
Nor was Marshall the only one partial to informality. For instance, Pigou tutored 
Keynes over breakfast once a week. This preference for informal relations persisted 
down the generations at Cambridge. Thus, even when debating A Treatise on Money 
and Keynes‟s subsequent ideas, the Circus‟s deliberations were so informal that „scant 
written material has survived to document the group‟s activities‟ (Marcuzzo 2002: 
430). 
 
Marshall: 
 
From what we have learnt so far about Marshall‟s character – his reserve, his disdain 
for controversy, and his procrastination – it would be easy to assume that he somehow 
preferred formality over informality when it came to leadership. But this is not the 
whole picture. As we have just seen, Keynes‟s education at Cambridge was 
influenced by the oral tradition, Marshall being a keen supporter of the tradition, 
which resulted in him putting the Organon „in the hands of his pupils long before he 
offered it to the world‟ (Keynes 1924: 345). 
 
A key aspect of the oral tradition during Marshall‟s time was the „at homes‟ that took 
place at his Cambridge residence, Balliol Croft, between the hours of four and seven 
on two afternoons each week. The more promising of Marshall‟s students would be 
invited to sit with the master whilst he poured forth on a host of subjects, including 
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ideas for research, reading suggestions and „above all warnings and exhortations‟ 
(Becattini 2006: 613). Keynes was one of these students and he would go on to write 
affectionately about what it was like to visit Marshall in his proverbial ivory tower: 
„The pupil would come away with an extraordinary feeling that he was embarked on 
the most interesting and important voyage in the world… The young man was 
presented with a standard of intellectual integrity, and with it a disinterestedness of 
purpose, which satisfied him intellectually and morally at the same time. The subject 
itself had seemed to grow under the hands of master and pupil, as they had talked‟ 
(Keynes ibid., 366). Although Marshall must have dominated the discussions, there 
seems to have been little hierarchical delineation, everything being „friendly and 
informal‟ (Sanger in ibid.). 
 
Marshall‟s use of the oral tradition produced a number of results. First, it meant that 
he was able to get his ideas over to his pupils much more quickly than through a book. 
Second, the knowledge that Marshall imparted through oral teaching and discussion 
gave his pupils a sense of „privilege and superiority‟ (Coats 1993: 109). Not 
surprising, then, that Pigou and many others became disciples and considered 
themselves to be the guardians of Marshall‟s legacy. Third, the oral tradition provided 
a smokescreen for Cambridge economists, Harcourt (2001: 337) pointing out that it 
was „a good ploy to fall back on, especially when on dangerous ground.‟ 
 
Less positively, the oral tradition seems to have played at least some part in 
Marshall‟s publication delays. Having regaled students with his latest thinking, 
Marshall no doubt believed that this would be enough to keep the Marshallian 
tradition going, at least, that is, until his next book appeared, whenever that might be. 
Although there is little evidence of it happening, the danger of Marshall‟s approach 
was that his views could be misinterpreted or misused in some way – even if his 
students believed they understood them – before he was able to provide a written 
explanation. In addition, Marshall‟s lectures became less and less systematic in the 
latter part of his teaching career, leading Keynes to complain that by 1906 they had 
become so informal that he found it „impossible to bring away coherent notes‟ 
(Keynes 1924: 359). It would seem therefore that, in his later years, Marshall may 
have placed too much emphasis on the oral tradition as a means of communicating his 
ideas. 
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Hayek: 
 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that Hayek could be rather formal and stuffy. Some 
further insight on this point can be drawn from the Robbins-Hayek Seminar. The 
motivation behind its founding is unclear, but it may have been driven by an attempt 
to emulate Keynes‟s Political Economy Club at Cambridge on the one hand and to 
gather a wider following for Hayek‟s ideas on the other. Meetings of the brightest and 
best had already been a theme in Hayek‟s career. 
 
Most notable was his part in the establishment of a small discussion group of like-
minded thinkers in the early 1920s in Vienna and his attendance at the famous Mises 
Seminar. The former group held its first meeting in 1921 and was made up 
predominantly of social scientists but with representatives from other disciplines also 
in regular attendance. What was most striking about these gatherings was the 
glittering array of those who took part. They included the economists Fritz Machlup 
and Oscar Morgenstern, the historian Friedrich Engel-Janosi, the philosopher Felix 
Kaufmann, and the mathematician Karl Menger. Meanwhile, the Mises Seminar ran 
for 14 years from 1920 to 1934 and was held in Mises‟s private office. As with the 
Political Economy Club at Cambridge, the atmosphere at the Mises Seminar has been 
described as one of „genial toleration‟ (Vaughn 1994: 63). 
 
Hayek, it seems, was keen to reproduce at the LSE something akin to his experiences 
in Vienna. The Robbins-Hayek Seminar was held every week to discuss matters of 
broad interest and usually involved a few staff members and between 30 to 40 
students – not in itself particularly conducive to informality, it has to be said. 
Nevertheless, „[t]here was no hierarchy‟ once the meetings began as „[s]taff and 
students alike were a band of eager seekers after truth [with] the order of prominence 
[depending] upon the excellence of performance‟ (Robbins 1971: 131). 
Notwithstanding its description as the „Robbins-Hayek‟ Seminar, Robbins was 
usually chairman, possibly a reflection of his greater popularity among the students as 
well as Hayek‟s generally more introverted character. For Hayek, this nevertheless 
gave him more freedom to concentrate on the issues being discussed, an area where he 
had a distinct advantage over Robbins, especially when economic theory was 
involved. 
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In spite of its size, the seminar managed to preserve an „intimate character‟ (Caldwell 
1995: 56), helped by the forming of an inner group or „front bench‟ (ibid.), consisting 
of staff and some of the more able students, who would be the main contributors to 
the proceedings. For their part, students would have been grateful for the opportunity 
to get closer to their teachers given that they had „very little personal contact with 
members of…staff, many of whom were themselves part-timers‟ (Coats 1993: 374). 
This would have been in stark contrast to the situation at Cambridge, where the 
supervision system facilitated close and regular interaction between staff and pupils. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Of the evidence that exists on Kalecki‟s mode of working, the general picture is one 
of relative formality. This is not to say that he was immune to informality. For 
example, his sense of humour was legendary and, more importantly, there is some 
support for the argument that Kalecki may have favoured a more informal approach to 
leadership in the latter part of his career (see Sachs 1977: 49). But, during his earlier 
years, Kalecki‟s formality was predominant. One is tempted to make the assumption 
that this aspect of Kalecki‟s personality was a function of his training as an engineer, 
the nature of which tends to promote precision and meticulousness. However, this 
argument does not always hold: Keynes‟s undergraduate degree was in mathematics, 
yet he had a fondness and an exceptional talent for using words as a means of 
communication over numbers and equations. Indeed, so good was he at textual 
exposition – the General Theory excepted – that it is sometimes easy to lose sight of 
the fact that he is writing about economics! 
 
Returning to Kalecki, it is nevertheless reasonable to argue his training did have an 
impact on his particular means of written presentation. Even though his clipped style 
has meant that there has never been „any great controversy about what Kalecki 
actually meant‟ (Johansen 1978: 162), it may have been a „barrier to comprehension 
for some‟ (Dobb 1976: 370), especially those with little or no mathematical training. 
Moreover, this formality could spill over into Kalecki‟s discussions with others, 
Lipinski (1977: 74) noting how „A conversation with Kalecki really was an effort; it 
was dialectics as Zeno would have understood it‟, his attitude to those who did not 
agree with his views being, at best, one of „forbearance‟ (ibid.). 
 56 
Summary: 
 
„„Informal‟ setting and leadership style‟ again sees Keynes scoring positively. As with 
„„Charismatic‟ leader(s)‟, there is qualified support for Marshall when measured 
against informality, with Hayek and Kalecki seemingly trailing him as well as 
Keynes. 
 
Table 3. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘iii. ‘Informal’ setting and leadership style’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
iii. 'Informal' setting and leadership
    style + ± - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
Morrell-Geison emphasises the importance of close teacher-pupil relations, especially 
in terms of physical proximity. The importance of this is clear when we consider the 
charisma and informal leadership criteria side by side: even if a leader has charisma, 
his effectiveness in establishing and maintaining a successful research school seems to 
be reduced if he is physically distant and formal. 
 
We saw how Keynes had a preference for informality, this especially being the case 
when he interacted with the Circus and with certain of his colleagues. One 
explanation proffered for this was that Keynes had grown up in the oral tradition 
promoted by Marshall. Marshall himself is something of a contradiction in the 
formality stakes: he disliked public disagreements, was generally cautious, and was a 
perfectionist, all of which would suggest a significant degree of formality. However, 
he was also prepared, through the oral tradition, to pass his ideas on to pupils through 
discussion, a seemingly dangerous practice for someone so concerned with clarity. 
 
Hayek attempted to recreate at the LSE the atmosphere of the meetings and seminars 
he had attended in Vienna, but his leadership style was predominantly founded on his 
intellectual abilities rather than the force of his personality, the role of charismatic 
leader being left to Robbins. Finally, reports of Kalecki‟s often forbidding personality 
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coupled with observations about his written style point to a somewhat formal 
approach to leadership. The issue of writing styles, in particular, is an interesting one 
as it highlights one of the essential differences between Kalecki and Keynes. Even if 
he is not referring directly to Kalecki and Keynes, Shackle sums up this crucial 
difference as follows: „I think there are two kinds of economics. One of them aims at 
precision, rigour, tidiness and the formulation of principles which will be permanently 
valid: an economic science. The other is…rhetorical…often used disparagingly… The 
rhetorician employs reason…appeals to logic, but…is a user of language at its full 
compass, where words are fingers touching the keyboard of a learner‟s mind. I do not 
believe that human affairs can be exhibited as the infallible and invariable working of 
a closed and permanent system‟ (Shackle in Harcourt 1984: 504). It is easy to see 
which of Shackle‟s categories best describes Kalecki and which Keynes. 
 
 
iv. Leader with institutional power 
 
„[F]or a potentially valid intellectual programme to be implemented, 
power [is] necessary. Quite simply the director [has] to possess or be 
rapidly gaining sufficient power within his institution to realize his 
ambitions‟ (Morrell 1972: 6). 
 
For a leader to be effective, he has to have a sufficient level of control over the 
institutional forces that may influence the success of his research school. In the 
absence of this power, the leader is more likely to get waylaid by administrative 
issues. Additionally, if the particular academic discipline which the leader is involved 
in is considered to be marginal within the wider university curriculum, battles over 
preserving institutional status for both himself and his students could become a 
significant drain on time. One additional aspect that is relevant for our analysis but 
which Morrell-Geison does not pick up on is the leader‟s institutional power outside 
of the university setting. The more power a leader has in this respect, the more likely 
it is that he will be able to propagate the findings of his school to a wider audience. As 
we shall see, Keynes‟s accomplishment in getting his ideas accepted in Whitehall in 
the 1940s played an important part in helping to ensure the success of his research 
agenda. 
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Keynes: 
 
The fact that Marshall had already established the Economics Tripos at Cambridge 
meant that Keynes‟s institutional power was much greater than it would have 
otherwise been and certainly gave those involved in the teaching of the subject a 
higher profile within the University. But the new Tripos also brought with it 
considerable administrative commitments. In Keynes‟s case, there is some evidence to 
suggest that in the mid- to late 1920s and the very early 1930s, his various duties – 
both within and outside Cambridge – were excessive, even if some of them were of 
his own making. 
 
To begin with, Keynes‟s responsibilities as an economics lecturer at Cambridge were 
at first fairly substantial. In 1909, even though he was typically lecturing to audiences 
of just 15 students, his lecture load was heavy, standing at about one hundred hours a 
year (see Skidelsky 1983: 211). Moreover, the Economics Tripos was becoming 
increasingly popular with students. On top of teaching and supervisions, Keynes had 
also been made a Fellowship Elector at King‟s in 1912, which involved him reading a 
host of dissertations, many of which had nothing or very little to do with economics or 
mathematics. There was still the occasional gem, however, such as Alan Turing‟s 
work on probability in 1935. Unlike Keynes, Turing secured a Fellowship at his first 
attempt. 
 
Despite the added burden of work that teaching and supervising foisted on to 
Keynes‟s shoulders in the early years, it should be remembered that these activities 
gave him a very good opportunity to develop Cambridge‟s best economics students. 
As time went on, it is doubtful whether people like Richard Kahn would have become 
part of the Cambridge firmament without Keynes‟s encouragement. In this sense, 
Keynes‟s institutional responsibilities indirectly helped him to achieve his revolution. 
Saying this, although he would teach some very talented students in the interim, such 
as Dennis Robertson, it would still be over two decades from when Keynes first 
started lecturing at Cambridge to when the Circus was formed. 
 
Keynes‟s heavy administrative load at Cambridge continued up until the First World 
War. There was a brief respite after 1920 due to his resignation from his University 
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lectureship and because the students whom Keynes and others had taught before the 
war were now being appointed to posts in the Faculty, thereby making them available 
to take some of the lecturing load from their more senior colleagues. After he resigned 
his lectureship, Keynes‟s only official link to Cambridge University was his King‟s 
Fellowship. However, he did continue to give a handful of „remarkably inspiring‟ 
lectures (A. Robinson 1947: 26) every year, focused on the research he happened to 
be involved in at the time. In fact, Keynes ended up lecturing in only one term of each 
academic year. 
 
Table 4. Keynes’s lectures at Cambridge, 1908/09-1913/14 
Subject Years taught Number of terms Number of
(1 term=8 weeks) hours per week
Money, Credit and Prices 1908/09-1909/10 2 2
The Stock Exchange and the Money Market 1909/10-1913/14 1 1
The Theory of Money 1910/11-1913/14 1 2
Company Finance and the Stock Exchange 1910/11-1912/13 1 1
Currency and Banking 1910/11-1913/14 1 2
The Currency and Finances of India 1910/11 1 1
Money Markets and Foreign Exchanges 1910/11-1912/13 1 1
Principles of Economics 1910/11-1913/14 3 2
The Monetary Affairs of India 1912/13 1 1
Source: CW XII: 689 
 
Keynes was also heavily involved in the financial affairs of King‟s College. He first 
became acquainted with the College‟s finances in 1909, before being made a member 
of the Estates Committee in 1911. This was followed by his appointment as First 
Bursar in 1924. Apart from three brief periods during which his investments on behalf 
of King‟s performed relatively poorly, Keynes proved to be an inspired choice as 
bursar, his knowledge of the stock market helping to put the College on a much 
stronger financial footing. 
 
By the mid- to late 1920s the toll of administrative life began to tell even on the 
workaholic Keynes. He realised that if he was going to make any major contributions 
to economics, his „other‟ responsibilities had to be scaled back. These were 
considerable and included his „Activities‟,24 as they are referred to in the Collected 
Writings, his work on gold and Russia in 1925, and his ongoing commitments to the 
                                                 
24
 In his Collected Writings, Keynes‟s „Activities‟ take up no less than 13 volumes. 
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Liberal Party: „Despite his efficient work habits [and his resignation from the 
„Chinese torture‟ of the University Council in early 1927], it is small wonder that he 
lost the thread of his ideas, [leaving] chapters [of A Treatise on Money] mouldering 
for months unread at Tilton‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 285). 
 
Elsewhere at the institutional level, Keynes‟s influence in Whitehall waxed and 
waned, even if his various roles made him a national and international figure, 
attaining a public profile achieved by very few, if any, economists. As we have seen, 
Keynes started to build his research reputation in part as a result of serving on the 
Royal Commission on Indian Currency and Finance. What followed were a series of 
important appointments spanning over three decades. One of the first occurred in 
1915 with Keynes‟s entry into the wartime Treasury. His reach within the Treasury 
was, for the most part, extensive, even from a relatively early stage: only two weeks 
after taking up his first posting, he became secretary of a committee of the cabinet 
headed by then Prime Minister Herbert Asquith. Later on in the First World War, he 
was appointed head of „A‟ Division, which dealt with all matters concerning Britain‟s 
external finance: „[A]ll the money we either lent or borrowed passed through my 
hands‟ (Keynes in CW XVI: 3). During this period, he also had direct access to the 
Chancellor and future Prime Minister, Andrew Bonar Law. 
 
Of course, the culmination of Keynes‟s involvement at the Treasury around this time 
was his appointment in January 1919 as its principal representative at the Paris Peace 
Conference following the end of hostilities. Despite his eventual resignation from the 
British delegation, Keynes had cemented his position as a leading figure in the civil 
service, his protests against reparations at the same time indicating his willingness to 
put at risk any political power base that he may have had. Saying this, Keynes still 
tried to influence inside opinion by sending copies of the Economic Consequences to, 
amongst others, Austen Chamberlain and Bonar Law, the latter of whom had 
dismissed Keynes‟s advocacy of a complete cancellation of inter-Allied war debt as 
„too altruistic‟ (Bonar Law in Markwell 2006: 36). 
 
The Economic Consequences was important within the context of the Keynesian 
Revolution partly because it brought into sharp focus Keynes‟s subsequent 
relationship with the Treasury. Much has been written on this subject, notably by 
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Harrod and Skidelsky. Harrod‟s view (1951: 283) was that Keynes‟s onslaught 
against the Allies meant that he was „in the wilderness‟ for many years thereafter; as 
far as the Treasury was concerned, Keynes‟s appeal „against the authorities to a wider 
public‟ meant that the „official world could no longer use him‟ (ibid.). The key 
problem with this is that Harrod provides very little supporting evidence. Granted, 
there is some foundation to the argument that Keynes‟s influence in the Treasury 
suffered a gradual decline during the 1920s. For example, the change of senior 
personnel in key Treasury departments as the decade wore on meant that Keynes‟s 
network of contacts inside government was scaled back. Moreover, as Keynes was no 
longer a Treasury official, he was excluded from ongoing discussions between the 
British, the Americans and the French over post-war financial arrangements. But this 
does not mean that Keynes was completely impotent as far as his influence over 
policy-making was concerned and it certainly does not mean that he was frozen out of 
the Treasury altogether, as depicted by Harrod. Indeed, only a few months after the 
appearance of the Economic Consequences, Keynes was being sounded out by 
Chamberlain for his views on the conduct of monetary policy „as though he had never 
left the Treasury‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 19). He was also consulted on what to do about 
the high level of unemployment which Britain faced after the war. Thus, even though 
it might be pushing the envelope to argue that Keynes „never left the Treasury‟, it was 
difficult for Whitehall mandarins to ignore his advice in the years immediately after 
the Economic Consequences, a situation that was nevertheless astonishing in itself 
given the general level of hostility in the Treasury towards the book. There were, of 
course, limits to this influence. For instance, Keynes failed (albeit only just) to 
convince Churchill not to return Britain to the Gold Standard in 1925. All the same, 
the problems faced by British exporters in the second half of the 1920s due to the 
strong pound meant that Keynes‟s star was again in the ascendancy, his full return to 
the fray confirmed in 1929 when he was appointed to the Royal Commission on 
Finance and Industry (or „Macmillan Committee‟) by the Labour government of 
Ramsay MacDonald. In a repeat of the Royal Commission on Indian Currency and 
Finance, Keynes dominated the Committee‟s proceedings as he brought to bear the 
analysis he was developing in A Treatise on Money. 
 
In spite of this dominance, Keynes was frustrated by the workings of the Macmillan 
Committee‟s EAC, driving him to write to MacDonald in July 1930 on the subject of 
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setting up a Committee of Economists, with a specific remit of producing a set of anti-
Depression policy recommendations. MacDonald decided to follow Keynes‟s advice 
and the Committee held its first meeting on 10 September 1930, with all the 
appointees that Keynes had suggested, including Pigou, Robbins and Robertson; Kahn 
acted as joint secretary. However, the Committee also proved to be something of a 
mixed blessing for Keynes: on the one hand, he had demonstrated his institutional 
power by getting it set up in the first place, but on the other, the Committee‟s 
deliberations were often characterised by dissent, the most notable example being 
Robbins‟s opposition to a proposal to introduce an emergency import tariff; Keynes 
eventually had to give way and allowed Robbins a minority report. Moreover, when it 
came to it, the Committee‟s findings were buried by the Cabinet as they were 
allegedly too general to be of any practical use. This, coupled with „[t]he relative 
meagreness of [his] public activities in the early 1930s‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 436) and the 
associated „collapse of his networks of persuasion‟ (ibid.) meant that Keynes‟s 
institutional influence during this period and for much of the rest of the 1930s was 
clearly not as extensive as he would have wished, even given his belief only a few 
years beforehand that his ideas were beginning to be taken more seriously in official 
circles. (The view that Keynes‟s influence on Treasury thinking was limited in the 
1930s is supported by Middleton (1982, 1983 and 1985), Peden (1980, 1983, 1984) 
and Tomlinson (1981; see also Booth 1989: 24), who instead point to the importance 
of political and administrative constraints on economic policy-making during this 
time.) Apart from all this, Keynes suffered a major heart attack in May 1937 and 
despite attempts to exert some kind of influence from his hospital bed, he was, in 
reality, almost totally removed from officialdom for a significant part of the decade. 
 
Nevertheless, with another conflict looming, it was inevitable that a man of Keynes‟s 
talents would be found a place in the Whitehall machinery. His rehabilitation had its 
roots in a brace of articles he published in The Times in mid-November 1939 which 
would go on to form the basis for How to Pay for the War. The General Theory had 
dealt primarily with an economy faced by a lack of effective demand and possible 
deflation. But Keynes was able to turn this analysis on its head and apply it to the 
booming conditions of wartime. In particular, he knew that the economy would be at 
full employment during the war and that this could give rise to inflation as producers 
would be unable to increase supply and so would try to increase prices instead. In 
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response, Keynes advocated rationing and a scheme of compulsory saving which 
would serve to defer consumption until after hostilities had ended. These proposals 
were picked up by Whitehall and, in July 1940, Keynes was given a room at the 
Treasury and a few months later was made a member of the Chancellor‟s Consultative 
Committee. 
 
Even if his return to the Treasury came too late to influence Chancellor Sir John 
Simon‟s main budget of April 1940 and his supplementary budget three months later, 
Keynes made a considerable impact on the July 1941 budget presented by Simon‟s 
successor, Sir Kingsley Wood. Apart from Keynes, Hubert Henderson, Dennis 
Robertson and Lord Catto were also at the Treasury, although it should be 
remembered that the role of economists in Whitehall was still extremely limited, a 
situation which probably played into Keynes‟s hands as it made it easier for him to 
influence Wood without having to compete against other centres of power within the 
civil service.
25
 All the same, it was clear to Churchill that a well-run domestic 
economy would be vital to Britain‟s war effort, this forming the basis of his decision 
to divide the Central Economic Information Service into two parts, the Central 
Statistical Office and the Economic Section (ES), in January 1941. 
 
Recruits to the ES were usually young and had, more often than not, been heavily 
influenced by the General Theory; James Meade, a one-time core member of the 
Circus, was one such individual. In June 1940, he had returned to Britain from a 
posting at the League of Nations in Switzerland, this after Austin Robinson had asked 
him if he would help set up a system of national accounts for use in the Wood budget. 
But despite the increased profile enjoyed by economists in government as a result of 
the creation of the ES, working conditions were far from easy for Meade and his co-
workers, as the following, almost quaint, description demonstrates: „[Meade] drew up 
a complicated and comprehensive system of balancing tables; a young Cambridge 
graduate in the Ministry of Economic Warfare, Richard Stone, was sent over to help 
him with the statistics… Stone joined Meade in his tiny room with its single desk, 
established himself on a corner of the desk with a quill pen and a hand calculator, and 
                                                 
25
 In what would turn out to be one of his less accurate forecasts, Keynes was of the view that the 
Treasury would never need more than two economists! 
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gradually moved from the corner of the desk to the centre, while Meade turned the 
handle of the calculator‟ (Howson 2008). In spite of their extremely limited resources, 
Meade and Stone had, by late 1940, succeeded in producing double entry accounts for 
a whole country. The fruits of their work, „National Income, Saving and 
Consumption‟, was circulated by Keynes to Treasury officials in December 1940 and 
it would go on to have a major impact on the budget of July 1941 (the „Keynes 
budget‟) via the 1941 White Paper entitled An Analysis of the Sources of War Finance 
and an Estimate of the National Income and Expenditure in 1938 and 1940. 
Chancellor Wood was impressed and was happy to be the messenger for one of the 
first major steps in what turned out to be a revolution in national income accounting; 
Wood‟s additional approval of a tax burden in excess of the level recommended by 
Keynes in order to keep a lid on inflation was further testament to Keynes‟s influence 
at this time. With inflation falling significantly between 1940 and 1943, Keynes was, 
it seems, proved right: his ideas had already become highly influential, only a few 
years after the appearance of the General Theory. 
 
There is another side to this story however. When considering Keynes‟s impact on 
official thinking in the 1940s it is worth remembering that the level of awareness of 
technical economics amongst the Treasury‟s senior personnel was, for the most part, 
not particularly high. Granted, there were some outstanding economists working in 
government. Ralph Hawtrey was one of the most notable, but because he spent much 
of the war collecting material for a history of war finance, he had little or no influence 
on policy (see Peden 2006: 110). 
 
Hawtrey‟s talents contrasted sharply with what could sometimes be a severe 
deficiency in economics training amongst the mandarins. A good example was 
Wilfred Eady. Eady had secured a First Class degree in Classics from Cambridge and 
became Second Secretary to the Treasury in 1942. His economic adviser was none 
other than James Meade. Eady felt at a distinct „disadvantage in discussions with the 
young professional adviser‟ (Clarke 1998: 170), reflecting the fact that he had had no 
formal schooling in economics. For his part, Meade was astonished that such a 
situation could prevail: „When one looks at it objectively, what a state of affairs it is 
when the man chiefly responsible for internal and external financial policy has had no 
technical training. I am sure that in our grandchildren‟s days this will be considered 
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very odd‟ (Meade in ibid.). What with all this together with the fact that Keynes 
already knew many of the senior officials in government from his Eton and 
Cambridge days, one has to question how difficult it really was for him and his 
acolytes to bring Treasury officials round to their way of thinking. Indeed, this is an 
aspect of the Keynesian Revolution which probably deserves a greater level of 
attention. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Despite his eminence, it took Marshall more than a decade of campaigning to bring 
the Economics Tripos into existence, a period in which he suffered from „frail health 
and limited energies‟ (Levitt 1976: 439). Moreover, with the formation of the Tripos 
coupled with wider changes in teaching practices that were happening in 
Cambridge,
26
 Marshall‟s lecturing and administrative responsibilities were to „absorb 
much of his energy…frustratingly so‟ (Whitaker 1996: xix). On the other hand, his 
teaching load should be seen in some context. Keynes (1924: 358) states that Marshall 
gave „two lectures a week in a general course, and one lecture a week on special 
theoretical difficulties; but he lectured, as a rule, in only two terms out of three, 
making about forty-five lectures in the year.‟ Of course, Marshall spent many 
additional hours supervising. But in terms of the number of hours dedicated to 
lecturing, his load was around half that compared to Keynes‟s when the latter was at 
his most active at Cambridge in the years prior to the First World War but also when 
the Economics Tripos was much expanded. 
 
Much has been made of Marshall‟s alleged lack of participation in activities outside 
Cambridge. In the years leading up to 1890 much of his time was taken up by the 
writing of the Principles and it would not have been a surprise if Marshall had 
decided that, with the Principles out of the way, his life‟s work was done (even if the 
first edition was suggestively subtitled „Volume I‟). His external activities do indeed 
pale in comparison to those of the hyperactive Keynes and he never attained the close 
proximity and influence over senior political figures enjoyed by his famous pupil. 
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 For example, „[i]t was no longer possible for [Marshall] to give his few required lectures to „Poll 
men‟ (ordinary degree students)…as Fawcett had done‟ (Whitaker 1996: xix). 
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Then again, Marshall was far from averse when it came to providing advice and 
guidance when he thought it appropriate. He gave evidence to five official 
commissions, including the Gold and Silver Commission (1887), the Commission on 
Local Taxation (1897), and the Indian Currency Commission (1899). Most 
importantly, Marshall served on the Royal Commission on Labour, which sat from 
1891 to 1894. The Commission had been convened by the Salisbury Administration, 
which was worried about increasing levels of industrial conflict. Marshall took an 
active part in questioning witnesses and used his position to test his emerging theories 
on wages and employment (see Lawlor 2006: 48). Unfortunately, the time that 
Marshall spent on official business, especially the Labour Commission, together with 
the work required to get the Tripos in place meant that there was less time for more 
theoretical work in the 1890s, notably a second volume of the Principles (see 
Groenewegen 2006: 88). 
 
Hayek: 
 
During the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek‟s institutional power was restricted due to a 
combination of factors, one of the most important of which was that he never became 
involved in British economic policy-making at central government level. At best, 
there may have been an opportunity for him to exert some influence through the 
EAC‟s Committee of Economists, but Robbins‟s efforts to get Hayek to give evidence 
to the Committee failed, Keynes no doubt wary of introducing any further 
complications into the proceedings; an appearance by Hayek would surely have upset 
the apple cart even further. 
 
There was certainly no question over Hayek‟s credentials. As previously noted, he 
had risen to become director of the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, a 
position which catapulted him on to a bigger stage. But the ability of the Institute to 
influence policy-making in Austria was compromised by the fact that its founder, 
Mises, was a Jew and was known for his outspoken liberal views. Both of these 
factors would have been „indisputable barriers to advancement‟ (Vaughn 1994: 63) in 
Vienna in the 1920s and 1930s. There is also some evidence to suggest that Mises was 
not the easiest man to get on with. All the same, the work Hayek produced at the 
Institute was enough to secure him a post at the LSE, and although it was still 
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overshadowed by the ancient universities, the LSE had already become a leading 
institution within British academia by the 1930s. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Whilst Keynes and Hayek were attached to two leading academic institutions in the 
1930s, Kalecki‟s institutional presence was very limited during this period. Granted, 
his meticulous work as an economic journalist did play an important part in his 
securing a post at the Polish Institute of Research on Business Cycles and Prices in 
1929. But the Institute cannot be said to have had anything approaching the reputation 
enjoyed by either Cambridge or the LSE. Even when Kalecki moved to Cambridge in 
the late 1930s, Keynes‟s presence and reputation loomed larger than ever at the 
University, underpinned by the stir created by the General Theory. Moreover, as we 
have seen, Kalecki would probably have never made it to Cambridge had it not been 
for the intervention of Keynes and his close circle. 
 
In fact, it was only from around 1940 that Kalecki was able to start making a name for 
himself at an institutional level when he went to work at the Oxford Institute of 
Statistics. Not one to waste time, Kalecki quickly became „the guiding spirit‟ of the 
Institute, „which consisted mainly of people with left-wing (Labour Party) 
sympathies‟ (Steindl 1981: 591). But even if Kalecki‟s later proposal that all 
consumer goods should be rationed during the Second World War did receive a lot of 
attention, it was already far too late for his earlier revolutionary ideas on the cycle to 
have any meaningful impact. 
 
The rest of Kalecki‟s career was mostly characterised by disappointment after 
disappointment whenever institutional interaction was involved. There were his failed 
attempts as an economic advisor to the governments of Cuba, India and Israel, his 
difficulties at the United Nations as a result of the McCarthy witch-hunts, and his 
multiple resignations. Even when he had the opportunity to spread his ideas, Kalecki‟s 
high moral standards often intervened, forcing him, for instance, to turn down what 
must surely have been a tempting job offer from Stanford University on the grounds 
of his opposition to the United States‟s controversial military involvement in 
Vietnam. 
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Indeed, if Kalecki was going to have any institutional impact one would expect it to 
have been later on in his career when he returned to his native Poland in 1955, by 
which time he had already made something of a name for himself in the West. By the 
mid-1950s, his „penchant for doing economics [had] developed into a near-passion‟ 
(Brzeski 1976: 617), partly driven by his close association with Hilary Minc, a senior 
minister in the communist government that came to power in Poland after 1945. It 
was through Minc that Kalecki was able to work at the Polish Planning Commission. 
However, despite Kalecki‟s hopes for the future, his network of influence began to 
disintegrate after Minc‟s exit from the political scene in 1956. In truth, Kalecki‟s job 
at the Commission was not all it was cracked up to be. According to Brzeski (ibid., 
619), a fellow worker, Kalecki „had no regular duties… He had no decision-making 
power whatever. Most revealing of his status: he had no staff. The Commission of the 
Perspective Plan of which he was the Chairman…was an ad hoc group, with poorly 
articulated authority, and insufficient control over planning activities… [I]ts substance 
and procedures were subject to a hierarchy of which Kalecki, though nominally in 
charge, was not a part.‟ Eventually, realising his ineffectiveness and frustrated by 
major disagreements over investment policy with Ladislaw Gomulka, head of the 
ruling Polish United Workers‟ Party, Kalecki resigned from the Commission in 1961. 
 
In the years following these events, Kalecki made a successful return to academic life 
at the Polish Academy of Sciences. Once again, he became the leading light, this time 
in the Department of Economics and was a key force behind the establishment in 
1962 of the Centre of Research on Underdeveloped Economies (CRUE), of which he 
was chairman. But by then, of course, the revolutionary contributions that Kalecki had 
made to macroeconomics three decades previously had long been eclipsed by the 
Keynesian Revolution. 
 
Summary: 
 
We have seen how Keynes‟s performance in terms of his power at the institutional 
level was not as clearly positive as with the preceding three criteria, although there 
were still some affirmative aspects; Hayek was in a similar position in this category. 
Institutional power was again largely absent in Kalecki‟s case. Finally, Marshall can 
be said to have outperformed each of the other three on this measure. 
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Table 5. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘iv. Leader with institutional power’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
iv. Leader with institutional power ± + ± -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
Morrell-Geison argues that a research school is more likely to be successful if its 
leader has a significant degree of institutional power. More often than not, the 
institution in question is a university. In an extension of Morrell-Geison, however, we 
have seen how institutional power outside of academia can also play a crucial part in 
determining research school success or failure. More specifically, the British civil 
service – in particular the Treasury – and government were key battlegrounds in the 
first half of the 1940s in the fight to get Keynes‟s ideas officially accepted. 
 
Keynes‟s relationship with officialdom was a topsy-turvy one. Granted, he was 
consulted by both Liberal and Conservative chancellors of the exchequer. On the 
other hand, his resignation from the British delegation at Paris meant that he was not 
in the front line of economic policy-making in the 1920s, while the writing of the 
General Theory and illness limited his influence during the 1930s. Moreover, his 
admission to British MPs in 1931 that over the previous 12 years he had had „very 
little influence, if any, on policy‟ (Keynes in CW XX: 611) was an acknowledgement 
that, amongst other things, he had failed to win the day on the Committee of 
Economists, this despite being its „central figure‟ (Patinkin 1982: 204). Had the 
General Theory been in circulation at the time of the Committee‟s deliberations, 
Keynes‟s influence in Whitehall would probably have been much greater. Instead, he 
had to wait until the July 1941 budget before his ideas first had a major impact on 
British economic policy. 
 
After this, the 1942 Social Insurance and Allied Services report, otherwise known as 
the Beveridge Report (Beveridge 1942), which assumed that the government could 
run the economy along Keynesian lines, provided further institutional support for 
Keynes‟s theories, while the 1944 White Paper on Employment Policy incorporated a 
political commitment to maintain full employment through Keynesian-inspired 
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policies. Notwithstanding the fact that demand management continued to be 
something of a blunt instrument, the foundations which Keynes, Meade and others 
had put in place meant that it became an accepted part of policy-makers‟ armoury 
within a relatively short period of time. On a related note, the work of Meade and 
Stone in particular can be seen as a vital extension of the original Keynesian School at 
Cambridge and is, as such, a nod in the direction of the cognitive type of research 
school identified by Rocke (1993). 
 
At Cambridge, Keynes‟s institutional power was bolstered by the Economics Tripos. 
Granted, Tripos duties meant that in the early years of his academic career, Keynes‟s 
teaching load was onerous. Nevertheless, he was still able to reduce these duties from 
1919 onwards and by the early 1930s was institutionally powerful enough to cancel 
some of his Cambridge lectures which, together with a sloughing off of other 
administrative calls on his time, meant that he could devote more time to writing the 
General Theory and to fostering ties with those sympathetic to his cause. Later on, by 
the middle of the Second World War, Keynes seems to have been happy to let his 
revolution run its course in the knowledge that it was, in any case, gaining a full head 
of steam, both at Cambridge and in Whitehall. Given what we know about Keynes‟s 
sometimes multifarious institutional entanglements, one is left wondering how much 
more „impressive‟ – for want of a better word – his intellectual output might have 
been had he not been burdened by his activities away from theoretical economics. At 
the very least, his hyperactivity played a major role in his premature death: had he 
lived a few more years, he would surely have had the opportunity to fully develop and 
publish his „notes‟ on the General Theory which, in turn, would have helped to 
eliminate much of the subsequent confusion over what he actually meant. Conversely, 
the ambiguity of the General Theory was indeed part of its attraction for economists; 
any attempt at clarification may have reduced such ambiguity which could have 
diluted the impact of Keynes‟s revolutionary ideas. 
 
Meanwhile, both Hayek and Kalecki had little institutional power in the 1930s and 
1940s. Neither was successful during this period in promoting their ideas at 
governmental level, either in Britain or abroad. Hayek was undoubtedly influential at 
the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research, which played a major part in 
establishing his reputation as a serious economist and in securing him an appointment 
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at the LSE. But his closest confidant at the LSE, the charismatic Lionel Robbins, was 
not powerful enough to provide the necessary support for Hayek in his battle against 
Keynes, Robbins‟s failure to secure an opportunity for Hayek to give evidence to the 
Committee of Economists being one manifestation of this. 
 
Whilst Hayek had the benefit of being employed in a recognised academic institution, 
Kalecki‟s access to institutional power in his early career was virtually non-existent. 
At a broader level, Kalecki „spent most of his adult life bounced about between Josef 
Pilsudski‟s anti-Semitic fascism, Oxbridge‟s snobbish condescension, Joe McCarthy‟s 
populist witch-hunting, and Ladislaw Gomulka‟s relapse into neo-Stalinism‟ 
(Bronfenbrenner 1976: 464). By the time Kalecki had reached Oxford, where he was 
able to exert some institutional influence, the General Theory had already been in 
print for four years. What is more, whilst Kalecki was at Oxford, Keynes was at the 
Treasury, overseeing a revolution in fiscal policy. Even in later life, Kalecki‟s access 
to institutional power was constrained by his high moral code and by his failure to 
establish close and lasting relations with senior politicians. 
 
 
v. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, ‘discipleship’ 
 
„Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, and „discipleship‟‟ often flow from the 
other criteria identified by Morrell-Geison. For example, loyalty to a research leader 
is sometimes the result of that leader possessing charisma. Since Morrell‟s and 
Geison‟s original articles, their analyses of social cohesion and loyalty have been 
extended in three crucial ways. First, Geison himself has noted that different 
disciplines can, by definition, generate more or less opportunity for cohesion. He 
focuses on the distinction between research schools in the field sciences, such as 
entomology, and laboratory-based schools: „In the latter the research director and his 
apprentices [work] cheek by jowl in the same physical and instrumental setting, day in 
and day out. In the field sciences, by contrast, the members of a research 
school…are…spatially dispersed at least part of the time‟ (Geison 1993: 233). 
 
Second, Hagen (1993: 194) highlights the fact that the loyalty generated by a research 
school, both towards its leader and between its members, can act as an “intellectual 
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buffer” between the group and non-group researchers. Consequently, when a school 
comes under external attack, its members are more likely to rally to its support when 
such a buffer exists. 
 
Finally, Hagen (ibid., 178-179) also shows that the presence of a so-called „ideal 
student‟ in the research school can be important in underpinning group loyalty. Hagen 
argues that an ideal student must be in possession of a number of qualities, including 
the ability to independently develop the leader‟s ideas in directions which enable the 
school‟s research programme to be extended in ways not necessarily imagined by the 
leader. In pursuing these other lines of enquiry, the ideal student must simultaneously 
possess enough loyalty to the leader so that the integrity of the wider school‟s 
research programme is kept intact. Hagen notes that „[s]uch a balance of intellectual 
qualities is not often found‟ (ibid., 179). 
 
Keynes: 
 
Keynes did not achieve the commanding heights of the General Theory on his own. 
He received crucial help and input primarily from the Circus, a small group of young 
economists at Cambridge who began to meet on an informal basis in late 1930 to 
discuss Keynes‟s evolving ideas. Over the subsequent few months, the group‟s 
meetings expanded to include some of the more promising economics undergraduates 
although, highlighting its exclusive nature, attendance at Circus gatherings was only 
granted to those who passed a stern interview with some of the senior members. The 
core of the Circus was made up of Richard (later Lord) Kahn (then aged 25), Joan 
Robinson (27), James Meade (23) and Piero Sraffa (32); Joan Robinson‟s husband, 
Austin (33), was also part of the group, but did not contribute „directly to Keynes‟s 
thinking‟ (Cairncross 1994: 906).27 
 
For the purposes of providing some background, it should be noted that arguably the 
most important outcome of the Circus‟s discussions was to persuade Keynes to „recast 
his analysis in terms of changes in output‟ (Moggridge 1973: 78), a stark difference 
                                                 
27
 Other peripheral members of the Circus included R.B. Bryce, C.H.P. Gifford, A.F.W. Plumptre and 
L. Tarshis. 
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from the focus on changes in prices which had dominated his analysis in A Treatise on 
Money. Other important issues identified by the group included the fallacy of the 
widow‟s cruse in conditions of unemployment, and the clarification of definitions, 
accounting identities and causal relationships (see Feiwel 1989: 39). Still, the Circus‟s 
contribution should probably not be overstated. Austin Robinson notes the following: 
„I think the Circus put together some of the ingredients. But many of the ingredients 
were there already and Keynes was aware of them. He only had to be reminded of 
them‟ (A. Robinson 1985: 57). Kahn supports this position, adding that „it did not 
occur to any of us that we were doing more than adding glosses and embroideries to 
Keynes‟s work. Any further advance was made by Keynes‟ (Kahn in ibid., 49). Given 
these comments, Joan Robinson‟s assertion that the Circus sometimes had „trouble in 
getting Maynard to see what the point of his revolution really was‟ (J. Robinson 
1979a: 170) appears to be something of an exaggeration. 
 
Keynes‟s interaction with the Circus reflected his broader preference, especially as he 
got older, for group-orientated intellectual activity. There was a precedent for this 
type of behaviour, albeit not linked to economics. Keynes was a member of the 
Bloomsbury Group, a coterie of artists and scholars which came together in the 
opening years of the 20th century and which remained intact, in one form or another, 
until the Second World War. Mini (1991: 159-160) argues that Keynes‟s Bloomsbury 
connection must have been „of great support…enabling him to withstand the criticism 
of his economic and political ideas by outsiders who did not share his premises, and to 
that extent Bloomsbury not only encouraged him to continue but strengthened his 
appreciation of the value of solidarity.‟ In this sense, then, Bloomsbury provided a 
buffer for Keynes in his efforts to get his economic ideas accepted.
28
 Of course, there 
were important differences between the functioning of Bloomsbury and the Circus, 
most importantly the fact Keynes never attended Circus meetings, this a reflection of 
his not wanting to overawe other attendees linked, no doubt, with a desire to avoid 
generating possible irritation amongst those not able to keep up with the speed of his 
mind. Nevertheless, the Circus can be viewed as a microcosm of Bloomsbury at 
Cambridge insofar as it too provided an intellectual crutch for Keynes. 
                                                 
28
 At a broader level, Goodwin (2006: 236) argues that Bloomsbury made Keynes „both a more ethical 
human being and a more ethical economist.‟ 
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Even though the other core members of the Circus were Keynes‟s close associates and 
friends, there can be little doubt that he had a special affinity with Richard Kahn. It 
was in Kahn‟s lodgings at King‟s College that the Circus‟s meetings began, before 
they were moved to a more spacious room at Trinity. The strong intellectual link 
between Keynes and Kahn had already begun to take shape a couple of years earlier 
when Kahn was a 22-year-old economics student. Skidelsky (1992: 287-288) sets the 
scene: „Keynes had had good economics students before… But…Kahn was the first 
who was able and willing to help him in his own work… On 29 April 1928, Keynes 
wrote to Lydia, „Yesterday my favourite pupil Kahn wrote me one of the best answers 
I have ever had from a pupil – he must get a first-class‟‟. Once Kahn‟s place in 
Keynes‟s affections was secured, the two were a force to be reckoned with, especially 
when it came to criticising the work of others: „“Why is there such obstinacy and 
wilfulness in error?” [Keynes] asked about Gottfried Haberler‟s Prosperity and 
Depression [1937], which he got Kahn to savage in the Economic Journal‟ (Skidelsky 
2000: 7). 
 
The contribution that Kahn made to the General Theory has been a matter of some 
contention (see Harcourt 1994 and Marcuzzo 2002). Moggridge (1992: 532) and 
others claim that Kahn himself was of the view that he and the Circus played a major 
part in guiding Keynes‟s thinking while Schumpeter (1954: 1,172) suggests that 
Kahn‟s contribution „cannot have fallen very far short of co-authorship‟. Granted, 
Kahn was Keynes‟s most important bulwark against technical mistakes. Indeed, the 
meticulous nature of Kahn‟s mind was legendary, a point not lost on Keynes: „I am 
now engaged in trying to write out…a really detailed, but nevertheless popular, 
account of the relation between primary and secondary employment. I hope I don‟t 
make any bloomers, – I wish you were here to look over my shoulder‟ (Keynes to 
Kahn, 24 March 1933, CW XIII: 413). 
 
In addition to the above, we also have Keynes‟s reporting of the „stiff supervisions‟ 
(Keynes in ibid., 422) which Kahn gave him during the drafting of the General 
Theory and how this led to a „paradoxical “inversion” of roles‟ (Marcuzzo ibid., 444) 
between the two men, with the „pupil [intervening] to correct, tidy up, and sound out 
the master‟s rationale‟ (ibid.). Finally, there was Kahn‟s seminal article on the 
multiplier, which gave Keynes‟s system a greater degree of theoretical respectability. 
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Against all of this evidence, however, must be weighed Kahn‟s own clearly stated 
opinion that he (and the Circus) provided nothing more than „glosses and 
embroideries‟ to Keynes‟s work. Given this, it seems that those who assign a greater 
role to Kahn have decided, unjustifiably, to overrule the evidence of the person best 
qualified to comment on the matter. Moreover, it was also the case that Kahn and 
Keynes did not always see eye-to-eye on theoretical matters. Thus, Kahn has 
described how Keynes‟s notion of voluntary unemployment left him „very cold‟ 
(Kahn 1976: 23) and that, as a result, he „took no interest in the wording of Chapter 2 
of the General Theory‟ (ibid., 24). 
 
The second key member of the Circus was Joan Robinson, a woman of „outstanding 
brains, personality and looks‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 287). If Robinson allegedly only 
feared Sraffa when it came to debating economics (see Harcourt and King 1995: 39), 
she clearly also held Keynes in great respect, as the following letter from her to him 
demonstrates: „It has just occurred to me that I have been being extremely dense. The 
point of our [the Circus‟s] supply curve business is that it steps into what is 
admittedly the breach in your method, i.e. the effect on output of the redistribution of 
profits between industries… I feel very much ashamed of giving you trouble by not 
saying where our method dovetails into yours and allowing you to think that our tools 
were quite different from yours. The only difference is that you use a box spanner and 
we use an adjustable one‟ (J. Robinson to Keynes, 11 May 1932, CW XIII: 379). But 
Robinson need not have been ashamed: Keynes saw her as integral to his intellectual 
endeavours and, fortunately, did not take the same dim view of women economists as 
Marshall. 
 
While Robinson may not have been quite as intimate with Keynes as Kahn was, 
Keynes was confident enough in her abilities to ask for her comments on various draft 
versions of the General Theory: „Here is a first instalment, namely Book I… I shall be 
extremely grateful for any criticisms of form or substance‟ (Keynes to J. Robinson, 8 
June 1935, ibid., 638). Keynes went on: „Could you and Austin dine with Lydia and 
me in King‟s on Thursday…and come with us to the Handel afterwards?‟ (ibid.). 
What we see here, then, is not only the strong intellectual relationship between 
Keynes and Robinson, but also evidence of how close they were socially. 
(Incidentally, Robinson had to decline Keynes‟s invitation to attend the Handel 
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concert as she and her husband had already been invited to the same event by 
Keynes‟s mother!) 
 
On a different occasion a few months later, a letter from Robinson to Keynes 
arranging a meeting to discuss the drafts of the final chapters of the General Theory 
highlights her awareness of the need to protect Keynes‟s ideas from prying outsiders 
whilst also trying to minimise the influence that those who were not part of the Circus 
might be having on Keynes. It is a good example of Hagen‟s intellectual buffer: 
„Thursday at 8 will be fine. It is possible Austin may have to be away, but I won‟t ask 
anyone in, in case you would like to talk about the book. I will keep my notes on these 
chapters until then… I hope you won‟t let Roy [Harrod] intimidate you about 
[chapter] 26. I think it is very important to have it, and it is very enjoyable to read. I 
don‟t think you have overstated matters at all‟ (J. Robinson to Keynes, 7 September 
1935, ibid., 651). 
 
The buffer was not always effective however. Robinson and Kahn were extremely 
critical of IS-LM. This supposed simplification of the General Theory received its 
first major public airing at a meeting of the Econometric Society at Oxford in 
September 1936, a gathering which Young (1987: 3) has justifiably described as „one 
of the most important in the history of modern economic thought‟, but which neither 
Robinson nor Kahn attended. Despite Keynes‟s own ambivalence towards IS-LM, his 
two protégés categorically claimed that it was not a fair representation of the General 
Theory‟s central message which, they maintained, was, in fact, the fundamental role 
played by uncertainty and expectations in determining economic fluctuations. 
However, this view started to be edged out at the Oxford meeting, with IS-LM getting 
the initial upper hand (although the Robinson-Kahn view has arguably won the day 
over subsequent decades). Whether things would have turned out differently had 
Robinson and/or Kahn been in Oxford is a matter of speculation, although given that 
IS-LM gave policy-makers a more determinate framework to work with than the often 
highly ambiguous General Theory coupled with the fact that Harrod, Hicks, Meade 
and others had simultaneously developed variations of IS-LM-type models, it seems 
doubtful that attendance at Oxford would have made much difference.
29
 
                                                 
29
 It nevertheless remains unclear why Kahn and/or Robinson failed to make an appearance at Oxford. 
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Putting the above to one side, Joan Robinson‟s contribution to the Keynesian 
Revolution did not stop at her involvement with the Circus and her comments on 
drafts of the General Theory. Her contemporaneous and subsequent written output on 
Keynesian themes was extensive. To begin with, she penned two articles in 1933 
which were updates of Keynes‟s latest ideas: one was „A Parable on Savings and 
Investment‟ (J. Robinson 1933a), which appeared in the February Economica and was 
an attempt – albeit an ultimately unsuccessful one – to mediate between Keynes and 
Hayek in their dispute over A Treatise on Money, whilst the second, „The Theory of 
Money and the Analysis of Output‟ (J. Robinson 1933b), was published in the first 
volume of the Review of Economic Studies. In this article, Robinson sought to explain 
– in a mood which, it has to be said, was at times rather critical of Keynes – the 
revolutionary nature of the switch from analysing changes in prices to analysing 
changes in output which the Circus had been urging Keynes to adopt. This was 
followed by the appearance of her Introduction to the Theory of Employment (J. 
Robinson 1937a), a “told to the children” version of the General Theory. Keynes‟s 
positive reaction to Robinson‟s book gave a strong indication that he was aware of the 
difficulties readers were having in trying to understand the General Theory: „You‟ve 
been very successful, I think, in simplifying and have skated round the complications 
beautifully‟ (Keynes to J. Robinson, 20 November 1937, JVRP vii/240/14). In 1937 
Robinson also published her Essays in the Theory of Employment, where her stated 
objective was to „apply the principles of Mr. Keynes‟ General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money to a number of particular problems‟ (J. Robinson 1937b: v), 
notably the Marshallian long period. Finally, in her magnum opus, The Accumulation 
of Capital (J. Robinson 1956), Robinson attempted to extend Keynes‟s system further 
to account for growth and capital accumulation, all the time fighting against „bastard 
Keynesianism‟, as she saw it (see J. Robinson 1962a).30 
 
Apart from Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson, there were two other prominent 
members of the Circus. The first was James Meade. Meade took part in the group‟s 
discussions while spending a postgraduate year at Cambridge in 1930/31. Keynes 
                                                 
30
 Given his prominent role in the origination of IS-LM, Hicks became the target for much of the 
criticism levelled by those, including Joan Robinson but also Paul Davidson and Hyman Minsky, who 
were of the view that IS-LM misrepresented the General Theory (see Coddington 1983: 67). See also 
Leijonhufvud (1968: 49). 
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considered him to be of considerable promise and the two got on socially, Keynes 
inviting Meade to dine with him at High Table at King‟s and taking him to meet his 
parents at Harvey Road (see Howson 2000: F124). For his part, Meade considered 
Keynes to be „God‟. Decades later and long after Keynes‟s death, Meade described 
how he was still under Keynes‟s „magic spell‟ (Meade 1983: 263). (Interestingly, out 
of all the Circus members, both in the core and on the periphery, Meade was the only 
one to receive the Nobel Prize, sharing the 1977 award with Bertil Ohlin for 
contributions to international trade theory.) 
 
Meade‟s role in the Circus has arguably been overlooked by historians of economic 
theory, who have instead preferred to concentrate on the roles played by Richard 
Kahn and Joan Robinson. However, Meade was „more active than any of us‟ (A. 
Robinson 1977: 33), not least because of the amount of spare time that he had at his 
disposal due to his postgraduate status. This aside, given that Meade was still only 23 
together with the fact that the other main participants in the Circus were already well 
on their way to becoming reputable economists, his contribution becomes even more 
impressive. 
 
Meade‟s work was often underpinned by mathematics (albeit not overly so) and even 
Keynes, who was rarely stumped on technical matters, was puzzled and „looked 
around the room for „Mr Meade‟s Relation‟ on first acquaintance‟ (Clarke 1988: 249; 
see also Meade 1993). At the same time, Meade maintained that he had the basic 
elements of what was to become the General Theory in his head when he returned to 
teaching duties at Oxford in the autumn of 1931. This appears to be an over-simplistic 
assessment given that Keynes was to toil for another four or so years on the book. 
Either way, there is little doubt that Meade was sympathetic to the original Keynesian 
system and that this sympathy was to play a crucial role in subsequently shaping 
British economic policy: Meade promoted Keynes‟s ideas through the New Fabian 
Research Bureau in 1933 when „many of Labour‟s future economic policies 
were…being thrashed out‟ (ibid., 286). Together with Colin Clark, Meade was 
thereby instrumental in the conversion of the Labour Party‟s younger economists to 
Keynesianism by the end of the 1930s (see Howson 2000: F125). Then there was 
Meade‟s work within the ES, which gave him a further excellent opportunity to exert 
influence on policy. Booth goes as far to say that, „If Keynes was the dominant 
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intellectual power behind wartime discussions of postwar external policy, the driving 
force in the shaping of postwar macroeconomic domestic policy was James Meade… 
[H]e managed to persuade the [ES] to unite behind a Keynesian programme which 
slowly but surely worked its way through the Whitehall committee structure‟ (Booth 
1989: 93). But Keynes and Meade, as with Keynes and Kahn, did not always agree. 
During the war, as part of the National Debt Enquiry, Meade‟s support of interest rate 
flexibility was directly opposed to Keynes‟s preference for low and stable interest 
rates. Despite a stout defence by Meade, the cheap money option was adopted by 
Chancellor Hugh Dalton. Meanwhile, having assumed the directorship of the ES in 
1944, Meade decided to leave in 1947 due to a mixture of frustration and poor health. 
He eventually returned to Cambridge in 1957 as Robertson‟s successor as Professor of 
Political Economy, but even though he remained at Cambridge for 11 years, his 
experience was marred by the cool reception he received from the Cambridge 
„Keynesians‟, who regarded him as too neoclassical (see Howson ibid., F137). 
 
The final prominent member of the Circus was the Italian, Piero Sraffa. Wanting to 
escape Mussolini‟s Fascist government, Sraffa settled in Cambridge in 1927 and soon 
became close friends with Keynes. Socially, the two could often be found visiting 
Cambridge‟s antiquarian bookshops on the lookout for a bargain, Keynes 
affectionately referring to this as “Pottering with Piero”. Sraffa was someone whom 
Keynes „liked to worry about. He was negligent about his clothes [and] had a horror 
of lecturing‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 290). In line with his fear of public exposure, Sraffa 
was also extremely reluctant to publish. Luckily for him, Keynes saw beyond these 
eccentricities and was instrumental in keeping Sraffa at Cambridge through various 
non-teaching appointments after Sraffa resigned his lectureship in economics in 1931. 
 
Sraffa was well acquainted with Keynes‟s early theoretical work as he had translated 
the Tract into Italian in 1925. However, the two men held decidedly different 
positions when it came to economics. Keynes found Sraffa‟s preoccupation with 
Ricardo and Marx rather odd whilst Sraffa did not agree with many of the arguments 
contained in the General Theory, in particular Keynes‟s views on liquidity preference. 
Joan Robinson went further, claiming that Sraffa „never really quite knew what it was 
that we [Keynes and the Circus] were going on about‟ (J. Robinson 1979b: 1). Given 
the power of Sraffa‟s intellect and the fear it held for Robinson, this again seems to be 
 80 
something of an exaggeration. This aside, Keynes had a great deal of respect for 
Sraffa and in his capacity to defend the Cambridge economics fortress against 
external attacks; Sraffa‟s savage review article of Prices and Production for the 
Economic Journal was ample demonstration of this, Sraffa referring to the book as a 
„maze of contradictions‟ which made the reader „completely dizzy‟ and „prepared to 
believe anything‟ (Sraffa 1932: 45) out of sheer despair. Keynes must have been 
delighted at Sraffa‟s loyalty. 
 
From the above, it is apparent that discipleship played an important part in 
determining the success of Keynes‟s research school at Cambridge, a point Keynes 
himself was well aware of. Writing to Harrod in August 1936, he complained how, 
„[E]xperience seems to show that people are divided between the old ones whom 
nothing will shift…and the young ones who have not been properly brought up and 
believe nothing in particular… I have no companions, it seems, in my own generation, 
either of earliest teachers or of earliest pupils‟ (Keynes to Harrod, 30 August 1936, 
CW XIV: 85). While Keynes may have been technically correct in his assessment, he 
was being a little pessimistic. It is true that he had considerable trouble convincing 
some of his contemporaries, notably Robertson, of the merits of the General Theory. 
Furthermore, the likes of Richard Kahn were far from being amongst Keynes‟s 
earliest cohort of pupils. However, he did have a number of supporters outside 
Cambridge who were able to propagate his message to a wider audience both within 
Britain and abroad. 
 
In Britain, Keynes‟s most prominent non-Cambridge-based follower was Roy Harrod. 
Harrod was at Oxford from the 1920s to the 1960s and in 1922 spent some time 
studying economics under Keynes at Cambridge. Through their extensive 
correspondence, Harrod had a significant influence on Keynes‟s thinking during the 
writing of the General Theory. Harrod was instrumental in making Keynes realise that 
it was possible to have separate curves for saving and investment rather than 
collapsing the two into the same thing (although he was less successful in his attempts 
to persuade Keynes to soften his attack on classical theory) (see Phelps Brown 1980: 
13-14). Harrod provided valuable additions to the Keynesian corpus in his own right 
and it was partly through these contributions that he ended up seeing himself as „the 
disciple on whom the responsibility for continuity had especially fallen‟ (Harrod 
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obituary from The Times in Skidelsky 1992: 696). A key Harrodian theory was the 
„warranted rate of growth‟, which extended the General Theory by identifying „that 
rate of growth which, if it occurs, will leave all parties satisfied that they have 
produced neither more nor less than the right amount. Or, to state the matter 
otherwise, it will put them into a frame of mind which will cause them to give such 
orders as will maintain the same rate of growth‟ (Harrod 1939: 16; see also Harrod 
1948). At a broader level, the building of growth theory within a Keynesian 
framework was part of a wider Oxbridge research programme, with Harrod playing a 
leading role. 
 
For his part, Keynes regarded Harrod as the most accomplished economist at Oxford 
(see Skidelsky ibid.). Even though he was geographically removed from the 
discussions going on in Cambridge, Harrod was in regular contact with Keynes. He 
also corresponded with Kahn. Kahn realised Harrod‟s importance as a defender of 
Keynes‟s ideas, aware of the role Harrod could play in spreading the Keynesian 
doctrine at Oxford. In a revealing letter, Kahn wrote to Harrod in November 1934: 
„You are one of the few economists in the whole world on whom Maynard can 
reckon. I do not add the words “outside Cambridge” because the number of 
Cambridge economists, as you may by now have noticed, who can really be regarded 
as Maynard‟s supporters is a vanishingly small quantity. Such as we are, we do very 
much look to you as a leader in what must after all be described as a fight‟ (Kahn to 
Harrod, 13 November 1934, Kahn Papers (King‟s College, Cambridge) 13/57/70). 
Thus, Kahn here takes on the role of disciple but also, to an extent, recruiter, even 
though Harrod‟s support for Keynes was more or less assured by this stage. 
 
Keynes was fortunate enough to have access to a group of students and, to a degree, 
colleagues who were willing to help him in his quest for a new economics. In 
addition, some of these followers were active in promoting Keynes‟s ideas outside 
academia. We have already seen how Meade pushed Keynesian theory in Whitehall. 
Yet, for the Keynesian gospel to spread beyond Britain‟s shores, it was necessary for 
there to be supporters further afield, especially in America. Galbraith (1998: 11-12) 
notes how the General Theory created a considerable amount of excitement amongst 
the younger economists in the United States, a view confirmed by Samuelson (1946: 
187), who posited that Keynes‟s ideas „caught most economists under the age of 35 
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with the unexpected virulence of a disease first attacking and decimating an isolated 
tribe of South Sea Islanders. Economists beyond 50 turned out to be quite immune to 
the ailment.‟ But given the General Theory‟s inherent difficulty, Keynes‟s ideas still 
needed to be interpreted and championed. Across the Atlantic, the main thrust of this 
support was provided by Alvin Hansen. Of course, Keynes had other devotees in the 
United States. Most notable in this respect was the Canadian, Lorie Tarshis, who had 
attended Keynes‟s lectures at Cambridge in the early and mid-1930s. In 1938, Tarshis 
and a group of colleagues from Tufts (where he was then teaching) and Harvard 
published An Economic Program for American Democracy. The book, which 
criticised Washington‟s economic policy-makers for not adopting a greater 
interventionist stance, received widespread attention and confirmed Tarshis as a 
devout Keynesian. Most importantly, from a policy perspective, it also influenced the 
United States‟s 1938 budget.31 
 
Nevertheless, it was Hansen who was to be the standard bearer of the Keynesian 
message in the United States. Hansen had spent time at the University of Minnesota 
before securing a professorship at Harvard in 1937. He initially had doubts about the 
General Theory, writing a highly critical review of it in the Yale Review of June 1936 
where he argued that, „It is reasonably safe to predict that Keynes‟s new book will, so 
far as his theoretical apparatus is concerned, fare little better than did the “Treatise” 
[on Money]‟ (Hansen 1936a: 829). But in spite of this initial hostility, Hansen had, 
after just a few months of reflection, become more sympathetic, subsequently stating 
that the General Theory „will stimulate thinking on fresh lines in the field of 
economic dynamics‟ (Hansen 1936b: 686). He still accused Keynes of using 
unconvincing arguments and suggested that the General Theory was more „a 
symptom of economic trends than a foundation stone upon which a science can be 
built‟ (ibid.). Be that as it may, it was clear that Hansen was gradually becoming a 
convert, an exception to Samuelson‟s supposition that economists over 50 were 
                                                 
31
 Tarshis‟s later book, The Elements of Economics: An Introduction to the Theory of Price and 
Employment, which appeared in 1947 and was the first textbook to be written within a Keynesian 
analytical framework, did less well due to allegations that its author had Marxist sympathies, 
allegations which turned out to be wide of the mark (see Harcourt 1995: 1,249). Although not a 
textbook, Timlin (1942) was also an important early exposition of the General Theory to come out of 
North America. 
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somehow immune to the General Theory (Hansen was in his fiftieth year when it 
appeared).
32
 
 
Hansen was in an excellent position to influence both contemporary and future policy-
makers. A key channel through which this influence was exercised was his famed 
Fiscal Policy Seminar at the Graduate School of Public Administration at Harvard, 
which began in September 1937 and ran for 19 years until Hansen‟s retirement in 
1956. The seminar would regularly draw in senior officials from Washington, keen to 
hear Hansen‟s latest views on budgetary policy, views which began to take on an 
added interest for officials as a result of the 1937 recession. All the same, it would be 
wrong to portray the seminar as dominated by Hansen as it was jointly organised and 
chaired by his colleague, John H. Williams, a sceptic when it came to the General 
Theory, who would use the meetings to air his differences with Hansen (see Haberler 
1976: 12). 
 
Hansen was not the only prominent Keynesian in Harvard‟s Economics Department. 
There was also Lauchlin Currie, who by the time he became Franklin Roosevelt‟s 
chief economic advisor in July 1939 had „established an informal network 
of…converts extending into all of the fiscally significant agencies‟ (Galbraith 1975: 
229). Furthermore, a number of attendees at the Fiscal Policy Seminar went on to hold 
high-ranking governmental and/or advisory positions, including one Chairman of the 
Council of Economic Advisers plus a handful of other Council members, two Under-
Secretaries of the Treasury, two Assistant Secretaries of State for Economic Affairs, 
and four members of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (see 
Salant 1976: 22). 
 
Hansen himself was highly influential in his role as a consultant to the Federal 
Reserve Board – he was very close to Marriner Eccles, chairman of the Fed from 
1934 to 1948 – and from late 1934 onwards was instrumental, with the help of Currie, 
in converting the Fed to Keynesianism. Moreover, although he never held an official 
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 Barber (1987) posits various reasons for Hansen‟s transformation into a Keynesian, including his 
move to Harvard, where he was more exposed to issues relating to fiscal policy, and the 1937 economic 
downturn in the United States, although neither of these reasons, it has to be said, account for the 
mellowing in Hansen‟s opinion of the General Theory which took place over the course of 1936. 
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government post, Hansen played a key role in getting Congress to understand the 
importance of the budget as a tool in policy-making and in committing the federal 
government to a policy of full employment in the landmark Employment Act of 1946 
(see Tobin 1976: 34). 
 
In terms of written support for Keynes‟s ideas, Hansen demonstrated his allegiance to 
the General Theory in various publications, including Full Recovery or Stagnation? 
(1938), Fiscal Policy and Business Cycles (1941), and A Guide to Keynes (1953). 
Even though the last of these exaggerated the emphasis that Keynes had placed on 
deficit spending as a means of curing a downturn, the book became part of Keynesian 
orthodoxy. In the meantime, Keynes was fully aware of the importance of his 
supporters in the United States and wrote „admiringly‟ (Galbraith 1998: 12) of those 
youngsters in particular who propounded his case in Washington. On a related point, 
Keynes would also have been concerned that the General Theory had failed to make 
an impression at the prestigious Department of Economics at the University of 
Chicago, and probably wanted to encourage his supporters at Harvard as much as 
possible with a view to establishing a bulwark against any criticism from Chicago. 
 
Finally, Britain and the United States were not the only places where the Keynesian 
message was making an impact in the 1930s and 1940s. In Canada, the General 
Theory was being advocated by Keynes‟s Canadian students. Robert Bryce was one of 
them and because he had been taught by Keynes at Cambridge, Bryce felt that he had 
a „special licence‟ (ibid., 13) to explain what Keynes meant. Moreover, his 
appointment to a number of senior posts in the Canadian government, eventually 
ending up as Deputy Minister of Finance in 1963, was an important element in 
Canada becoming „perhaps the first country to commit itself unequivocally to a 
Keynesian economic policy‟ (ibid.). 
 
Marshall: 
 
As with many aspects of his character, Marshall‟s approach to discipleship and esprit 
de corps was somewhat contradictory. There is firm evidence to support both his 
introverted intellectual style and his lack of interest in socialising on the one hand, and 
his ability to produce disciples on the other. By way of context, Marshall was a 
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predominantly lone thinker. Many of his most innovative ideas came to him as he 
meandered his solitary way through the Alps, or when, in 1881, he went to Italy for 
nearly a year, this trip inspiring Keynes‟s (1924: 353) memorable depiction of 
Marshall discovering the concept of elasticity as he sat on the roof of a small hotel in 
Palermo. Tollison (1986: 913-914) puts forward two convincing explanations for 
Marshall‟s burst of productivity during his Italian sojourn: the first was that he was 
away from his normal surroundings and so could look upon the world „through a 
different window‟ (ibid., 914). Second, Marshall was recovering from illness brought 
on by a kidney stone. This forced him to rest his body, giving his mind the ideal 
opportunity to wrestle with new ideas. 
 
Back in Cambridge, there was a distinct lack of social cohesion between Marshall and 
Neville Keynes. As we have seen, Keynes found Marshall to be „a dreadful bore‟, and 
these sentiments were transferred to the social realm, Marshall never being invited to 
the Keynes home in Harvey Road. Maynard Keynes would have been aware of these 
tensions and it seems that he tried to throw a smokescreen over them by stating that 
Marshall „did not much care about going to other people‟s houses‟ (Keynes 1924: 
357) despite his „great conversational powers‟ (ibid.). The lack of social interaction 
between Marshall and Neville Keynes was also probably a reflection of the 
differences in their respective approaches to economics, the best example of this being 
Marshall‟s critique of the methodological system adopted by Keynes in his best 
known book, The Scope and Method of Political Economy, which appeared in 1891, 
just a year after Marshall‟s Principles. 
 
Despite these problems, Neville Keynes is still regarded as a disciple of Marshall‟s, as 
are a host of other important economists, the result of a number of them having been 
under his tutelage at Cambridge and elsewhere. By 1890, Marshall had already been 
teaching economics for two decades, not only at Cambridge but also at Bristol and 
Oxford. Amongst his Cambridge-educated followers were Charles Sanger, Arthur 
Bowley, Sydney Chapman, Arthur Pigou, Charles Fay, Walter Layton and, of course, 
John Maynard Keynes; Pigou was particularly loyal. Moreover, despite his attack on 
the classicals, Keynes could not get away from the fact that he had a Marshallian 
heritage. Loyalty to Marshall also resulted from his extensive use of the oral tradition, 
which produced subtleties in his work which only the initiated (i.e. his colleagues and 
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pupils) could understand. The effect was in many cases irresistible and gave rise to „a 
circle of cognoscenti‟ (Becattini 2006: 614) who felt that they were the „custodians of 
an esoteric knowledge with a special mission‟ (ibid.). 
 
Hayek: 
 
With the fanfare that greeted the lectures he delivered at the LSE in early 1931, Hayek 
might have been forgiven for believing that his new academic home was going to 
provide him with an opportunity to recruit disciples. But even if it was clear within a 
relatively short space of time that many of the School‟s best young economists were 
being won over by Keynes, it would be wrong to assume that there was a complete 
absence of the elements required – at least in the initial stages of his professorship – 
for Hayek to establish a cohesive group of supporters. To begin with, his closest ally 
was Lionel Robbins. Robbins was head of the Economics Department and the man 
responsible for bringing Hayek to London from Vienna. The two men soon become 
close friends: as well as daily contact at the LSE, they lived in close proximity to each 
other in Hampstead Garden Suburb in North London and would often visit each 
other‟s homes. At a broader level, Hayek has also described how the staff in the 
Economics Department „rapidly [became] a circle of very close friends… We got on 
extremely well together. There was very little need for any formality or formal 
organisation‟ (Hayek in Ebenstein 2001: 82). All the same, apart from Hayek‟s 
friendship with Robbins, there seems to have been limited social interaction between 
members of staff, there being „very little social life beyond the occasional entertaining 
of a visiting colleague‟ (Hayek in ibid.). It seems therefore that Hayek was unable to 
replicate the very sociable relationship he had with Robbins, in spite of his claims 
regarding the Department‟s togetherness. At the very least, this failure must have 
been, in part, due to spatial constraints, staffers no doubt retreating to the far-flung 
corners of London after a hard day‟s work in the Aldwych. This would have been in 
stark contrast to Keynes and his supporters at Cambridge who lived pretty much 
within a stone‟s throw of each other. 
 
A lack of social cohesion did not necessarily mean that there was a lack of unity 
amongst the LSE‟s ranks in the early 1930s when it came to intellectual matters, 
especially if it involved fighting Cambridge. Even if this unity fell away as the 1930s 
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progressed, it was alive and kicking in the early years of the decade. One of the best 
examples of it took place in October 1932 when, with British unemployment running 
at over 20%, a group of Cambridge economists, including Keynes and Pigou, sent a 
letter to The Times advocating an increase in government spending. Not wanting to 
miss an opportunity to engage with the enemy, the LSE‟s big hitters, including Hayek, 
Gregory, Plant and Robbins, published their response shortly after, criticising the use 
of higher public expenditure as a means of reducing the jobless total. 
 
There was also no shortage of talent at the LSE, and Hayek was initially able to form, 
with Robbins‟s help, a „group of young theorists who were more or less like-minded 
about economics and could have all been called Hayekians‟ (Shehadi 1991: 381-382). 
Among them were John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor and Abba Lerner. Hicks‟s theoretical 
prowess meant that he would have been a prime candidate to take on the 
corresponding role vis-à-vis Hayek as that played by Kahn in his relations with 
Keynes. But he was distracted by his own work on constructing an analytical 
economic framework founded on Paretian and Walrasian principles, a framework 
which would have been „alien to Hayek‟s Austrian ideas‟ (McCormick 1992: 31). 
Any lingering hope that Hayek might have had of Hicks coming to his aid in the battle 
with Cambridge vanished when Hicks left the LSE in 1935 and took up a lectureship 
at Cambridge at the invitation of Pigou. Even though he arrived too late to take on a 
significant role in the group around Keynes,
33
 Hicks was destined to play a major part 
in the Keynesian Revolution as a result of his diagrammatic formulation of IS-LM 
(Hicks 1937).
34
 
 
A specific symptom of Keynes‟s growing ascendancy during the 1930s was the 
switch in loyalties away from Hayek and towards Cambridge that took place amongst 
many of the LSE‟s staff and students. Both Kaldor and Lerner were clear 
manifestations of this seemingly ineluctable trend. Nicholas (later Lord) Kaldor had 
both studied and lectured at the LSE and was for a time, like Hicks, strongly 
influenced by Hayek. However, this changed with the advent of the General Theory 
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 Even though he ended up being a supporter of Keynes, Hicks‟s first affiliation on arriving in 
Cambridge was with Robertson (see Klausinger 2006: 631). 
34
 At Keynes‟s request, Hicks also wrote a review of the General Theory, which appeared in the June 
1936 number of the Economic Journal (Hicks 1936; see also Hamouda 1993: 199). 
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and was confirmed by Kaldor‟s article on wages and unemployment in the December 
1937 Economic Journal, a piece which „was crucial in winning acceptance for 
Keynes‟s ideas‟ (Skidelsky 1992: 698). After this, Kaldor was increasingly drawn to 
Keynes and his immediate circle, a process facilitated by the LSE‟s evacuation during 
the Second World War to Cambridge, where Kaldor would go on to become a Fellow 
of King‟s in 1949 and ultimately a Professor of Economics in 1965. 
 
Just as interesting was the case of Abba Lerner. Lerner was a Russian-born economist 
who studied and taught at the LSE from 1929 to 1937. By 1936 it was clear that he 
also had become sceptical of Hayek‟s theories, in part encouraged by his six-month 
stay at Cambridge in 1934-35 when he had come into contact with Keynes. On top of 
this, Lerner had become the „main link‟ (Shehadi 1991: 386) at the regular meetings 
held between Cambridge and LSE staff members at Bishop‟s Stortford – a practical 
solution in geographic terms, although even here Cambridge just had the upper hand! 
– where members of Keynes‟s coterie would try to explain the new gospel to their 
London colleagues in the hope of winning them over. Keynes never attended these 
gatherings, but they were led by the impressive figures of Joan Robinson and Richard 
Kahn. In what must have been a fascinating series of discussions, Lerner has 
described how the two tribes once met for a whole weekend in an attempt to finally 
get to grips with Keynes‟s theory. It was one of the LSE‟s first introductions to 
Keynesianism: „Mainly…it was Joan Robinson in charge… [A]s we would try to 
understand, she‟d say, “Yes, that‟s right; now you‟re getting the idea…No, no; now 
you‟ve gone backwards.” When the weekend was over we still didn‟t know what they 
were talking about… They were confident that we were either just very stupid or 
backward – and we thought they were crazy, obviously doing something that didn‟t 
make any sense, but we couldn‟t quite put our finger on what was wrong‟ (Lerner in 
Landreth and Colander 1989: 359). 
 
Later on, in June 1936, Lerner, who was by then fully versed in the new ideas, wrote 
to Keynes to tell him about a favourable review he had written of the General Theory 
in the International Labour Review. Keen to encourage Lerner, Keynes wrote back: „I 
think your article is splendid. You have succeeded in getting a most accurate and 
convincing story into a small space‟ (Keynes to Lerner, 16 June 1936, CW XXIX: 
214). With this blessing, Lerner had become a fully-fledged convert and would go on 
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to write the influential The Economics of Control (Lerner 1944), a book based on his 
PhD thesis at the LSE which developed the theory of functional finance, even if, as 
with Hansen‟s A Guide to Keynes, Lerner went beyond anything that Keynes had ever 
advocated. 
 
Lerner‟s devotion to Keynesianism was not a flash in the pan. Thus, in a review of 
Lerner‟s later book, Economics of Employment (1951), the reviewer commented that, 
„The theoretical part of this volume is pure and undiluted Lord Keynes. Its practical 
part is pure and undiluted Lerner. Lord Keynes appears here as Allah, and Lerner as 
his militant Prophet… Indeed, there is something of [a] religious fervor in Lerner‟s 
treatment of the Keynesian theory as the key to universal prosperity and happiness‟ 
(Woytinsky 1952: 110). Interestingly, Lerner‟s interpretation of the General Theory 
was different from Hansen‟s: Lerner stressed the importance of controlling monetary 
and especially fiscal policy as a means of avoiding slumps while Hansen was more 
focused on the problem of secular stagnation (see Colander 1984: 1,573). Even 
though both men were confirmed disciples of Keynes, the fact that they had different 
takes on the General Theory was an early example of how Keynes could appeal to 
varying audiences. 
 
Meanwhile, with the LSE proving to be an increasingly difficult recruiting ground for 
Hayek, the impressive array of economists who visited the School in the 1930s 
provided him with an alternative opportunity to secure disciples. However, this also 
turned out to be a false dawn. Amongst those who frequented the LSE during this 
period were Gottfried Haberler, Fritz Machlup, Erik Lindahl, Bertil Ohlin, Frank 
Knight, Jacob Viner and Joseph Schumpeter. Due to his status as one of the stars of 
the Austrian School, it was Hayek himself who was instrumental in bringing to the 
LSE this „host of intellectual contacts from abroad which otherwise would not have 
existed‟ (Robbins 1971: 127). But for various reasons, he was never able to turn these 
visitors into devotees. The Swedes already had firm views on the cycle and the 
determination of output levels in the short period, which were more in line with 
Keynesian thinking than anything Hayek had to offer. With regard to the Americans 
and those non-Americans based in America, the failure to convert was fatal. Haberler 
tried to promote Austrian ideas at Harvard but lacked sufficient influence to sustain 
and strengthen the effort, this despite a growing reputation founded on his seminal 
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contributions to international trade theory. Later on in the 1930s, any efforts by 
Haberler to promote Austrian theories at Harvard were not helped by the fact that 
Cambridge, England, and especially Kahn, was, as we saw, deeply of critical of the 
first edition of what would nevertheless become Haberler‟s classic text on business 
cycles, Prosperity and Depression (1937). Unfortunately for Hayek, Haberler‟s attack 
on the multiplier had to wait until the second edition of Prosperity and Depression 
which appeared in 1939. Even after all this, Haberler himself still regarded the 
General Theory as a stimulating book, his loyalties between Austria and Keynes being 
torn possibly as a result of the month he had spent at Cambridge in 1932 as Keynes‟s 
guest. Further, Laidler (1999: 243) argues that Hayek‟s lack of impact in the United 
States was in part down to the fact that he could not call on the services of an 
„American equivalent to Lionel Robbins, an established senior figure in an important 
department of economics who adopted and promoted [his ideas].‟ Laidler is right to 
make this general point, but his specific reference to Robbins is inappropriate as 
Robbins, while an „established senior figure in an important department of 
economics‟, could not provide the necessary intellectual support required by Hayek in 
his battle with Keynes. 
 
In addition to defections and a lack of discipleship, Hayek faced opposition to his 
theories from other junior members of staff at the LSE as the 1930s progressed, a 
situation „in contrast to the support that Keynes received from the younger economists 
at Cambridge‟ (McCormick 1992: 3). For instance, Evan Durbin drew attention to the 
fact that Hayek‟s theory of the business cycle did not work if unemployment was 
already present and that it failed to give an adequate account of why unemployment 
tended to increase in a downswing (see ibid., 71-75). Matters were also not helped by 
the increasing popularity at the LSE of the theories emanating from the 
aforementioned Swedish School, in particular the work of Gunnar Myrdal and Bertil 
Ohlin. These ideas were championed at the LSE by Brinley Thomas, who had visited 
Sweden for six months in 1936 and whose Monetary Policy and Crisis (1936) was an 
exposition of Sweden‟s relatively rapid recovery from the Great Depression as a result 
of its adoption of interventionist policies. Given the parallels between the Swedish 
School‟s theories and those that Keynes was working on, it was no surprise that the 
warm welcome which the former would end up receiving at the LSE – not least 
amongst the likes of Hicks, Kaldor and Shackle – „helped to intensify the interest in 
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the epoch-making book that Keynes was expected to publish soon‟ (B. Thomas 1991: 
390).
35
 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Kalecki‟s primary intellectual concern was with discovering the truth. He treated any 
secondary matters connected to his work as just that, secondary. Granted, he was keen 
to influence other economists, but preferred to do it solely through the power of his 
ideas rather than through the representations of disciples. Nevertheless, a greater 
effort on his part to establish a group of loyal supporters, in the 1930s especially, 
would have undoubtedly helped to strengthen the propagation of his theories. 
 
It would be incorrect to say that Kalecki had no disciples and attracted little loyalty. 
He had his own fan club in the later phase of his career, even if it was „reserved, 
discrete, and not apparent to the outside world, including the bulk of professional 
economists‟ (Klein 1975: v). In his earlier years, the closest that Kalecki came to 
enjoying any kind of esprit de corps was with the Polish statistician, Ludwik Landau. 
The two men struck up a productive partnership at the Polish Institute of Research on 
Business Cycles and Prices, a partnership which led to the publication in 1934 and 
1935 of investigations into Poland‟s national income, and a piece on Poland‟s prices, 
costs and industrial production, also 1935. Although not as close as his work with 
Landau, Kalecki, in addition, collaborated with the promising young economist, 
Marek Breit, at the Institute. 
 
All of this was going on against the background of a significant increase in popularity 
for Polish economics, driven in particular by Oscar Lange and his ideas on the 
economics of socialism (see Lange 1936, 1937). But the failure of Kalecki and Lange 
to create disciples during this period was in stark contrast not only to Keynes at 
Cambridge but also the Swedish School. Bronfenbrenner (1969: 74) puts it in the 
following manner: „Poland burst on the economic scene in the 1930s with Kalecki and 
                                                 
35
 There has been considerable debate over whether the Swedish School anticipated the General 
Theory, although the evidence is arguably not as strong as that which is supportive of Kalecki‟s claim. 
Moreover, the Swedish School never challenged Keynes in the way that Hayek did. Any further 
consideration of the Swedish case is therefore precluded from this thesis. 
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Lange, much as Sweden had done at the turn of the century with Cassel and Wicksell. 
Sweden…remained in the limelight by reason of the generation after the Cassel-
Wicksell one; such names as Lindahl, Lundberg, Myrdal, and Ohlin come to mind. It 
seems natural to look for Lindahls, Lundbergs, Myrdals, and Ohlins among the Polish 
disciples of Kalecki and Lange… [U]nfortunately…there isn‟t a Lindahl, a Lundberg, 
a Myrdal, an Ohlin, or indeed much else...‟ 
 
We have seen previously how Kalecki was able to establish a rapport with Tew and 
Hsu, his two research students at Cambridge. This was in the late 1930s, after the 
appearance of the General Theory. Later on, Kalecki‟s ability to recruit disciples was 
met with mixed outcomes. His years at Oxford produced some measure of success, 
most notably in the form of Joseph Steindl and David Worswick. However, this 
influence did not extend to undergraduates, the result being „no large body of Oxford 
students to constitute a Kalecki generation‟ (Worswick 1977: 27). Back in Poland, 
Kalecki‟s reputation was bolstered by the followers he managed to recruit through his 
work at CRUE. But in later years, under pressure from the Polish authorities, some of 
Kalecki‟s students emigrated whilst others had their research activities seriously 
curtailed. Of course, the Keynesian Revolution had long become established by then. 
 
Summary: 
 
„Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, „discipleship‟‟ is one of the strongest 
categories for Keynes. Marshall also performs well, especially in the loyalty stakes. 
Both men are well ahead of Hayek and Kalecki, neither of whom was able to form 
much of a following around themselves and/or their ideas during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Table 6. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘v. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps, ‘discipleship’’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
v. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de
    corps , 'discipleship' + + - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
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We have tried to show how „Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de corps and 
„discipleship‟‟ played a key part in underpinning the Keynesian Revolution during the 
1930s and 1940s. At the heart of this effort was the Cambridge Circus. Having just 
finished A Treatise on Money, Keynes could easily have decided to go his own way. 
Yet he realised the Circus‟s importance, in particular its focus on the importance of 
changes in output rather than prices. Granted, the Circus did not follow up with 
statistical checks of the General Theory (see Klein 1966: 192). However, Klein‟s 
opinion that the Circus would have been eminently well qualified to carry out such 
analyses is only half right at best: Joan Robinson, for one, was never trained as a 
mathematician and there was never much evidence of Piero Sraffa being interested in 
empirical testing. Richard Kahn and/or James Meade might have been candidates, but 
the former was noted for his dithering when it came to publishing whilst the latter was 
engaged in other projects. 
 
The Circus provided Keynes with the “intellectual buffer” required to see off potential 
opponents, a state of affairs which has been described as „almost religious protection‟ 
by Blaug (1994: 1,205). To further appreciate this point one only has to think of the 
verbal onslaught meted out by Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson to Hubert Henderson 
at a meeting of the Marshall Society in May 1936, this after Henderson had attempted 
to mount a full-scale attack on the General Theory (see CW XXIX: 218). Such 
devotion may have been one of the reasons why Hayek chose not to review the 
General Theory; it also played a major part in Dennis Robertson being hounded out of 
Cambridge in 1938.
36
 Furthermore, it should be noted that the production of 
Keynesian disciples at Cambridge would probably not have been possible without 
Marshall‟s efforts to establish the Economics Tripos. Marshall‟s work and reputation 
enjoyed its own high degree of protection, mostly due to the efforts of Pigou, and it 
does not seem unreasonable to argue that Kahn and Robinson observed Pigou‟s 
devotion to Marshall and decided to replicate it with Keynes. 
 
The Circus provided Keynes with ready-made disciples. However, if we are looking 
for the „ideal student‟ as described by Hagen (1993: 178-179), the prime candidate 
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would arguably not be Kahn, Keynes‟s favourite pupil, but rather Joan Robinson. 
Robinson‟s theoretical work was essential in extending Keynes‟s ideas in important 
directions, not necessarily considered by Keynes himself. Robinson also played a key 
role in communicating a simplified version of the General Theory through her 
Introduction to the Theory of Employment, thereby going some way to confirming 
Galbraith‟s assertion that Keynes was „deeply dependent on his prophets‟ (Galbraith 
1998: 8). The Circus also produced James Meade, who played a crucial part in 
promoting Keynesian ideas in Whitehall during the Second World War. Interestingly, 
however, as we will see later on, Keynes was not always successful in using his 
influence to secure official appointments for his supporters. Thus, he tried but failed 
to get either Kahn or Harrod into the Treasury during the war. Meanwhile, the last key 
member of the Circus, Piero Sraffa, was never quite convinced by Keynes and the rest 
of the Circus. Fortunately for Keynes, Sraffa was too absorbed in his own work on the 
theory of value to pursue any serious objections he may have had, but was 
nevertheless prepared to act as an effective critic of Hayek‟s Prices and Production. 
 
The Circus was not the only source of discipleship for Keynes. If his ideas were to 
become part of mainstream thinking, he had to convince his American audience, a 
task made possible by the support of Alvin Hansen and others. For their part, Hayek 
and Kalecki never had a Hansen equivalent. Hayek had considerable trouble 
recruiting disciples at the LSE, let alone in the United States. As already noted, there 
was hardly a scarcity of potential recruits, among them Hicks, Kaldor and Lerner, and 
Hayek‟s influence can be seen in some of their later work, specifically Hicks‟s and 
Kaldor‟s capital theories and Lerner‟s theory of optimal socialist planning. 
Notwithstanding this, the appeal of Keynes‟s developing ideas coupled with the 
impact of Swedish theories at the LSE resulted in the rapid decay of the Hayekian 
camp, such that by the time Hayek‟s The Pure Theory of Capital appeared in 1941, 
former sympathisers had „come to question the whole Austrian approach, and this 
dense and difficult tome did little to alter that‟ (Caldwell 2004: 176). Even Robbins, 
who had, by that time, become director of the ES in 1941, had become a lot more 
sympathetic to Keynesian theory. With the failure of The Pure Theory of Capital, 
Hayek turned his attention away from economics and towards political theory.
37
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Finally, there was the physical proximity enjoyed by Keynes and his Cambridge 
disciples. As Cambridge was and still is relatively small, access to kindred spirits and 
social interaction was made much easier. In this sense, Cambridge can be said to have 
been akin to an economics laboratory in the early and mid-1930s. Social interaction, 
whilst present at the LSE between Hayek and Robbins, was less evident within the 
wider Economics Department due to a combination of the spatial constraints of living 
in London and because many of Hayek‟s colleagues and students eventually came to 
disagree with his views on the cycle. Finally, aside from his sometimes intense 
personality, Kalecki‟s inability to settle in one place for a prolonged period did little 
to help any effort on his part – which itself seems to have been broadly absent in the 
1930s – to establish a group of disciples who could have challenged Keynes. 
 
 
vi. Focused research program 
 
While Morrell-Geison could perhaps be more explicit about the particular meaning of 
this category – in particular, to what extent it differs from criterion viii, „Invasion of 
new field of research‟ – it is intuitively obvious what is meant: it is important that a 
research school, if it is to be a success, works towards a common set of goals. In some 
instances, this may translate into solving some long-standing problem or issue. 
 
Keynes: 
 
On the first day of 1935, Keynes was able to confidently write to his friend George 
Bernard Shaw: „To understand my state of mind, however, you have to know that I 
believe myself to be writing a book on economic theory which will largely 
revolutionise – not, I suppose, at once but in the course of the next ten years – the way 
the world thinks about economic problems… I can‟t expect you, or anyone else, to 
believe this at the present stage. But for myself I don‟t merely hope what I say, in my 
own mind I‟m quite sure‟ (Keynes to Shaw, 1 January 1935, CW XIII: 492-493). 
Even if Keynes‟s confidence was impressive, by simultaneously stating that his 
revolution would take a decade to achieve, he underwrote his belief that any research 
programme which flowed from the General Theory would have to be successfully 
sustained over a number of years. 
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Backhouse (2006a: 20) identifies Keynesian economics as referring to three different 
things, namely: demand management; a political philosophy grounded between 
Marxism and the free market; and Keynes‟s attempt to change economic theory. It is 
the first and last of these that most interests us here. What Keynes and his early 
adherents came up with was a synthesis of new and extant ideas which were broadly 
pertinent to the issues thrown up by the Depression, in particular the problem of mass 
and sustained unemployment. This synthesis has, when seen as a whole, arguably 
become the most important legacy of the Keynesian Revolution, a legacy which 
retains a major influence up to this day despite the emergence of numerous rival 
research programmes, many of which owe a debt of some sort or other to the General 
Theory. 
 
It may seem obvious but the fact that Keynes‟s theories continue to be regarded as 
important is partly down to the importance that Keynes and his supporters attached to 
the policy usefulness of their theoretical output. Austin Robinson has noted that, 
„never…did Keynes in late life devise an economic tool purely for its own sake rather 
than to solve an immediate practical problem in the application to government of the 
methods of economic analysis‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 10). When we consider to what 
extent the Keynesian Revolution helped to generate a new field of research, i.e. 
economists‟ theoretical response to the Great Depression, it is apparent that there was 
plenty for researchers to focus their attention on. The General Theory implied the 
importance of creating a coherent framework for the analysis of national income and 
related statistics, not least because this would help to improve the treatment of any 
multiplier effects. Ever the pragmatist, Keynes „worked hard to define all his variables 
in operational terms, relating them whenever possible to actual or potentially available 
data‟ (Blaug 1991: 180). This was particularly the case concerning national income 
data: Keynes knew that he could piggyback on the recently published groundbreaking 
work on national income by Clark (1932) and Kuznets (1934). By using Kuznets‟s 
time series data, Keynes was able to produce the first ever estimate of the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC). The General Theory also stimulated work on 
consumption functions, liquidity preference, and stagnation theories. Of course, 
Keynes‟s research agenda was far from being a rounded one. But putting such issues 
to one side, it remains questionable how rapidly work in the aforesaid areas might 
have progressed had the General Theory never been written. 
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For now, Keynes‟s emphasis on policy relevance provides one affirmative answer to 
the question of whether the Keynesian School possessed a focused research 
programme in the 1930s and 1940s. Other evidence points to a more subtle and 
arguably less positive response. Keynes‟s professional career in the years prior to the 
General Theory have led to him being characterised as a man who would frequently 
change his mind: Elizabeth Johnson (1974: 99) goes so far as to characterise Keynes 
as the „india-rubber man.‟ One of the best examples of this flip-flopping was 
Keynes‟s backing of free trade in the early years of his career and his subsequent 
switch to support for tariff protection. Given this behavioural tendency, Keynes can 
be forgiven for not providing a clearer research programme in the General Theory. 
But of course, this is not to say that he did not have strong views on certain issues. His 
criticism of the application of mathematics to economic problems was well known. 
Despite his undergraduate training in mathematics, Keynes was of the opinion that an 
over-formalisation of economics would mean that theorists would „lose sight of the 
complexities and interdependencies of the real world in a maze of pretentious and 
unhelpful symbols‟ (Keynes in CW VII: 298). At the same time, he was aware that 
mathematics did have a role to play insofar as it provided the degree of sophistication 
that was necessary for variables, such as investment and consumption, to be placed 
within a framework which could be manipulated in order to assist in the drawing up 
and application of policy. 
 
Even given the above, there is still a case for placing less emphasis on the argument 
that Keynes‟s tendency to change his mind should necessarily be seen as a negative. 
As far as his thinking changed during the 1930s and 1940s, this aspect of Keynes 
might be better appreciated if it were considered as a form of adaptation on his part 
rather than anything else. A case in point, as we saw, was his approach to the problem 
of excess demand which he knew would emerge during the Second World War and 
where Keynes demonstrated in How to Pay for the War the flexibility of the General 
Theory‟s implied research agenda. In a sense then, How to Pay for the War can be 
viewed as part of the footnotes which Keynes had otherwise intended to write for the 
General Theory (see Brown 1997: 47). 
 
Much has been made of the General Theory‟s poor construction. In the United States, 
this „unreadability‟ meant that „no-one in Cambridge, Mass. really knew what [it] was 
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about for some 12 or 18 months after its publication‟ (Samuelson in Brown 1988: 28) 
and that it was only with the subsequent IS-LM formulations that readers were given 
greater clarity. Yet, the General Theory‟s open-endedness and a particular fascination 
with the notoriously obscure chapter 17
38
 – which deals with the properties of interest 
and money and where Keynes tries to show that there can be underemployment 
equilibrium – meant that researchers were able to interpret its contents with a fair 
degree of latitude. Leijonhufvud (1968: 10-11) takes this line of argument one stage 
further by suggesting that the problem with the General Theory was not just its poor 
literary style, but also that it contained logical errors, the result being that later 
theorists were given the opportunity to make „repairs‟ as they saw fit. This, in turn, 
was a major contributory factor towards the emergence of the distinction between 
Keynesian economics and the economics of Keynes. 
 
At a broader and more speculative level, Keynes may have had a premonition of 
Thomas Kuhn‟s later landmark work on paradigms and how they are overhauled: 
Keynes was certainly aware that the chances of his research agenda being successful 
would be greater if it not only encompassed new ideas but also made a direct 
challenge to orthodoxy. He had a two-pronged approach: an assault on classical 
economic theory and its claim that large-scale unemployment could not persist, and 
the debunking of the „Treasury view‟. The credibility of the attack on the latter was, 
of course, significantly strengthened by the advent of Kahn‟s article on the multiplier. 
Regarding classical theory, the success of the Keynesian challenge was questionable, 
even if Pigou (1950) did eventually concede that the General Theory was an 
important book, in contrast to his critical review of it some 14 years earlier in 
Economica (see Pigou 1936). 
 
Marshall: 
 
In his 1885 inaugural lecture at Cambridge, Marshall attempted to set out „The 
Present Position of Economics‟. As part of this, he identified the Organon, a 
theoretical framework which would provide those wanting to improve the world 
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through the study and application of economics with the means to do so. The Organon 
also supplied the foundation for Marshall‟s career, laying down, as it did, the basis 
upon which he could build the broader Cambridge School‟s approach to economics.39 
At the same time, he was keen to avoid relying too heavily on formal analysis, 
arguing that economic theory had to be combined with the analysis of other real-world 
phenomena if socio-economic behaviours and trends were to be properly understood. 
Thus, the Organon was, in Marshall‟s view, a necessary but not sufficient condition 
for the alleviation of man‟s ills. 
 
Although it would be fair to say that both Marshall and Keynes had focused research 
programmes, the nature of these programmes was different. In writing the Principles, 
Marshall was responding to the need for there to be a coherent theoretical framework 
for the study of economic problems based, to some extent, on the mathematisation of 
John Stuart Mill‟s ideas on political economy but also on new theories about 
economics developed by Marshall himself and which could be used for pedagogic 
purposes. The focal point of Marshall‟s research agenda was the production of theory, 
albeit, as noted above, not of an overly formalistic type. Keynes‟s focus was also to 
produce theory but with practical applications, most notably, as it turned out, the 
elimination of unemployment. We should not be too unkind towards Marshall as he 
was never faced with the problems presented by the Depression. At the same time and 
putting to one side Keynes‟s attack on classical theory, had Marshall lived to see the 
General Theory, he probably would have been happy that Keynes had filled in a 
missing part of the Organon. 
 
Lastly, we have seen how Marshall had a habit of delaying the publication of his work 
through a mixture of sensitivity to criticism and a desire to ensure that his written 
words reflected as accurately as possible what he wanted to say. This meant that he 
spent excessive amounts of time on detail, thereby probably denying himself the 
chance of making additional discoveries. On a related theme, Marshall was, as we 
already know, much more generous in sharing his latest thoughts with his students 
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 Backhouse (2006b: 28) argues that Marshall‟s interest in economics was sparked by the Cambridge 
philosopher Henry Sidgwick. In the same article, Backhouse also makes the wider case for Sidgwick 
having a much greater influence on the creation of the Cambridge School of Economics than has 
previously been suggested. 
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than with the outside world. Even so, the oral tradition was not the only means of 
communication he had with students: „Much more than [his] published economic 
work, the Syllabus of Economics Studies developed by Marshall mapped out the 
research agenda for his direct and indirect students at Cambridge, by explicitly 
highlighting gaps to be filled‟ (Groenewegen 1988: 650). The theory of money, credit 
and finance was one of these. As such, despite Keynes‟s identification of Marshall as 
one of the classicals and his overthrow of Marshall‟s distinction between real and 
monetary factors in the long period, the General Theory should still be seen as a valid 
part of the mostly Marshall-inspired Cambridge tradition of creating innovative 
economics. Returning to our original point, what we have here is not only the fact that 
Marshall was comfortable in promoting the Organon through the formal syllabus as 
well as informally through the oral tradition, but also his willingness to point out 
those areas ripe for development – all in the name of further strengthening his „engine 
of analysis‟. 
 
Hayek: 
 
Hayek‟s work at the Austrian Institute for Business Cycle Research and, in particular, 
his Geldtheorie und Konjunkturtheorie (1929), secured his reputation as an important 
economic theorist. He certainly enjoyed some propitious conditions in terms of 
developing a focused research programme when he arrived at the LSE. The School‟s 
attack on Cambridge was, to a certain extent, grounded in Robbins‟s important work 
on the methodology and philosophy of economics encapsulated in An Essay on the 
Nature and Significance of Economic Science (Robbins 1932), where he argued that, 
„Economics is the science which studies human behaviour as a relationship between 
ends and scarce means which have alternative uses‟ (ibid., 15).40 Robbins hoped that 
the success of the Essay would bolster the LSE‟s reputation and, by association, 
garner support for Hayek‟s cycle theory. He was certainly keen to focus attention on 
what he saw as Hayek‟s important contributions: Howson (2004: 440-441) notes that 
whilst Robbins was predominantly concerned with defining economics and with 
methodology during the first and second phases of writing the Essay, in the third 
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phase, which took place during the winter of 1931-32, he turned his attention to 
incorporating contemporary economic theory, notably the work of the Austrian 
School. 
 
Aware of his limitations as a theorist, Robbins was keen to help Hayek in any way 
that he could in the fight against Cambridge. In addition to promoting Hayek‟s ideas, 
Robbins used the Essay to attack the use of interpersonal comparisons in science, an 
approach which had been strongly advocated by Pigou in his work on welfare 
economics, itself an extension of the Marshallian research programme. What with 
Keynes‟s own attack on Pigou‟s theory of unemployment in the General Theory, it 
came to be that Cambridge and the LSE were, at different points but separated by just 
a few years, united in their opposition to Marshall‟s protégé.41 But despite this ironic 
turn of events, Hayek and Robbins were ultimately unsuccessful in challenging the 
emerging Keynesian paradigm, in part, it seems, because there was a question mark 
over the extent to which Prices and Production was itself underpinned by a focused 
research agenda. Some of the problem lay in the fact that the result of Hayek‟s 
analysis – where it could be gleaned, for like the General Theory, Prices and 
Production was criticised for sometimes being too abstract – was a policy 
recommendation to do nothing in a downturn: Hayek was in broad agreement with 
Mises‟s assertion that cycles are caused by changes in credit activity and that, as a 
result, a bust should be allowed to run its course through an adjustment of relative 
prices. However, as must have been obvious during the first half of the 1930s, it 
would have been politically impossible for governments to adopt a „doing nothing‟ 
stance given rising unemployment and severely weakened economic activity; nature 
does indeed abhor a vacuum. Moreover, any claim that Hayek may actually have had 
a focused research programme which was able to provide a coherent solution to the 
Depression was made much less certain by the lack of alignment between his theories 
and reality: for example, Prices and Production concentrated on the dangers thrown 
up by inflation, this when deflation was a key feature of the Depression. 
 
A further problem encountered by both Hayek and the broader Austrian School was 
its use of terminology. The various arguments that Hayek had with Keynes and Sraffa 
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which had been ignited by Hayek‟s review of A Treatise on Money were partly 
centered on definitions of key concepts, such as saving and investment. This 
disagreement with what was fast becoming a very important aspect of the Anglo-
Saxon economics literature meant that Hayek and the Austrians, as Klausinger (2006: 
629) points out, were eventually put in the „position of outsiders‟, from where it 
proved difficult to recover. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Various commentators have argued that Kalecki failed to produce a coherent scheme 
of thought. Lipinski (1977: 75) notes how difficult it is to extract any „Kalecki 
system‟ from his work on socialism. Of course, this is not the same as saying that 
Kalecki failed to have any subsequent influence – one only has to think of his 
considerable reputation especially amongst post-Keynesians and the major impact of 
his mark-up theory on the development of industrial economics as examples of how 
his ideas continue to bear fruit. It remains the case, nevertheless, that Kalecki did 
indeed fail to produce a focused research programme with respect to his work on 
cycles and output determination in the short period. A variety of reasons can be 
posited for this. First, he could change his mind, a trait shared with Keynes. However, 
a crucial difference between the two men in this regard was that even though Keynes 
may have frequently revised his opinions, the General Theory provided researchers 
with an opportunity to develop a policy agenda, an opportunity which seemed to be 
less available to those reading Kalecki‟s work. 
 
Another reason behind the lack of a focused research programme relates to Kalecki‟s 
preference for publishing in journals as opposed to writing books. Asimakopulos 
(1986: 815) and Dobb (1976: 369) maintain that Kalecki‟s influence was blunted due 
to his failure to produce a book which contained his „theoretical framework that could 
serve as a basic reference for his approach‟ (Asimakopulos, ibid.). Moreover, Dobb 
notes that even when Kalecki did decide to publish in book form, his ideas came 
across as „disparate‟42 and that this contributed to his neglect, especially in the United 
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States.
43
 There is also some doubt as to whether Kalecki‟s theories of the cycle 
formed a coherent system. Blaug (1987: 260), in particular, highlights Kalecki‟s 
preferred method of theorising, which involved starting off with accounting identities 
and using these same identities as the basis for asserting a causal relationship between 
them and claiming the results to be valid theoretical propositions. Consequently, 
Blaug states that, even if Kalecki‟s macroeconomic ideas had a microeconomic 
foundation, it was „not always clear where this foundation [came] from‟ (ibid.). In 
making this point, Blaug appears to be taking his lead from Keynes, who pointed out 
to both Kalecki and others his (Kalecki‟s) tendency to make questionable 
assumptions. 
 
Finally, even if all of the above is put to one side, any potentially viable research 
agenda which Kalecki might have created with respect to his cycle theories would 
have been tainted by allegations concerning his leftist leanings.
44
 Kalecki saw the 
socialist system as being „superior to the capitalist‟ (Feiwel 1975: 7), a position 
reflected in his attitude towards certain elements of the cycle. A good example was his 
approach to investment. Both Kalecki and Keynes appreciated the important role that 
investment played in capitalist economies. But whereas Keynes described investment 
in generally positive terms, Kalecki was less generous: his view that the „tragedy of 
investment is that it causes crisis because it is useful‟ (Kalecki in J. Robinson 1941: 
235) was, as Joan Robinson pointed out, very close to Marx‟s belief that, „The real 
barrier of capitalist production is capital itself‟ (Marx in ibid.). In the 1930s, Britain 
and the United States were the key battlegrounds in the war of macroeconomic ideas. 
In neither country did socialism or communism become part of the political orthodoxy 
during this period, a fact which would have dented Kalecki‟s prospects had he ever 
tried to mount a challenge to Keynes.
45
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some way to supporting this point. For example, in the 1935 British election, the Communist Party 
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Summary: 
 
Given the evidence relating to their research activities, it is clear that both Keynes and 
Marshall had a clear focus when it came to conducting a research programme. 
Although Hayek and Kalecki both possessed elements of a focused research 
programme, these were arguably not as strong when compared with either Keynes or 
Marshall. 
 
Table 7. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘vi. Focused research program’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
vi. Focused research program + + ± ±  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
We have tried to bring out some potentially interesting points regarding focused 
research programmes. We saw that it is difficult to pin down exactly what is meant by 
a „Keynesian‟ research agenda, a problem which partly arose as a result of the 
General Theory‟s ambiguity. It seems reasonable to argue that Keynes wanted to keep 
his options open and no doubt suspected that this would help to underpin differing 
research strands going forward (albeit at the risk of fundamental misinterpretation). 
This explains why he had no major objections to IS-LM but still proceeded to 
emphasise the importance of uncertainty in his 1937 article for the Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (Keynes 1937). It may also shed light on why the General Theory was, 
in places, so obscure despite Keynes‟s legendary facility with the English language. 
 
In spite of the various interpretations that have been placed on his work, the key 
concern for Keynes was finding a viable solution to the types of problems created by 
the Depression: in the years leading up to 1936 and after this was the basis of his 
research programme, a programme characterised by, amongst other things, the 
utilisation of new research into national income statistics, and which spurred 
 
whilst in the 1936 American presidential election, the Communist Party candidate, Earl Browder, won 
0.18% of votes cast and no votes in the Electoral College (see Petersen 1963: 94-95). 
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innovative work on consumption functions and the like. Keynes was also able to adapt 
the conceptual framework contained in the General Theory to account for conditions 
of excess demand in Britain during the Second World War. The General Theory was 
also guided by the gaps that had been left in Marshall‟s Organon, most obviously a 
theory of the business cycle. Moggridge (2006a: 599) makes the additional point that 
Keynes‟s work on concepts such as liquidity preference seemed to be „logical 
developments of someone working within the [Marshallian] tradition.‟ 
 
Meanwhile, Hayek‟s Prices and Production and his subsequent disputes with Keynes 
were, of course, driven by a common concern with excessive fluctuations in the cycle. 
However, the remedies recommended by the two men were wholly different, the one 
pro-active, the other passive. Sadly for Hayek, his work quickly became „unpalatable‟ 
(Vaughn 1994: 48) for those more interested in action rather than thumb twiddling. 
Also, Hayek‟s concern with the problem of inflation did not match up with the 
contemporary reality of a deflationary environment, whilst his and the Austrian 
School‟s adoption of different meanings to important economic concepts meant they 
were increasingly removed from the emerging orthodoxy. Finally, there was little 
direct effort by Hayek to knock over old theories, as opposed to Keynes who made a 
point of attacking the classicals and the „Treasury view‟. 
 
Kalecki‟s theories did not, in general, present the opportunity to easily extract 
guidance when it came to policy-making. Moreover, it was not always a 
straightforward matter for other economists to develop his ideas in different 
directions.
46
 Kalecki‟s cause may have been helped if he had published his theories in 
book form rather than scatter them in journals, although he still would have been left 
with overcoming suspicions about his method of theorising and his leftist reputation. 
 
 
vii. Simple and rapidly exploitable experimental techniques 
 
A research school‟s cohesion can be strengthened where experimental techniques lead 
to the steady and systematic production of reliable experimental results, in turn giving 
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rise to “a knowledge factory”. When a knowledge factory is successfully established, 
a school often becomes strongly associated with a particular field of inquiry, this field 
sometimes becoming the “property” of the school. (Given that economics is not, in 
general, a discipline based on the construction of experiments which are simple and 
rapidly exploitable, it is necessary to interpret the meaning of this criterion in the 
broadest possible sense when applying it to our specific area of interest. In particular, 
in what follows, a key emphasis is placed on the extent to which the work of Keynes, 
Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki was „translatable‟ into more simple structures and, in 
turn, the ease with which such formats lent themselves to empirical testing.) 
 
Keynes: 
 
As soon as the General Theory appeared in early February 1936, economists „started 
formulating mathematical models of the relationship between saving, investment, the 
rate of interest, wages and the level of employment, working out when they yielded 
classical results and when they yielded Keynesian ones‟ (Backhouse 2006a: 22). How 
did these efforts manifest themselves? The ambiguity of the General Theory meant 
that certain parts of it were difficult to understand at best, although this haziness did 
not preclude it from simplistic interpretation. Although Richard Kahn and Joan 
Robinson were quick to highlight the importance, in their view, of the role played by 
expectations and uncertainty in Keynes‟s schema, the counterweight to this was the 
work which resulted in IS-LM, carried out in the early days by Harrod, Hicks, and 
Meade and, a little later, by Hansen, who was responsible for naming IS-LM. Keynes 
did not mount any serious objection to IS-LM as he was aware of the difficulties faced 
by his readers and the need for his work to be „translated‟.47 The fact that the 
„Fundamental Equations [of A Treatise on Money] (and mathematical ambitions 
generally) were given up‟ (Leijonhufvud 1968: 24) in the General Theory meant that 
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 Dimand (2007) shows that Keynes had actually mapped out a simultaneous equations approach in 
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Capital (1939), although like Marshall in the Principles, he did go to the trouble of including a 
mathematical appendix. 
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the translation process was made easier as interpreters could cherry-pick what they 
wanted. IS-LM quickly became popular and even if Keynes did not explicitly endorse 
it, he was prepared to publish articles in the Economic Journal which made use of it, 
especially if it helped in attacking his opponents. An example of this was Kaldor‟s 
reference to IS-LM in a note in the December 1937 Journal (Kaldor 1937) which 
attempted to refute Pigou‟s views on the relationship between real and money wages 
and unemployment (Pigou 1937). 
 
Still on IS-LM, Weintraub (2005: 148) points out, in an echo of what we have already 
touched upon, that in the 1930s, British economists did not, in general, have a 
particularly advanced level of mathematical training and so would have welcomed the 
diagrammatic representation of the General Theory offered up by Hicks. (This lack of 
training may also have accounted for the relatively slow take up of Tinbergen‟s 
important but heavily econometric work on business cycles which he carried out for 
the League of Nations and published in 1939, this despite his analysis seeming like 
the „natural empirical extension of Keynesian economics‟ (Backhouse and Bateman 
2006: 14).) At the same time, IS-LM was such a generalised model that it was, in fact, 
capable of accommodating theories opposed to those in the General Theory, such as 
the „Treasury view‟. Either way, and despite Hicks‟s later criticism of IS-LM, the 
model‟s determinateness gave policy-makers a better handle on how they could 
manipulate economic variables. 
 
To give Keynes his dues, he was not averse to publishing material in the Journal 
which contradicted the General Theory. Most striking in this regard was the early 
statistical work of John Dunlop and Laurie Tarshis on the respective movements of 
money and real wages. In chapter 2 of the General Theory Keynes argued that money 
and real wage rates move in opposite directions. Soon after, Dunlop, who was a 
graduate student at Cambridge at the time, found that in Britain during the period 
1860 to 1937, money wages and real wages actually increased together and that real 
wages may rise or fall when money wages decline (Dunlop 1938); Tarshis (1939) 
found broadly the same relationships in data for the United States between 1932 and 
1938. Keynes allowed both articles to be published in the Journal, admitting to 
Dunlop that the General Theory contained some „rash…generalizations‟ (Keynes in 
Dunlop 1998: 232), and followed this up with an article in the March 1939 Journal 
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calling for further investigations to be conducted. Keynes would no doubt have been 
surprised by the mass of literature which has subsequently been devoted to the 
question of wage movements and by the fact that the bulk of it more or less confirms 
Dunlop‟s and Tarshis‟s original findings.48 
 
Although Keynes was, of course, the key figure in the development of the ideas that 
culminated in the General Theory, we know that he was able to draw on some crucial 
help along the way. One of the more obvious examples of this was Kahn‟s June 1931 
article on the multiplier. Skidelsky (1992: 371) provides a simple explanation of 
Kahn‟s thesis: „In his 1929 pamphlet with Hubert Henderson, „Can Lloyd George Do 
It?‟, Keynes had suggested that an initial expenditure on public works sets up a 
„cumulative effect‟ through an „increase in effective purchasing power‟. Kahn had 
worked out a formula for calculating the net addition to employment produced by the 
consumption of the newly employed.‟ Kahn‟s work was the missing link in the 
Keynesian puzzle, one which provided governments with a simple justification for 
boosting spending during a downturn. 
 
Despite Kahn‟s widely-cited article, there continues to be a lively debate about the 
actual origins of the multiplier concept. This debate has naturally revolved around 
Kahn‟s work itself and to what extent he was anticipated by others. The list of these 
„others‟ is long and continues to grow: De Lissa, Giblin, Hawtrey, Schwoner, 
Warming, and Wulff are the names identified by Kent (2007: 529) as possible 
anticipators. Intriguingly, the main thesis of Kent‟s paper is his nomination of Keynes 
himself as a precursor. Kent argues that in the (extant) notes that Keynes made for a 
speech he delivered in London in May 1929, he meets all of the four criteria identified 
by Wright (1956: 193) as being the essential components of a multiplier-type analysis, 
including recognition of the importance of an exogenous injection in the form of say, 
an increase in public expenditure, and an incorporation of leakages. Keynes‟s 1929 
speech was made more than a year before Kahn started work on his multiplier article 
(August 1930) and more than two years before its appearance in the Economic 
Journal. Saying this, Keynes would not attempt another multiplier analysis again until 
September 1930, when he concluded from an early draft of Kahn‟s work circulated to 
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 See Dunlop (1998) for a retrospective on the money/real wage debate. 
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the Committee of Economists that in Britain, „a given amount of primary employment 
gives rise to an approximately equal amount of secondary employment‟ (Keynes in 
Kent 2007: 539-540). 
 
Even given all of the above, it is still difficult to disagree with Shackle‟s observation 
that Kahn‟s article was „one of the great landmarks of economics‟ (Shackle 1951: 
241). Granted, Keynes and other candidate precursors recognised the importance of 
the multiplier,
49
 but it was Kahn who was the first person to bring together in a 
rigorous, detailed and structured way the mechanisms by which the multiplier process 
works; the process of calculating multiplier values and, with it, the MPC was, in 
addition, made easier by the mathematical sophistication of Kahn‟s paper. This latter 
aspect was underpinned by Kahn‟s incorporation of “Mr Meade‟s Relation”, which 
showed how the extra income created by an increase in initial investment would, in 
turn, create additional savings that would be equal to the original injection of 
investment. Thus despite the fact that the original idea for the multiplier may not have 
originated with Kahn, his 1931 article, its detailing of “Mr Meade‟s Relation”, and its 
publication in the Journal, give some support to the argument that the Keynesian 
School in Cambridge in the early 1930s was something of a knowledge factory. 
 
Cambridge‟s ownership of the multiplier was bolstered by the further analyses carried 
out by both Keynes and Colin Clark. As well as estimating the value of the multiplier 
in Britain, Keynes made a number of attempts at estimates for the United States, the 
first of which was contained in a paper read to the American Political Economy Club 
in the spring of 1934 (see Kent 2005: 104-109). A subsequent estimate for the United 
States appeared in the General Theory and two further estimates were made in the 
drafting of Keynes (1936) (see Kent ibid., 111-115). Meanwhile, Clark (1938) 
calculated the value of the multiplier for the British economy for the periods 1929 to 
1933 and 1934 to 1937, whilst Clark and J.G. Crawford calculated it for Australia in 
their The National Income of Australia (1938), which was reviewed in the Economic 
Journal, the American Economic Review and the Journal of the American Statistical 
Association. Although Clark was not a member of the Economics Department at 
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 Later on, Keynes went as far to say that „[a]bout half the [General Theory] is really about it‟ (Keynes 
to Beveridge, 28 July 1936, CW XIV: 57). 
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Cambridge, he was a lecturer in the University‟s Department of Statistics from 1931 
to 1937, a position which, coupled with Keynes‟s opinion of him as „a bit of a genius‟ 
(Keynes in Patinkin 1976: 1,098), must have eased the process of getting his work 
published in the Economic Journal.
50
 
 
Aside from the General Theory‟s opaqueness and Keynes‟s aversion to applying 
mathematics to economics, he did set some considerable store by the mathematical 
simplification, where possible, of economic processes and the related importance of 
identifying and quantifying functional relationships between macroeconomic 
variables. The multiplier was the best example of this and related to it was the 
consumption function, which Keynes was able to formulate as a result of Kahn‟s 
article. The consumption function has received extensive subsequent theoretical and 
empirical attention, most notably in the form of Friedman‟s „permanent income 
hypothesis‟, Modigliani‟s „life cycle hypothesis‟, and Duesenberry‟s „relative income 
hypothesis‟, this popularity resting on the fact that it is relatively easy for the 
consumption function to be captured within the Y=C+I+G rubric – „the cornerstone 
of Keynesian economics‟ (Patinkin ibid., 1,107) – and which has additionally formed 
some of the theoretical foundation upon which national accounts can be prepared; 
Samuelson‟s „Keynesian Cross‟ diagram, a simple representation of the relationship 
between saving, investment and national income, was contained in the first edition of 
his highly successful Economics: An Introductory Analysis (1948), which gave 
popularity to Y=C+I+G. 
 
Of course, the Keynesian Cross also referenced the inflationary gap, and during the 
Second World War the calculation of the gap became, according to Smithies, „one of 
the favourite occupations of economists‟ (Smithies 1951: 590), even though by the 
time it had been calculated, it had, more often than not, been closed by, for example, 
higher rates of saving (ibid., 591). Smithies wrote from an American viewpoint and it 
was indeed in the United States that Keynes‟s ideas could be more easily put to the 
test: the relatively closed nature of the American economy meant that autonomous 
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 The intellectual link between Clark and Keynes went back to Clark‟s seminal The National Income, 
1924-1931 (Clark 1932), which analysed a number of variables, including prices, investment, and 
saving, within the context of Britain‟s national income based on definitions contained in A Treatise on 
Money. 
 111 
macroeconomic policies could be given greater rein (Samuelson 1976: 26). 
Samuelson (ibid.) also notes how the United States provided a „massive controlled 
experiment‟ in the late 1930s of the Keynesian „liquidity trap‟, as a large flow of gold 
into the country was met with a weak elasticity response to an easing of credit 
conditions. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Marshall‟s undergraduate training was in mathematics. Admittedly, by the end of the 
1890s, he had not kept up with the latest mathematical developments and, as a result, 
his own analyses had become „outdated even by Cambridge standards‟ (Dardi 2006: 
154), with Edgeworth and Pareto, by that time, considered to be his mathematical 
superiors (ibid.). Marshall did not wholeheartedly embrace mathematics in his 
economics, although there has been a tendency to underestimate his propensity to use 
it, a tendency which is hard to understand given that he took the trouble to include a 
mathematical appendix in the Principles.
51
 
 
Linked with the issue of Marshall‟s use of mathematics was his employment of 
diagrammatic constructions. His supply and demand diagrams are now, of course, a 
mainstay of microeconomics, Marshall aware that if he could represent his ideas 
pictorially, understanding amongst his readership would be increased. Moreover, the 
fact that his diagrams could, more often than not, be directly translated into algebra 
would have appealed to researchers interested in quantifying concepts such as 
consumer and producer surpluses and the price elasticity of demand. Marshall himself 
was conscious of the need to provide an empirical basis to his work, although with 
specific regard to estimating consumer surplus, he was still dogged by his reluctance 
to publish. He had already aired his early musings on consumer surplus in The Pure 
Theory of Domestic Values (1879), where he offered up a definition very similar to 
that given by the originator of the concept, Jules Dupuit, in 1861.
52
 But The Pure 
                                                 
51
 Schabas (1989) argues that Marshall‟s adoption of mathematical techniques was influenced by his 
reading of Jevons‟s Theory of Political Economy (1871) while Schumpeter (1941: 247) claims that 
Marshall was „one of the strongest influences in the emergence of modern econometrics.‟ 
52
 Marshall implicitly denied that he had been influenced by Dupuit (see Ekelund and Hébert 1985: 
434). 
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Theory of Domestic Values was only issued privately and so the theory of consumer 
surplus had to wait until 1890 to secure the exposure afforded by the popularity of the 
Principles. Even then, it was not until April 1891 that Marshall published his one and 
only estimate of the size of the consumer surplus when he sent a letter to The Times 
detailing the surplus generated by the British Post Office. 
 
Marshall‟s lack of any further empirical estimates of the consumer surplus can be 
explained not only by his reluctance to publish but also by his later view that the 
surplus was better seen as a theoretical device than as an empirical one. Either way, its 
inclusion in the Principles brought it the attention that it probably would not have 
otherwise received and may have been the catalyst for Hicks‟s later improvements 
which, in their turn, led to an outpouring of empirical work (see Ekelund and Hébert 
1985: 440). Meanwhile, despite not necessarily being experimental techniques in 
themselves, Marshallian concepts such as the representative firm, have, over the 
years, become embedded in economics, providing researchers with ample opportunity 
to build on Marshall‟s original work. Furthermore, it does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that Keynes realised the importance of – for want of a better choice of words 
– catchily named concepts, and employed this device in his own work, the multiplier 
being an obvious example. 
 
Hayek: 
 
The General Theory was, as we know, a difficult read. All the same, it did provide 
researchers with an opportunity to test a number of hypotheses. This was in contrast to 
the equally difficult Prices and Production, the result being that the process of 
translation failed to materialise. Granted, Clark (1932) did try to test an equation 
which he attributed to Prices and Production whilst also testing Keynes‟s 
“fundamental equations” (see Patinkin 1982: 243). But one of the problems with 
Hayek‟s analysis was his use of diagrams as a means of supposedly simplifying his 
theories. In Prices and Production, this involved the presentation of so-called 
„Hayekian triangles,‟ which showed how the values of capital goods are related to the 
time period in which they are used in the production process, and the construction of 
3D representations of various theoretical ideas, such as the intertemporal structure of 
capital. All of this turned out to be too complicated for his audience, not least Joan 
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Robinson (1972: 2), who recalls how, at a lecture on his new ideas delivered by 
Hayek at Cambridge, he ended up covering a „black board with his triangles‟ and 
answered a puzzled question from Richard Kahn by pointing to his diagrams and 
maintaining that only a long mathematical argument could be used to explain why his 
diagrams were correct. 
 
Elsewhere, with Robbins concentrating on his methodological work and, in any case, 
being less able than Hayek in theoretical matters, any remote possibility, had it 
existed, of reducing Hayek‟s ideas into a more easily understandable format would 
probably have had to involve Hicks, arguably the ablest young theoretical economist 
at the LSE during the early 1930s albeit an ironic choice for such a role given the 
important part he was to subsequently play in the making of IS-LM. However, even 
by Hicks‟s own testimony, the idea of him crusading on behalf of Hayek was simply a 
non-starter, Hicks describing Hayek‟s theories as containing some „inner mystery‟ to 
which he and others „failed to penetrate‟ (Hicks 1967: 205). In making these 
observations, Hicks no doubt had in mind the fact that Hayek‟s schema was 
fundamentally a dynamic one, a characteristic which made understanding and 
simplification considerably harder than that presented by the General Theory‟s 
comparative static framework. Whatever the case, any attempt by Hicks or others to 
simplify Hayek‟s work would have ultimately been less rich – at least as far as 
subsequent empirical testability was concerned – due to the fact that Prices and 
Production advocated a policy of non-intervention by the authorities. 
 
On a final point, not all of Hayek‟s output had an air of untestability about it. Some of 
his later work has formed the basis for extensive empirical testing. Notable in this 
respect is the „Hayek Hypothesis‟, which says that competitive markets have an 
inbuilt ability to meet certain efficiency postulates through information implicitly 
conveyed by prices. However, such work only took place much later on, well after 
Hayek‟s battle with Keynes over the cycle during the 1930s. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
The likelihood of Kalecki‟s cycle theories of the 1930s producing simple and rapidly 
exploitable experimental techniques was sharply limited in practical terms by the fact 
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that, with the exception of his technically demanding papers in the Revue d’Economie 
Politique and Econometrica (both 1935), his ideas appeared in relatively obscure 
publications in Poland: even had his theories been easily translatable into testable 
propositions, interested parties would have been constrained by the physical 
inaccessibility of such publications on the one hand and because they were in Polish 
on the other. 
 
As with Keynes and Marshall, Kalecki appreciated the importance of empirical 
investigation: real-world robustness would surely have been at the forefront of his 
mind when he decided to commence his important work on Poland‟s national income 
with Ludwik Landau in the early 1930s (see Kowalik 1966: 1-2). But even if we 
ignore issues relating to visibility and language, Kalecki‟s cycle theories were still not 
as amenable to empirical testing and manipulation as Keynes‟s. Kalecki „did not 
approach the theory of employment through the multiplier‟ (J. Robinson 1966: 337), 
the result being that his analysis was „in a way less rich than Keynes‟‟ (ibid.). This 
position is supported by Chapple (1995: 535) who, in considering Kalecki (1934) – a 
paper published in Ekonomista, the Journal of the Polish Society of Economists – 
argues that Kalecki „does not explicitly utilise a mathematical multiplier‟ in what 
Chapple notes is an otherwise simple Keynesian model which Kalecki used to 
examine the effect on aggregate economic activity of various shocks. On the other 
hand, Kalecki was well aware of the usefulness of the multiplier concept and did 
employ it in his review of the General Theory (see Targetti and Kinda-Hass 1982). 
 
As with Hayek, it would be wrong to assume that all of Kalecki‟s ideas were immune 
to testing. Had his writings been more accessible, there would have been opportunities 
for researchers: to return to Kalecki‟s 1934 paper, its treatment of the consumption 
function meant that it made „the same predictions as the simple Keynesian function‟ 
(Chapple ibid., 530); the same paper contained Kalecki‟s early views on investment 
and money demand functions, which have a distinctly Keynesian flavour (ibid., 534). 
 
Summary: 
 
This sub-section has demonstrated that The General Theory spawned a range of easily 
exploitable „experimental‟ techniques after its publication. Marshall also scored well 
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in this category. Once again, however, this feature was largely absent when we 
considered Hayek and Kalecki. 
 
Table 8. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘vii. Simple and rapidly exploitable experimental techniques’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
vii. Simple and rapidly exploitable
    experimental techniques + + - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
The General Theory presented researchers with fertile ground for further theoretical 
and empirical development. To begin with, its ambiguity meant that Keynes‟s 
supporters were faced with the challenge of how to distil his ideas into an 
understandable format. This was most obviously achieved through IS-LM, even if it 
was also able to accommodate alternative theories of how the economy works. 
Despite Joan Robinson and Richard Kahn‟s hostility to IS-LM, the fact that they went 
to great pains to stress the importance of uncertainty and expectations was – as indeed 
was the formulation of IS-LM itself – an example of Keynesians cherry-picking what 
they liked from the book despite this contributing to the spawning of the many 
subsequent arguments over what Keynes actually meant. 
 
Keynes was not keen on diagrams: the General Theory contained only one (on 
Harrod‟s prompting) and he was ambivalent about IS-LM. Given his Marshallian 
inheritance, this is somewhat surprising and marks a key difference in the way in 
which master and pupil theorised. This difference is even more surprising when 
considered alongside Cook‟s (2006: 105) observation that Marshall‟s liking for 
pictorial representation was probably a reflection of his undergraduate training and its 
foundation in Newtonian geometrical mathematics; this tradition clearly was not 
strong enough to influence Keynes when he took the Mathematical Tripos 40 years 
later. It is uncertain what would have become of the General Theory had techniques 
such as IS-LM not been invented. All the same, it is puzzling that neither Keynes nor 
any of the Circus had thought of it during the drafting process, especially given how 
many people subsequently and independently came up with the same basic idea. 
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Indeed, one is tempted to conclude that Keynes and his Cambridge coterie never 
thought along IS-LM lines. 
 
Keynes appreciated the need to gather empirical support for his ideas. Despite being 
dense, the General Theory still lent itself to empirical testing far more than Prices and 
Production, which was set in a difficult to manipulate dynamic framework and, in any 
case, ultimately advocated a policy of non-intervention. Granted, the results of 
empirical testing did not always lend support to the General Theory, most notably 
Dunlop‟s and Tarshis‟s findings on the movement of money and real wages. 
However, there was plenty of additional empirical work for researchers to get their 
teeth into, such as the multiplier – which by the mid-1930s had become the property 
of the Keynesian School at Cambridge, thereby bolstering its claims to be a 
knowledge factory – and the consumption function. Moreover, the excitement that 
accompanied the appearance of the General Theory was carried into the 1940s by 
work dedicated to measuring the inflationary gap (especially in the United States), 
whilst the diagrammatic appeal of Keynes‟s ideas was underpinned not only by IS-
LM but also by Samuelson‟s invention of the Keynesian Cross.53 
 
Just as interesting was the differing uses to which Keynes and Marshall utilised 
mathematics in order to explain their theories. Both saw economics as a moral 
science. However, if their respective use of mathematics is anything to go by, Keynes 
was a greater believer in the moral science assertion than Marshall. There is very little 
mathematics in the General Theory and, where it is used, the reader‟s understanding is 
not much impaired if it is omitted. 
 
Conversely, there has, it seems, been a tendency to underestimate Marshall‟s 
enthusiasm for the application of mathematics to economic problems: without 
mathematics, how else, Dardi (2006: 155) notes, would Marshall have achieved his 
major theoretical breakthroughs in the theory of trade and the determination of prices 
and other variables through the analysis of supply and demand functions? And why, 
                                                 
53
 In addition to IS-LM and the Keynesian Cross, „Aggregate Supply/Aggregate Demand‟ models also 
facilitated the diagrammatic representation of the General Theory (see, for instance, Swan 1989, which 
was originally written in 1945). 
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on a related point, would Marshall have gone to the trouble of including a 
mathematical appendix in the Principles, an appendix which, given the poor level of 
mathematical training amongst most of his colleagues, only a few of them would have 
understood? 
 
Like Marshall, Hayek had a liking for diagrammatic representation. His „triangles‟ 
were the clearest demonstration of this, but they turned out to be too complicated to 
understand. Moreover, given that Hayek‟s system was a dynamic one, the process of 
simplification was made even harder. Finally, Kalecki‟s 1934 paper might have been 
a good candidate for empirical testing, even if it failed to make explicit use of the 
multiplier. But even then, the problem remained that, as with so much of Kalecki‟s 
cycle work during the first half of the 1930s, it appeared in an obscure Polish journal. 
Tellingly, the same paper was not translated into English until it appeared in the first 
volume of Kalecki‟s Collected Works in 1990. 
 
 
viii. Invasion of new field of research 
 
As noted in criterion vi, „Focused research program‟, Morrell-Geison is not explicit 
about how that criterion differs in a significant manner from „Invasion of new field of 
research‟. Nevertheless, it is still possible to draw something of a distinction between 
a research programme which helps to deliver some interesting results at the margin, 
and one that, in Kuhnian terminology, is the source of a completely new paradigm.
54
 
 
Keynes:
55
 
 
A number of articles have examined the Keynesian Revolution in the context of 
Kuhn‟s work on the structure of scientific revolutions, including Coats (1969) 
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 For the purposes of our analysis, it seems reasonable to assume that the multitude of theories which 
sprang up during the 1930s to explain the Great Depression constituted a new field of research in itself, 
excluding those theories which were in the classical tradition. As such, the focus of this sub-section 
will be on the relative influence of the theories of Keynes, Hayek and Kalecki, each of which 
represented a contribution to this new field. 
55
 Parts of the following draw on Cord (2007: 75-76, 87 and 89). 
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(supporting), Bronfenbrenner (1971) (dissenting) and Stanfield (1974) (supporting), 
while Blaug (1976: 164) backs the contention that the Keynesian Revolution is 
actually better explained by Lakatos‟s research programmes methodology. On a 
related theme, Routh (1989: 27) maintains that the basic analytical framework around 
which economics has been organised has remained virtually unaltered since the 17th 
century, implying that there have been no revolutions in the Kuhnian sense, merely 
additions to the existing corpus of knowledge. For those who are still of the view that 
the General Theory was the special case rather than the general case which Keynes 
claimed for it, Routh‟s proposition vis-à-vis the Keynesian Revolution must carry 
some weight.
56
 But even if we allow for this – and, as we have seen, Ambrosi (2003) 
does not – it is still true that the General Theory represented a very important case, 
one which had previously received little systematic theoretical attention. In fact, the 
importance of the General Theory was such that it is difficult to think of an equally 
influential publication within the social sciences in the 20th century. 
 
It is difficult to deny that the General Theory was the trigger for a structural shift in 
the way that economists thought about how the economy works. It was certainly the 
founding document in the field of macroeconomics, a far cry from the partial 
equilibrium analysis which had otherwise dominated Keynes‟s Marshallian heritage. 
As Keynes confessed in the final paragraph of the English preface to the General 
Theory, the intellectual journey that he had had to travel and the one that he believed 
his readers would have to accompany him on as they ploughed through the book if 
they were to fully grasp his theories, was a tortuous one: „The composition of this 
book has been for the author a long struggle of escape, and so must the reading of it 
be for most readers if the author‟s assault upon them is to be successful, – a struggle 
of escape from habitual modes of thought and expression. The ideas which are here 
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 Irrespective of whether it was in fact a general theory, Keynes‟s masterpiece was responsible for 
driving interest in the search for general theories in economics. This meant a steady stream of articles 
and books appearing after the General Theory claiming – in all cases over-enthusiastically – to have 
discovered fundamental economic laws. Even those theories with arguably the greatest claims to 
generality – but which had actually appeared before 1936 – had major holes in them. For example, 
Schumpeter‟s (1946: 514) claim that Walras‟s general equilibrium theory was the „only truly general 
theory ever written‟ is subject to the criticism, inter alia, that there is no place in it for time and money 
(see Hahn 1980; see also Hodgson 2001: 225). 
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expressed so laboriously are extremely simple and should be obvious. The difficulty 
lies, not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones, which ramify, for those 
brought up as most of us have been, into every corner of our minds‟ (Keynes in CW 
VII: xxiii). 
 
In order to assist the reader, Keynes (ibid., xxii) gave an early glimpse in the book 
into a key aspect of his new thinking, namely the questioning of the assumption of 
fixed output: „When I finished [A Treatise on Money], I had made some progress 
towards pushing monetary theory back to becoming a theory of output as a whole. But 
my lack of emancipation from preconceived ideas showed itself in what now seems to 
me to be the outstanding fault of the theoretical parts of that work (namely Books III 
and IV), that I failed to deal thoroughly with the effects of changes in the level of 
output. My so-called „fundamental equations‟ were an instantaneous picture taken on 
the assumption of a given output… This book, on the other hand, has evolved into 
what is primarily a study of the forces which determine changes in the scale of output 
and employment as a whole…‟ In a reversal of Say‟s Law, Keynes proceeded to show 
the primacy, as he believed it, of effective demand rather than supply in determining 
the course of the business cycle. More specifically, Keynes‟s belief was that the 
investment activity of firms is mostly determined by the consumption behaviour of 
individuals, not their saving behaviour. Put another way, if planned savings are 
greater than planned investment at full employment there will be a deterioration in 
firms‟ animal spirits which will manifest itself in the form of lower investment in 
capital and labour. This, in turn, leads to unemployment. 
 
In spite of the difficulties he faced during the preparation of the General Theory, 
Keynes was determined to „raise a dust‟ and he was in no doubt, as demonstrated by 
his remarks to Bernard Shaw, that the book was going to be revolutionary. But did the 
analysis contained in the General Theory really represent a revolutionary contribution 
to the new field of research opened up by economists during the 1930s as they tried to 
understand and solve the Great Depression? It certainly contained a number of 
innovations, such as an emphasis on the short period, a focus on psychological factors 
(including animal spirits and uncertainty), and, as we have seen, Keynes‟s argument 
that classical theory should be considered as a special case, relevant only in conditions 
of full employment. However, Keynes also made use of a number of extant theories. 
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The principle of effective demand had been proposed as far back as Malthus in the 
late 18th century and the related notion that under-consumption could be responsible 
for the cycle had also been put forward before in various places (see below), albeit 
with relatively little success for its proponents. The question of Keynes‟s referencing 
of pre-existing under-consumption theories in the General Theory is of additional 
interest here. More specifically, Samuelson (1946: 190) maintains that Keynes was 
„not overly-generous‟ in his acknowledgements in the book. Even if Samuelson is 
referring here to the General Theory as a whole, it is difficult to support his position 
with respect to Keynes‟s description of forerunners to his own views on under-
consumption. For example, in chapter 23 of the General Theory, „Notes on 
Mercantilism, the Usury Laws, Stamped Money and Theories of Under-
Consumption‟, Keynes devotes no less than seven pages to under-consumption, 
focusing on Hobson and Mummery‟s The Physiology of Industry (1889) – a book 
which he quotes from extensively – and other „heretics‟, such as Major Douglas. At a 
broader level, Keynes‟s precursors did not have the benefit of innovative concepts, 
such as the multiplier, with which to underpin their work, nor did they enjoy Keynes‟s 
high public profile and influence. As a consequence, the chances of their theories on 
under-consumption taking hold were significantly reduced. All the same, judging by 
the space given over to them in the General Theory, it is clear that they had a 
considerable influence on Keynes. 
 
Where Samuelson may have a stronger point becomes apparent when we consider 
Keynes‟s incorporation of expectations and uncertainty in the General Theory. 
Shackle (1967: 6) notes that it was the Swedes, Erik Lindahl and, more decisively, 
Gunnar Myrdal, who first highlighted the relevance of expectations in economics. 
Regarding Keynes‟s knowledge of this prior work, one caveat should be noted and it 
is that Myrdal‟s thoughts on the subject were only published in English in 1939, eight 
years after they originally appeared in Swedish and six years after they were 
translated into German; Keynes had no knowledge of Swedish and his understanding 
of German was very limited. On the other hand, he was still well aware of theoretical 
developments taking place in Sweden, implied by his use of expectations in A 
Treatise on Money. It is therefore a little odd that there are no references at all to the 
Swedish School or its individual members in the General Theory. The same can be 
said about Keynes‟s use of uncertainty in the General Theory. He had looked at the 
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issue extensively in A Treatise on Probability. But an equally, if not more, important 
analysis was contained in Frank Knight‟s Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921), where 
Knight made his famous distinction between risk and uncertainty. Keynes‟s only 
reference to Knight in the General Theory is in a footnote on page 176 dealing with 
Knight‟s unrelated article for the August 1934 edition of Economica entitled „Capital, 
Time and the Interest Rate‟. The question of the extent of Knight‟s influence on 
Keynes seems to be another aspect of the Keynesian Revolution yet to be fully 
uncovered.
57
 
 
Meanwhile, the idea of using public works programmes as a means of curing a slump 
was certainly not a new one, especially at Cambridge, where, amongst others, Foxwell 
and Pigou had supported the idea well before the 1930s. Keynes himself had come out 
in favour of public works as far back as 1924, but his analysis was, as we saw, 
compromised by the „Treasury view‟. With the appearance in 1929 of Can Lloyd 
George Do It? the case was again made for public works based on Lloyd George‟s 
espousal of the same in March of that year in a Liberal Party pamphlet called „We 
Can Conquer Unemployment!‟ With the advent of Kahn‟s multiplier article two years 
later, theoretical support for public works became stronger. (As a side-note, Keynes 
never explicitly argued for the manipulation of fiscal policy in the way that has since 
become associated with his name; the closest he came to such a position was his 
advocacy of the „socialisation of investment‟. Rather, it was Lerner‟s elaboration of 
„functional finance‟ that became the channel through which Keynes‟s name would 
come to be identified with deliberate fiscal adjustment as a means of influencing 
output levels over the short period.) 
 
The multiplier was an example of Keynes‟s fondness for employing suggestive and 
evocative words and phrases in order to help get his point across. There are a host of 
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 Parker (1998: 155) points out that Keynes‟s ideas on expectations and uncertainty as well as his 
treatment of probability only really started receiving proper attention from economists in the 1980s. He 
goes on to identify various reasons as to why these ideas failed to get much notice, in the United States 
in particular, in the period immediately after the General Theory‟s publication despite the book‟s 
enthusiastic reception, especially amongst the young. These explanations include the dominance of 
other aspects of the book and the influence of interpretive work by, amongst others, Hicks and Hansen 
(ibid., 155-158). 
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similar examples throughout his work, including the „fundamental equations‟ of A 
Treatise on Money and the „animal spirits‟, „expectations‟, „liquidity preference‟, 
„marginal propensity to consume‟ and „marginal efficiency of capital‟, amongst 
others, used in the General Theory. Some of these concepts also lent themselves to 
measurement, a factor which only increased the attractiveness of Keynes‟s theories, as 
did other measurables, such as the inflationary gap, which although they came along 
after the General Theory, were an indirect result of it. It seems then that Keynes was 
able to achieve a fine balance between on the one hand, giving researchers enough 
new ideas to set them on their empirical way, and on the other, stressing the 
importance of certain concepts, such as expectations, which do not inherently lend 
themselves to real-world testing. 
 
The General Theory also coincided with the appearance of the newly developing field 
of national income accounting. Well before 1936 Keynes had become keenly aware of 
the need for the proper measurement of economic aggregates, as demonstrated by his 
recommendation to Macmillan that they should publish Clark‟s The National Income 
1924-1931; Macmillan followed Keynes‟s advice and published it in 1932. The book 
was a call to arms, with Clark complaining about the „disgraceful condition of British 
official statistics‟ (Clark 1932: vi) and that a greater effort should be made to 
centralise the collection of such data. Keynes followed this up by publishing another 
important piece of work by Clark, his June 1933 article for the Economic Journal, 
where he made the first ever attempt to estimate national income on a quarterly basis 
(Clark 1933). 
 
During this period, Keynes was also conscious that Simon Kuznets and his co-
workers at the University of Pennsylvania and the National Bureau of Economic 
Research were building a framework for national income analysis and, as we saw, 
Keynes would go on to quote Kuznets (and Clark) in the General Theory. Further, in a 
Journal article of September 1936, Keynes acknowledged and corrected his misuse of 
Kuznets‟s investment data in the General Theory (Keynes 1936). Patinkin (1976: 
1,098-1,099) devotes some space to analysing Keynes‟s use of the Kuznets data and 
to the subsequent correspondence between the two men which Keynes used to clarify 
its meaning. Given the level of interest quickly produced by the General Theory, it 
would have been easy for Keynes to have ignored any relatively minor errors it might 
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have contained. In the Kuznets case, however, he chose to very openly address the 
problem at hand, a point which Patinkin fails to give Keynes enough credit for. 
 
Keynes was in place to oversee other important developments in national income 
accounting post-1936. In late 1939 and early 1940, he worked closely with the 
German economist, Erwin Rothbarth, to produce the first double entry national 
accounts (see Cuyvers 1983: 629), thereby providing the missing link between Clark‟s 
earlier research and Meade and Stone‟s work at the ES during the Second World War 
(ibid., 632). Earlier, part of the foundation for the greater manipulation of national 
income data for policy purposes had been laid down as a result of the increase in 
interest in econometrics which took place in the late 1920s and early 1930s on the 
back of work by, amongst others, Ragnar Frisch, the founding of the Econometric 
Society in December 1930, and, relatedly, the appearance of the first volume of 
Econometrica in January 1933. As far as the Keynesian Revolution was concerned, 
these developments were ironic given Keynes‟s distrust of econometric methods – a 
distrust which famously manifested itself in his attack on „Professor Tinbergen‟s 
Method‟, which appeared in the September 1939 Economic Journal (Keynes 1939) – 
and his membership of the Council of the Econometric Society from 1935 until his 
death (he was also President in 1944-1945) (see Morgan 1990: 121). 
 
Even so, building on the successes of July 1941, Keynes‟s theories would go on to 
benefit from wider policy developments within Britain‟s social, political and 
economic landscape. As we saw, there was the Beveridge Report (Beveridge 1942), in 
which Beveridge implicitly assumed that government would be able to manipulate 
demand along Keynesian lines in the post-war period, and so maintain full 
employment, defined as being less than 3% unemployment. This, in turn, would help 
to finance an expansion of welfare provision for those who, for whatever reason, were 
unable to work. Beveridge‟s recommendations received strong political backing from 
the newly elected Labour government of 1945. Meanwhile, the emphasis on full 
employment would appear again in Beveridge‟s Full Employment in a Free Society 
(Beveridge 1944) and in the British government‟s White Paper on Employment Policy 
(also 1944). 
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Marshall: 
 
Marshall‟s claim to originality is almost as great as Keynes‟s. When we considered 
Marshall‟s contribution with respect to simple and rapidly exploitable experimental 
techniques, a number of factors were identified, amongst them Marshall‟s 
employment (albeit qualified) of mathematical techniques, his use of diagrams – 
which helped to simplify, in particular, his theories on supply and demand – and his 
origination of concepts such as the price elasticity of demand. All of these were 
important components of the Organon. At the same time, the extent of Marshall‟s 
originality was necessarily constrained as his work was, to a certain degree, built on 
the theories of a number of his classical predecessors, in particular Smith, Ricardo and 
Mill.
58
 
 
We saw a similar pattern in the General Theory with respect to Keynes‟s use of, for 
instance, under-consumptionist theories. However, Keynes‟s claim to greater 
originality is bolstered by the fact that the General Theory was a concerted attempt to 
escape from previous modes of thinking about a particular problem in economics. As 
part of this, Keynes made an explicit attack on orthodoxy, in stark contrast to 
Marshall, who would never have contemplated such a course of action in his own 
work. In addition, Keynes‟s apparent creativity may, in the 1930s at least, have 
appeared to have been greater than in other circumstances because he was responding 
to an important contemporaneous set of historical circumstances.
59
 Again, this was 
distinctly different from Marshall‟s theoretical output, which was, in the main, 
ahistorical.
60
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 Although Marshall may have thought of himself as belonging to the classical tradition, Sraffa 
believed that this was not the case and that Marshall‟s claim to being a classical economist in fact only 
served to weaken the classical tradition (see Harcourt 1981). 
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 Lawlor (2006: 72) notes that Keynes‟s preference for engaging in topical issues was a theme 
throughout his career, beginning with his interest in Indian monetary affairs – even if this was partly 
forced on him as the India Office was his destination after finishing second in the civil service 
examinations in August 1906; the first-placed man, Otto Niemeyer, went to the Treasury – before 
moving on to war finance, the Great Depression, and returning to war finance. 
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 Note should also be made of Lawlor‟s (2006: 99) point that, long before the appearance of the 
General Theory, the influence of Marshall‟s Organon had suffered a decline as a result of its inability 
to account for the increasing power and influence of large companies and, as a result, imperfect 
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Hayek: 
 
With Robbins at the helm at the LSE when Hayek arrived there in 1931, there was an 
air about the place which suggested that it wanted to make a break with the past, 
especially with the theories associated with Marshall via Cannan, who had dominated 
the Economics Department at the School for a number of years. Robbins wished to 
move the LSE in a more Continental direction, and this was one of the reasons for 
Hayek‟s recruitment. Hayek‟s appointment was, as already noted, also driven by 
Robbins‟s desire to fight Cambridge. Granted, it would be wrong to characterise the 
two camps as being in complete disagreement about everything concerning 
economics: thus, Robbins‟s objections to econometrics were probably stronger than 
Keynes‟s, reflected in his assertion that the application of quantitative methods to 
economic problems was „doomed‟ (Robbins 1932: 102). Robbins was nevertheless 
determined to give the LSE a new lease of life and he envisaged that Hayek‟s work on 
the cycle would be bolstered by his own ideas on methodology and value theory. 
However, both men made crucial mistakes in their respective approaches: in 
Robbins‟s case, his methodological work arguably failed to see the need for and the 
imminence of the Keynesian Revolution (see Winch 1969: 191), while Hayek did not 
at first realise that Keynes had founded the new field of „macroeconomics‟, one of the 
consequences of this being that he was unable, along with other reasons, to crystallise 
any early substantive criticism of the General Theory. Hayek instead opted to 
continue developing his own thoughts on the cycle which, he believed, would rival 
Keynes‟s, a decision which, unfortunately for Hayek and the Austrians, turned out to 
be erroneous. 
 
As with Keynes and Marshall, Hayek built on the work of his predecessors. He agreed 
with Mises that changes in credit conditions were a key driver of the cycle. This view 
was, in turn, an extension of Wicksell‟s capital theory and the “cumulative process” 
induced as a result of differences between the natural rate of interest and the money 
rate of interest. Wicksell‟s theories, encapsulated in his Value, Capital and Rent 
(1893) and, by implication, Prices and Production, were difficult to understand; 
 
competition. Meanwhile, in 1930, Sraffa had argued for the complete abandonment of Marshall‟s 
partial equilibrium analysis (see Sraffa 1930: 93). 
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Caldwell (1995: 33) notes that, „few of [Hayek‟s] English readers were familiar 
with…capital theory.‟ Part of the problem was that Wicksell‟s books were originally 
only published in German, his target audience necessarily restricted as a result.
61
 
Meanwhile, even if Wicksell‟s influence on Keynes was not insignificant, it may have 
been greater if his preferred language of publication had been English; it certainly 
would have increased the chances of A Treatise on Money having a stronger capital-
theoretic foundation, a weakness which Hayek was quick to seize on. Still, Hayek‟s 
own use of capital theory came under sustained attack from no less a figure than 
Frank Knight. Knight‟s onslaught and Hayek‟s defence lasted for three years from 
1933 to 1936 (see Knight 1933, 1934, 1935 and Hayek 1936), perhaps, in turn, 
contributing to Hayek‟s later declaration that he was tired of controversy as one of the 
reasons for his failure to critically review the General Theory. 
 
Lastly, Hayek was sometimes guilty of missing the opportunity to make better use of 
innovative theoretical ideas whilst actively objecting to others. For example, he and 
the wider Austrian School did not appreciate the potential significance of the role 
played by expectations in helping to shape the cycle when the idea first emerged in 
Sweden: „The failure to grasp „[this] golden opportunity‟ was surprising given the 
emphasis in Austrian economic thought upon the subjective nature of marginal utility 
analysis‟ (McCormick 1992: 84). Meanwhile, Hayek‟s opinion of the multiplier was 
dim at best: he sarcastically referred to it as the „Peter-Outer‟ (see Ebenstein 2001: 
111). 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Compared with Keynes, Marshall and Hayek, Kalecki has an equally strong, if not 
stronger, claim to originality. The difficulty of pinning down exactly how Kalecki 
arrived at his innovative theories of the cycle remains a pertinent one right up to this 
day, not least because of the relatively unorthodox route he took into economics but 
also because his early career has not, so far, been as well documented as those of 
Keynes, Marshall and Hayek. Add to this Kalecki‟s relative lack of contact with 
Western economists during the late 1920s and early 1930s and his reputation as one of 
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 An English translation of Value, Capital and Rent did not appear until 1954. 
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the great innovating economists of the 20th century is, although probably undeniable, 
still cloaked in a certain air of mystery. 
 
The fact that Kalecki had little communication with economists outside of Poland 
during the initial phase of his career as a professional economist may, paradoxically, 
be a pointer to how he managed what he did. More specifically, he was not inculcated 
with mainstream classical economic thinking (see J. Robinson 1966: 338), the result 
being that he never had to contend with the intellectual wrestling which Keynes, most 
obviously, had to go through in order to „escape from habitual modes of thought and 
expression.‟ If Kalecki did indeed stand on the shoulders of a giant, it was those of 
Marx, the description of schemes of production and reproduction in Das Kapital 
having a particularly strong influence on the development of Kalecki‟s views on 
economic fluctuations. 
 
Summary: 
 
Out of all of the 14 Morrell-Geison criteria, this was the only one where Kalecki‟s 
performance is an unambiguously strong one. Given that each of Keynes, Marshall 
and Hayek had a mixed record when it came to the question of „Invasion of new field 
of research‟, it was the only criterion where Kalecki is the clear winner. 
 
Table 9. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘viii. Invasion of new field of research’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
viii. Invasion of new field of research ± ± ± +  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
A diverse set of issues have been covered in the pages above. Putting to one side the 
debate over whether the General Theory represented a general or special case, it was 
nevertheless a very important case. At a minimum, it ushered in the new subject of 
macroeconomics: Keynes‟s synthesis of a number of pre-existing theories, his 
challenge to the classicals, and his belief, as subsequently summed up by Meade, that 
„a dog called investment wagged his tail labelled savings‟ (Meade 1975: 82) rather 
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than the other way around, provided the General Theory with its most convincing set 
of claims to be a revolutionary book. Moreover, it appeared at a fortuitous time: not 
only was the Great Depression fresh in the mind, but research into national income 
accounting was starting to take off whilst the use of econometrics was assuming a 
higher profile in the profession. In spite of his general distaste for the application of 
mathematics to economic problems, Keynes moulded the General Theory in such a 
way that it would become an integral part of such developments. Later on, Keynes 
also played a crucial role in disseminating Meade and Stone‟s pioneering work on 
national income accounting. 
 
Interestingly, however, the manipulation of fiscal policy as a means of influencing the 
cycle was an idea only indirectly associated with Keynes, its more direct expression 
being realised in Lerner‟s theory of functional finance. Meanwhile, any influence that 
Marshall may have had on the new ideas contained in the General Theory was 
restricted by his classical background, a characterisation which Keynes employed in 
order to sell the General Theory as being a genuine break from the past. Deliberately 
or not, Keynes had nevertheless filled in one of the major lacuna in Marshall‟s 
Organon, namely a convincing explanation of mass and sustained unemployment. 
 
Elsewhere, there was a determination on Robbins‟s part to move the LSE away from 
Marshall‟s influence and towards Continental-style thinking through his work on 
methodology and Hayek‟s cycle theories. Yet, both Robbins and Hayek failed to 
anticipate the Keynesian Revolution, the result being that Hayek, in particular, was 
unable to mount a convincing critique of it, left voluntarily, as he was, to concentrate 
on his own work on the cycle which he thought – wrongly as it turned out – would 
rival and possibly supersede the General Theory. Hayek also sometimes failed to spot 
the importance of new ideas, notably the role that expectations might play in 
influencing economic activity. For his part, Kalecki has arguably the greatest claim to 
being the innovator of a new field of research. He did, to some extent, rely on his 
interpretation of Marx. On the other hand, he had the benefit of not being influenced 
by orthodox Western theories, a problem particularly incumbent on Keynes. 
 
On a final note, Blaug (1991: 174-175) argues that one way of measuring the speed at 
which a new research programme is adopted is how long it takes for it to be 
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incorporated into elementary textbooks. Keynes‟s big break in this respect took place 
in 1948 with the appearance of Samuelson‟s Economics, a full 12 years after the 
publication of the General Theory (although this process of filtering may have been 
quicker had it not been for the Second World War). At first glance, it would not 
therefore seem unreasonable to argue that textbook expositions played only a 
relatively minor part in the Keynesian Revolution. But this is at the risk of 
underestimating the impact of Samuelson‟s book: his invention of the Keynesian 
Cross and his extensive use (for the time) of diagrams as pedagogic aids meant that he 
„out-Keynesianized‟ (Elzinga 1992: 863) Lorie Tarshis‟s The Elements of Economics 
(1947). As a testament to the longevity of Samuelson‟s analysis, Economics is still in 
print after 18 editions with over four million copies sold, thereby making it the most 
successful economics textbook ever written. As for Hayek and Kalecki, their 
respective theoretical systems received little or no formal treatment in textbooks 
during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Though maybe not quite as conclusive, we can try to extend Blaug‟s premise by 
examining journal citations for Keynes, Hayek and Kalecki from the early 1930s to 
the mid-1940s. 
 
Table 10. Most cited economists in the Index of Economic Journals, 1931-44 
1931-35 1936-39 1940-44
Keynes 66 Keynes 125 Keynes 59
Robertson 44 Robertson 48 Hicks 30
Hayek 33 Hicks 33 Haberler 24
Fisher 30 Pigou 31 Robertson 22
Hawtrey 30 Harrod 27 Hawtrey 20
Cassel 22 Hawtrey 25 Kalecki 18
Pigou 20 Haberler 24 Schumpeter 18
Wicksell 17 Hayek 24 Hansen 17
Hansen 14 Robinson (Joan) 20 Kaldor 17
Marshall 13 Clark 18 Kuznets 16
Lerner 16
Source: Ebenstein (2001: 80) 
 
The most striking aspect of Table 10 is Keynes‟s leading position in each of the three 
periods: even during the years 1931-35, before the General Theory‟s appearance, he 
was well ahead of the second-placed Robertson, reflecting the not-insignificant impact 
of A Treatise on Money. Keynes and Robertson retained their leading positions in 
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1936-39, the major difference being the substantial increase in citations received by 
Keynes: in percentage terms, he enjoyed 160% more citations than Robertson during 
this period, well up on the 50% advantage he had between 1931 and 1935, clearly a 
reflection of the General Theory appearing in 1936. 
 
During the war, when the publication of journals was necessarily restricted, Keynes 
was still dominant, recording a near 100% lead over Hicks in second. Reflecting the 
brief popularity of Prices and Production, Hayek took third place in 1931-35, before 
dropping to eighth in 1936-39; tellingly, he makes no appearance in the data covering 
1940-44. Kalecki does feature in this final set of years, but only in joint sixth place 
with 18 citations, well behind Keynes on 59. 
 
 
ix. Pool of potential recruits (graduate students)
62
 
 
According to Morrell-Geison, it is important that a research director has access to a 
reasonably large pool of potential recruits. The importance of this is apparent in two 
respects: 1) To help a director continue his own immediate research programme; and 
2) To disseminate to a wider audience the research outcomes discovered by the 
school. In addition, Morrell-Geison also makes reference to graduate students as being 
the most likely source of recruits. 
 
Keynes: 
 
Keynes became a lecturer in economics at Cambridge in January 1909. Although it 
was still very early days, as far as the potential for discovering students with the talent 
to contribute and carry forward his later revolution was concerned, the omens for 
Keynes were not good. At the beginning of the 20th century, economics was still 
finding its feet in the academic world. In Britain, there had been a rich tradition of 
eminent economists, amongst them Thomas Robert Malthus, David Ricardo, John 
Stuart Mill and, of course, the founding father, Adam Smith. Cambridge had had its 
professors of political economy, perhaps most notably the blind Henry Fawcett, 
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Marshall‟s predecessor. However, Fawcett‟s teaching responsibilities were small, 
amounting to little more than lecturing to a few ordinary degree students. Not 
surprisingly, this produced few individuals of real quality. 
 
Part of the problem lay in the fact that economics did not have its own tripos at 
Cambridge, that is until Marshall secured the new degree in 1903. Nevertheless, as of 
1909, the shortage of students was worryingly apparent to the newly appointed 
Keynes, who observed that he had delivered his first lecture „before an enormous and 
cosmopolitan audience – there must have been at least fifteen, I think, but a good 
many of them really had no business there, I am afraid, and I shall have to tell them 
that the lectures are not suitable to their needs‟ (Keynes to Grant, 19 January 1909, in 
Harrod 1951: 147). Indeed, in his search for disciples who would go on to further his 
revolution, Keynes would have to wait even longer than the decade and a half it took 
Marshall to find Pigou: it was not until the second half of the 1920s that Cambridge 
would produce Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson. 
 
In spite of all this, it soon became clear to Keynes that economics as an academic 
subject was changing, not least because of Marshall‟s efforts to put it on to a more 
rigorous footing. One result was that the number of economics undergraduates at 
Cambridge began to grow: by 1910, those sitting for Part I of the Tripos had reached 
25, relatively small, but well up from 11 in 1909 and just four in 1906. There was also 
growth in Part II examinees, where student numbers climbed from a paltry three in 
1906 to 13 in 1909.
63
 With the Faculty expanding, Keynes decided to set up the 
Political Economy Club in October 1909 (not to be confused with the Political 
Economy Club established by James Mill, father of John Stuart, in London in the 
1820s). 
 
The Cambridge version was a largely informal gathering of staff and some of the best 
undergraduates who would meet in Keynes‟s rooms at King‟s to discuss 
contemporary economic issues and problems. Keynes would preside over the Club‟s 
meetings with a benevolence which encouraged participation by students. The Club 
                                                 
63
 The number of students graduating from the Economics Tripos (Parts I and II) continued to grow, 
rising from 29 in 1910 to 74 in 1924, the year of Marshall‟s death (see Groenewegen 1990: 55). 
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could nevertheless still hold a certain terror for undergraduates, as one of its attendees, 
Austin Robinson has recalled at length: „To the undergraduate of the early twenties, I 
can say from experience, Keynes‟ club was fascinating but alarming. Fascinating 
because here one heard Keynes, a large part of the Faculty, and all the best of one‟s 
rivals discussing in realistic detail all the real and most urgent problems of the world. 
Alarming because if one read a paper one was likely to find one‟s undergraduate 
efforts (I speak from painful memory) being dissected by a visiting Mr. Hawtrey, 
destroyed by the full power of Frank Ramsey‟s dialectical analysis, and when one had 
maintained one‟s position to the best of one‟s ability for some three hours, Keynes 
would sum up in friendly but utterly devastating fashion – I learned a certain 
sympathy with the prisoner waiting for the judge‟s black cap‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 27). 
Despite this description, the Club would, over the years, become a defining feature of 
the economics scene at Cambridge. 
 
Although economics had been recognised as a separate Tripos at Cambridge, graduate 
studies were far from being put on a similar footing, either then or for a long time 
subsequently. Moggridge (1998: 23) sums up the common position at Oxbridge: 
„Oxford and Cambridge…were not well-organized centres of graduate instruction in 
economics. Both offered doctoral degrees, but the taking of such degrees in 
economics was a very new phenomenon in the 1930s (and one confined largely to 
foreigners for several decades), and neither ancient university…offered formal 
instruction in economics designed specifically for graduates. In these institutions, 
graduate work really meant learning from the literature, your supervisor, your fellow 
students and sympathetic faculty, but it was very much a matter of luck and 
circumstances.‟ Against this background, Keynes‟s wish to plug the gap in graduate 
training was, it seems reasonable to argue, one of the driving forces behind the 
creation of his Club, as was his interest in spotting and encouraging emerging talent: 
„Keynes knew intimately right down to his illness in 1937 all the best of each 
generation of Cambridge economists, and exercised a more personal influence upon 
them than anyone else‟ (A. Robinson 1947: 27). 
 
From around 1920 the Tripos was producing young men who could take on some of 
the lecturing load of more senior staff. This allowed Keynes to concentrate on other 
activities, such as academic writing and journalism, but also the supervision of 
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undergraduates. Whilst the oral nature of supervisions necessarily limits the amount 
of evidence available, if the recollections of Brian Reddaway are anything to go by, 
Keynes does not seem to have used meetings with his students to publicise the ideas 
that would appear in the General Theory.
64
 As Reddaway has described it, at his 
supervisions with Keynes, „bits of ideas leaked out, but they were pretty thin. From 
that point of view, I got my General Theory from the copy of the General Theory 
which Keynes gave to me‟ (Reddaway in Young 1987: 75). Reddaway must still have 
had a rough idea of what the book would contain: he published an early academic 
review of it in the June 1936 number of the Economic Record – the house journal of 
the Economic Society of Australia and New Zealand – when he spent a year as a 
Research Fellow at Melbourne University, where he became one of Keynes‟s 
overseas emissaries (see Millmow 2003). 
 
Morrell-Geison stresses that a research director should have access to a pool of 
graduate students rather than undergraduates. This makes sense as graduate students 
are, in general, more likely to have the research skills and knowledge that will be of 
use in a research school setting. The experience of the Circus goes some way to 
confirming this. While Kahn never undertook formal postgraduate work in 
economics, he did complete a seminal Fellowship dissertation on the economics of the 
short period
65
 and successfully submitted it to the Fellowship Electors at King‟s in 
December 1929. Meade was a graduate student, albeit from Oxford, and Sraffa had 
already completed his doctor of law dissertation in Italy as far back as 1920 and so 
had left his graduate student days long behind him by the time of the Circus meetings. 
Joan Robinson is the odd one out as she never completed a dissertation or any formal 
graduate study. She had finished her undergraduate degree in economics in 1925 and 
from 1926 to 1928 spent two years in India with her new husband, Austin. The couple 
then returned to Cambridge, but it was only in 1934 that she secured an academic 
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 Reddaway was supervised by Keynes (and Kahn and Shove) in the early 1930s, became director of 
the Department of Applied Economics at Cambridge in 1955 and Professor of Political Economy in 
1969. 
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 A Fellowship dissertation was roughly equivalent to today‟s PhD. During the writing of his 
dissertation, Kahn received considerable help from Shove and was also heavily influenced by Keynes 
(see Kahn 1989: xi). Marris (1992) is an interesting account of the varied history of Kahn‟s 
dissertation. 
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post, as a University Assistant Lecturer, helped by the publication of The Economics 
of Imperfect Competition in 1933. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that her 
participation in the Circus may have been facilitated by her husband, who was already 
a member of the Economics Department at Cambridge. 
 
Even though the Circus contributed to the initiation of the Keynesian Revolution, its 
subsequent contribution was mixed. After the appearance of the General Theory, 
Richard Kahn, still very much a Keynesian, continued in his role as something of a 
back room boy (albeit a very effective one) and Piero Sraffa devoted himself to 
Ricardo and Marx. Conversely, James Meade was Keynes‟s bulldog in Whitehall 
while Joan Robinson flew the Keynesian flag – or rather her and Kahn‟s interpretation 
of it – mainly through her teaching and extensive writing. The impact of the former at 
Cambridge was not inconsiderable, a fact not lost on Pigou who, describing the 
answers to that year‟s Tripos questions, wrote to Keynes in June 1940 that: „The chief 
bad thing we found was that a very large number of people had been stuffed like 
sausages with bits of your stuff in such a way that (1) they were quite incapable of 
applying their own intelligence to it, and (2) they perpetually dragged it in regardless 
of its relevance to the question… My own guess…is that the parrot-like treatment of 
your stuff is due to the lectures and supervision of the beautiful Mrs R[obinson] – a 
magpie breeding innumerable parrots.‟ (Pigou to Keynes, [?] June 1940, JMKP 
PP/45/254/44). We should also not forget the role played by Joan Robinson and 
Richard Kahn in convincing Abba Lerner and others from the LSE of the merits of 
Keynes‟s theories. 
 
Given such evidence, Pasinetti‟s (2007: 40) view that the Cambridge Keynesians „did 
almost nothing to prepare their succession‟ seems a little unfair: Cambridge was far 
from being a desert when it came to carrying forward the Keynesian message. In 
addition to the above, one only has to think of Kaldor‟s trade cycle article of 1940 
(Kaldor 1940) and his later work on growth theory to appreciate this. Renewing 
hostilities that had begun when they were both at the LSE, Kaldor was also willing to 
take up the baton in attacking Hayek. Indeed, the battle between Cambridge and LSE 
which had raged during the 1930s was only really brought to a close with Kaldor‟s 
critique (Kaldor 1939, 1942) of Hayek‟s revised cycle theory which appeared in 
Profits, Interest and Investment (1939) and The Pure Theory of Capital (1941). 
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It was true and somewhat inevitable that, after such a bright few years during the 
1930s, Cambridge as an outpost for Keynesianism suffered a relative, albeit not fatal, 
decline; after all, Keynes and the Circus must have been a hard act to follow. But one 
aspect of the Keynesian Revolution that we have not yet examined in detail is what 
happened after the 1940s. There have been some clues. For example, in Whitehall, the 
Keynesian torch found a very able bearer in the form of Robert Hall, who saw to it 
that Keynes‟s ideas were promoted during the 1950s, often by facing down non-
Keynesian analyses (see Booth 2001: 307). This had faint echoes of Keynes‟s 
successful challenge to the „Treasury view‟ in the 1930s and, as such, Hall can be 
considered as one of Keynes‟s natural successors in Whitehall; in the United States, 
Paul Samuelson and James Tobin performed a similar function during the Kennedy 
Administration. Meanwhile, the monetarist backlash is nominally dated from 
Friedman‟s 1956 restatement of the quantity theory of money, even if it was not until 
the 1970s that monetarist ideas began to seriously influence British and American 
policy-makers. On a related note, Pasinetti (2005: 839) argues that the Keynesian 
School at Cambridge failed to turn the Keynesian Revolution into a „permanent 
winning paradigm‟. This is inaccurate. What should be acknowledged is that 
Keynesianism was not abandoned as a result of the rise of monetarism; it was just 
downgraded in the armoury of economic policies available to government. In fact, 
Keynesian economics was subject to the process described by Merton as “obliteration 
by incorporation”. In other words, Keynesian principles became such an accepted part 
of economic policy-making that nobody ever or rarely bothered to cite their originator 
(see Samuelson 2002: 51). More recently, witness some of the fiscally-based 
responses to the ongoing economic downturn. 
 
Whilst Keynes could call on the services of a group of talented younger colleagues as 
well as students at Cambridge and to a lesser extent, Oxford, during the writing of the 
General Theory, there was a strong level of support amongst graduate students in the 
United States in the years following publication. Alvin Hansen was, of course, not a 
graduate student in 1936, having completed his doctorate in 1918. However, he was 
an important influence on a number of graduate students at Harvard, including 
Samuelson and Tobin, as well as other youthful members of the Faculty, such as John 
Kenneth Galbraith. Keynes‟s reputation as a man who was willing to challenge 
convention meant that there was a great sense of anticipation at Harvard in the period 
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leading up to the General Theory‟s appearance, with undergraduates putting in a 
special order to ensure that the book reached them as quickly as possible; Samuelson, 
for one, likened its arrival as giving rise to the kinds of emotions that Keats 
experienced as retold by the poet in his On First Looking into Chapman’s Homer (see 
Galbraith 1998: 11). Harvard‟s young would also have been encouraged in a 
Keynesian direction by the presence in their midst of Robert Bryce, who had attended 
Keynes‟s lectures at Cambridge and who arrived at Harvard in autumn 1935 full of 
the Keynesian gospel, having already taken the opportunity to preach it at the LSE 
(see Moggridge 1998: 29). Granted, not all of the economics students at Harvard 
during this period necessarily came under Keynes‟s spell. By way of example, in the 
late 1930s, Abram Bergson was preoccupied with his pioneering work on social 
welfare functions. It remained the case, however, that Harvard was the foremost 
centre of support for Keynes‟s ideas in the United States, fortunate for him, as we 
have already seen, given the distinct lack of support for the General Theory at 
Chicago.
66
 
 
Marshall: 
 
Marshall‟s pool of potential young recruits at Cambridge was relatively limited in the 
years before the establishment of the Economics Tripos, as well as in the immediate 
period following 1903. Before the Tripos, Cambridge undergraduates had to study 
either Moral Sciences or History to get any exposure to what was then termed 
„political economy‟.67 On reflection, Marshall seems to have made the best of a 
challenging situation, producing Cunningham, Foxwell, Neville Keynes, and 
Nicholson in the 1870s, Berry, Flux, and Johnson in the 1880s, and Bowley, 
Chapman, MacGregor, Sanger, and, of course, Pigou, in the period between 1890 and 
1903 (see Groenewegen 1995: 322). 
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 The fact that the Chicago School was right wing and therefore sympathetic to the then out-of-favour 
Austrian view of economics was fortunate for Hayek as it was one of the few institutions prepared to 
offer him a job in the early years after the Second World War. 
67
 The Moral Sciences Tripos had been introduced at Cambridge in 1848 along with Natural Sciences, 
while the History Tripos had to wait until the 1870s to get its own degree after being split off from 
Law. Mathematics has easily the longest history of any tripos at Cambridge, dating back to the middle 
of the 18th century (see Leedham-Green 1996: 226). 
 137 
However, Maloney‟s (1985: 59) claim that it was the Mathematical Tripos, not Moral 
Sciences, which was responsible for restricting Cambridge‟s output of economists 
before 1903 is a little off the mark when quality is considered. True, Moral Sciences 
was the source of the majority of Cambridge economists before the Economics Tripos 
was introduced. But Mathematics produced some influential thinkers in the subject, 
not least Marshall himself and others, such as Bowley and Flux. Moreover, Marshall 
was of the belief that Moral Sciences had failed to provide him with „one single high 
class man devoting himself to economics‟ (Marshall in Groenewegen 1990: 51). 
Perhaps a more interesting question is why the History Tripos produced so few 
eminent economists (with the exception of Pigou), despite the fact that it rivalled 
Moral Sciences in the number of students sitting for the political economy exams: 
according to Groenewegen (ibid., 53), of the 254 undergraduates who were Marshall‟s 
students between Michaelmas Term 1886-87 and Lent Term 1888-89, 24.0% were 
from History compared to 16.1% from Moral Sciences.
68
 
 
Not one to be easily deterred, Marshall pushed ahead with the creation of the new 
Tripos. One very specific reason for this may have been that when he spent just a year 
at Balliol College, Oxford, from 1883 to 1884, he produced three students of promise, 
namely Gonner, Harrison and Price (see Groenewegen 1995: 322), far better, 
proportionately, than his performance at Cambridge before and after 1903. Be that as 
it may, one alternative to an Economics Tripos would have been to recruit promising 
young teaching staff from other British universities. But instead of appointing 
outsiders, Marshall tried to „export‟ his protégés, successfully in some cases but 
doomed to failure in others, notably the effort to get Neville Keynes to go to Oxford; 
given the subsequent role played by Maynard Keynes in strengthening the profile of 
Cambridge economics, it was probably for the best that Marshall failed in this 
particular venture. 
 
Aside from a possible fear of being accused of poaching, Marshall‟s reluctance to 
recruit outsiders may also have been driven by a wish to produce home-grown talent 
schooled in Cambridge norms and habits, such as the oral tradition, and whom he 
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 The remainder were made up of „Special‟ students and „Miscellaneous‟, including those entered for 
the Indian Civil Service exams. 
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thought would be up to carrying forward his theoretical framework and, in particular, 
to fill in some of the gaps in the Organon. Before Maynard Keynes, Pigou played this 
role to a certain extent. But with the Economics Tripos up and running, there were 
hopes that it would begin to attract a greater number of able students who would not 
only excel as undergraduates but may also become economics lecturers themselves, if 
not at Cambridge then at other British universities.
69
 However, in the very early days, 
this turned out to be a premature hope. Particularly scathing was the testimony of 
Neville Keynes, who noted how the quality of the answers in Part I of the 1907 Tripos 
was „poor in the extreme… quite extraordinarily bad‟ (J.N. Keynes in Maloney 1985: 
64). 
 
Finally, Marshall‟s attitude towards women is worth considering at this point. In the 
early part of his professional career, Marshall was a keen supporter of higher 
education for women, and in the Easter Term of 1872-73 he gave six introductory 
lectures on political economy to a female audience at Cambridge (see Raffaelli, et al. 
1995: vii). Yet this seemingly enlightened attitude had its limits. For instance, despite 
Marshall allowing his wife, Mary Paley Marshall, to co-author The Economics of 
Industry (1879), he was, in fact, of the view, according to Harcourt (2001: 336), that 
„women could not do economic theory but that she [Mary] could act, in effect, as his 
research assistant.‟ Marshall also believed that the children of women who took up 
economics would suffer as a result. 
 
Marshall‟s misogyny was unfortunate and certainly had no grounding in reality if 
examination results in the Moral Sciences Tripos were anything to go by. Between 
1881 and 1906 the proportion of women receiving First Class degrees stood at 19.6%, 
higher than the 18.3% recorded by men during the same period (see Groenewegen 
1990: 57). Furthermore, within the First Class division itself, there were some 
outstanding women students, not least one H. Dendy, who topped the list in 1888 
(ibid., 52). But even with this evidence, Marshall continued to advocate the exclusion 
of women from economics, one broader manifestation of this being his support for an 
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 This was notwithstanding the fact that, as we shall see, Marshall had already created a network of 
former students who had taken up teaching posts in economics across the British university system. 
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1896 campaign to continue blocking the awarding of Cambridge degrees to women.
70
 
Had Marshall been more receptive to the idea of women economists, the history of 
economic theory might have turned out very differently. As it was, his prejudice may 
have been responsible for denying the profession a number of eminent thinkers. His 
chauvinism has certainly cast a shadow over his subsequent reputation. Most notable 
in this respect was the opinion of Joan Robinson, who once commented that the more 
she learned about economics, „the more I admire Marshall‟s intellect and the less I 
like his character‟ (J. Robinson 1973: 259). 
 
The difference between Marshall and Keynes in their attitude towards women in 
economics is striking: Keynes realised that women could make a significant 
contribution to the development of the subject, as demonstrated by Joan Robinson‟s 
role as one of his confidantes on theoretical matters, not to mention her own highly 
original contributions to economic theory. Marshall, on the other hand, regarded 
women as merely part of the support structure for the male of the species. Indeed, it 
would be hard to imagine a Joan Robinson-type figure emerging during the years 
when Marshall controlled economics at Cambridge, even though Robinson herself 
was, as it turned out, a beneficiary of the Tripos which Marshall strove hard to create. 
 
Hayek: 
 
The LSE was created in 1895, became a constituent college of the University of 
London five years later, and awarded its first degrees in 1902. According to Coats 
(1993: 373), as of 1919, more than two decades after its founding, only one-third of 
its students were full-time; the rest, categorised as „occasional‟, attended the odd 
lecture here and there. Whilst this situation was, to an extent, driven by the aftermath 
of the First World War, the School was nevertheless keen to consolidate its position as 
a centre for the study of the social sciences, a position which clearly could not be 
achieved if the majority of its students were part-timers. A subsequent push to reverse 
the balance between part- and full-time students was so successful that, by the late 
1930s, the number of full-time students had grown to around two-thirds of the total. 
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 Women could attend lectures and take exams but did not gain full admission into the University until 
May 1948. 
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As far as the Economics Department was concerned, it had started to be a magnet for 
some considerable talent from the late 1920s, both at student level and in terms of 
young staff members. In fact, the relatively wide pool of potential young recruits 
which Hayek could have drawn upon in the early 1930s rivalled that available to 
Keynes at Cambridge and included, as we have seen, Hicks, Kaldor, and Lerner. For 
one reason or another, each of these eventually left the Hayek camp to join the 
Keynesian fold. But just as telling was the experience of G.L.S. Shackle. Shackle 
joined the LSE as a doctoral student in 1935 under Hayek‟s supervision, his area of 
interest being Austrian capital theory. However, in what turned out to be a revelatory 
episode, Shackle travelled to Cambridge in the same year to hear Richard Kahn and 
Joan Robinson lecture on the forthcoming General Theory. Shackle was so taken by 
what he heard that he wanted to drop his proposed thesis on capital theory and replace 
it with an analysis of the application of the ex ante and ex post concepts to the 
emerging Keynesian paradigm; he did so, with, as Shackle (1983: 115) has described 
it, „extreme enlightened generosity‟ on the part of Hayek. In later years, Shackle 
would become a highly respected member of the Post-Keynesian School. 
 
On a last note, Hayek‟s only sustained support at the LSE during the 1930s came from 
the young Ludwig Lachmann, who had arrived at the School from Germany in 1933 
having obtained a PhD from the University of Berlin and who studied under Hayek 
before becoming a colleague. But with only Hayek and Lachmann left to fight 
Cambridge, it is not surprising that interest in Hayek‟s cycle theories had completely 
collapsed by the time The Pure Theory of Capital appeared in 1941. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
A variety of factors meant that Kalecki‟s access to a pool of potential young recruits 
was extremely limited during the late 1920s and the first half of the 1930s. Putting to 
one side his seeming indifference to the importance of the role that disciples can play 
in promoting ideas, Kalecki‟s lack of access to university students was not helped by 
the fact that he did not hold an academic post at the time. Had he finished his own 
university education, things may have been different. As it turned out, his talents as an 
economist were eventually noticed and he secured a job at the Institute of Research on 
Business Cycles and Prices in Warsaw in 1929. At the Institute, he worked relatively 
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closely with Ludwik Landau and Marek Breit. However, any suggestion that Landau 
and Breit could have somehow formed the basis of an equivalent to the Circus appears 
to be far-fetched. For one, Landau‟s primary area of interest was statistics. Granted, 
Breit,
71
 who had secured his PhD in monetary economics from the University of 
Krakow in 1933, had similar interests to Kalecki, demonstrated by his most important 
published article on the role of imperfect competition in the theory of credit and 
investment, which appeared in 1935. He was also engaged in other projects, notably 
his work with Oscar Lange on the economics of socialism (even though this seems to 
have been completed before his arrival in Warsaw). Nevertheless, any chance of 
Kalecki establishing a following in Poland during this period was ultimately dashed 
after Landau and Breit were dismissed from the Institute in 1936 for attacking 
government economic policy; Kalecki responded by resigning his own post at the 
organisation. 
 
There was also a question of age. Kalecki was born in 1899, making him only eight 
years older than Breit and ten years older than Landau. It seems possible that Breit 
and Landau saw Kalecki as someone from their own chronological cohort rather than 
belonging to a previous generation. Without the benefits of greater maturity which 
significant age gaps usually bring with them, Kalecki may therefore have had a harder 
job at recruiting people like Landau and Breit as disciples than did Keynes at 
Cambridge and in the United States. Indeed, apart from the anomaly that was Hansen 
(born 1887), Keynes (born 1883) never had to deal with such a problem: amongst the 
members of the Circus, Sraffa was closest to him in age but was still 16 years younger 
while at least two decades separated Keynes from each of Richard Kahn, Joan 
Robinson and James Meade. Meanwhile, in the United States, Samuelson was not 
born until 1915, making him a full 32 years younger than Keynes. 
 
Summary: 
 
„Pool of potential recruits (graduate students)‟ is one of only four criteria where 
Hayek secures a positive rating. Keynes also does well, outperforming Marshall (an 
ambiguous performance) and Kalecki (a negative performance). 
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 The details of Breit‟s life and career presented here draw on Chilosi (1982: 80-81). 
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Table 11. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘ix. Pool of potential recruits (graduate students)’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
ix. Pool of potential recruits (graduate
    students) + ± + -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
It is perhaps inevitable that there should be points of similarity and overlap between 
the criterion considered here and some others, notably that dealing with social 
cohesion and discipleship. Notwithstanding such considerations, this sub-section has, 
it is hoped, thrown up some interesting aspects of the Keynesian Revolution. In 1938 
Keynes wrote that, „Good economists are scarce because the gift for using „vigilant 
observation‟ to choose good models, although it does not require a highly specialised 
intellectual technique, appears to be a very rare one‟ (Keynes to Harrod, 4 July 1938, 
CW XIV: 297). When Keynes began teaching at Cambridge in early 1909, the pool 
from which he might draw „good economists‟ was relatively small, this despite the 
formation of the Economics Tripos just a few years previously. Keynes had to wait 
nearly 20 years before Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson emerged, although his 
decision to set up the Political Economy Club in late 1909 demonstrated an early 
willingness to compensate for the lack of teaching in advanced economics then 
apparent at Cambridge. Graduate education in economics was undoubtedly more 
sophisticated in the United States, especially at Harvard, where a generation of young 
economists, including Samuelson and Tobin,
72
 took it upon themselves to advance the 
Keynesian cause under the inspiring leadership of (the much older) Hansen; in fact, 
by the early 1940s, the pool of potential recruits had arguably become more 
„Keynesian‟ than Keynes himself.73 At the same time, had it been down to Chicago, 
the General Theory‟s reception in the United States would have been much cooler. 
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 Tobin had actually been introduced to the General Theory as an undergraduate (see Harcourt 1984: 
495). 
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 One is reminded here of Keynes‟s comment to Lerner shortly before he (Keynes) died where he 
claimed that he was not, in fact, a Keynesian (see Clark 1970: 53), an early instance, perhaps, of the 
bifurcation that would produce Keynesian economics on the one hand and the economics of Keynes on 
the other. 
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Marshall‟s pool of potential recruits was necessarily limited before 1903 as he had to 
rely on students supplied by other triposes. Despite managing to produce a number of 
important economists at Cambridge, Marshall‟s experiences at Oxford played an 
important part in setting him on a course that would end up with the establishment of 
the Economics Tripos. Although the new Tripos had a slow start, in time, it 
significantly expanded the pool of potential young recruits available to Marshall‟s 
successors in the Economics Department, including Keynes. Unfortunately, in 
Marshall‟s case, this pool did not extend to women, despite the considerable potential 
contained therein. 
 
Hayek‟s access to potential recruits was relatively good when he arrived at the LSE; 
he was arguably in a stronger position than Keynes in this respect. But as stories 
emerged from Cambridge about what Keynes and his close associates were working 
on, support for Hayek began to ebb away. As a microcosm of this, Moggridge (1998: 
27-29) notes that Kaldor‟s and Lerner‟s switch to the Keynesian creed was a classic 
example of the „persuasion effect‟ described by Hirschman (1989) in his intriguing 
account of how people are drawn to a new theory; Shackle‟s conversion to 
Keynesianism can be similarly categorised. Finally, Kalecki never had access to any 
university students during the period under consideration as he was working at the 
Institute of Research on Business Cycles and Prices. His co-workers at the Institute, 
Landau and especially Breit, might have been recruited to the cause, although this was 
made difficult as they were relatively close in age to Kalecki plus the fact that they 
were both dismissed from their posts at the Institute in 1936. 
 
 
x. Access to or control of publication outlets 
 
Discussing the ease with which members of a research school can publish their work, 
Morrell states: 
 
„[Relatively] easy access to publication opportunities, or best of all 
control of them, enable[s] a school to convert private work into public 
knowledge and fame. Publication [is] vital to the success of any 
ambitious research school. Otherwise its reputation remain[s] 
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restricted and its students [lack] the spur of seeing their names in print‟ 
(Morrell 1972: 5). 
 
Keynes: 
 
We have seen how the oral tradition at Cambridge was passed down by Marshall to 
his students, including Keynes. The continuation of the tradition under Keynes 
manifested itself in various guises, including his decision to establish the Political 
Economy Club. The proceedings of the Club were informal and, as a result, no written 
record of what it discussed exists. The meetings of the Circus, for which there are also 
no written records, adopted the same practice of informality. However, it would be a 
mistake to assume that Cambridge‟s activities with respect to the Keynesian 
Revolution were solely reliant on the spoken word; opportunities to get into print were 
plentiful. 
 
Keynes‟s publishing history dated back to well before 1936. His first non-academic 
piece appeared in February 1909 when he sent a letter to The Economist arguing in 
favour of free trade, while his first full-length professional article, on „Recent 
Economic Events in India‟, appeared in the March 1909 number of the Economic 
Journal (Keynes 1909).
74
 This marked the beginning of Keynes‟s long association 
with the Journal, an association which lasted right up until a few months before his 
death. 
 
For reasons that will soon become clear, Keynes was elected to the editorship of the 
Economic Journal in late 1911, aged just 28.
75
 It has to be said that he was 
remarkably fair when it came to deciding what should and should not appear in the 
Journal‟s pages. Of course, to an extent he had to be, not only because of his innate 
sense of even-handedness but also because Edgeworth had opened the very first issue 
with the following words: „The Economic Journal…will be open to writers of 
different schools. The most opposite doctrines may meet here as on a fair field‟ 
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 Keynes‟s first actual piece for the Economic Journal was a two-page note on rents, prices and wages, 
which appeared in September 1908. 
75
 This paragraph draws on Cord (2007: 27-28). 
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(Edgeworth 1891: 1). Keynes nonetheless found himself in a difficult position: on the 
one hand, he was in charge of a respected journal and so could not be seen to be 
biased, while on the other, he was emerging as one of the key figures in the 
Cambridge School of Economics, with a reputation for independent thought. Given 
this, it would have been easy for him to have used the Journal as an outlet for his and 
his followers‟ views. However, as it turned out, his name did not appear particularly 
frequently in its pages: between 1911 and 1946, 37 of his articles, comments on other 
articles, and notes (excluding obituaries and book reviews), were printed in the 
Journal, an average of around one appearance a year. Of those pieces which were 
published after February 1936, only one – Keynes‟s June 1937 article on alternative 
theories of the interest rate – had any direct relevance to the General Theory. His most 
important written defence of the General Theory was in the February 1937 issue of 
the Quarterly Journal of Economics and even that was only in response to the 
critiques published in the November 1936 number of the same journal by, amongst 
others, Robertson and Viner. Keynes‟s capacity to defend the General Theory became 
rather limited by first, the heart attack he suffered in May 1937 and, second, by his 
steadily increasing involvement in Britain‟s war effort. One other reason for Keynes‟s 
seeming reluctance to publish his own ideas in the Economic Journal was his view 
that Cambridge was the world‟s leading economics institution. Patinkin (1982: 33) 
points out that, in Britain, Keynes only really had time for Oxford and London (read: 
the LSE). With Roy Harrod and James Meade representing his theories at Oxford
76
 
and Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson busy converting the youngsters at both 
Cambridge and the LSE, Keynes took little interest in using the Journal as yet another 
mouthpiece for his ideas, even if there was the odd occasion – such as the 
employment of Sraffa to criticise Hayek‟s Prices and Production (Sraffa 1932) – 
when he would use the Journal to attack the ideas of others. 
 
In terms of how much exposure the specific issue of unemployment received in the 
Journal, there is a hint that Keynes may not have wanted to give too much publicity to 
others‟ theories. Thus, between 1932 and 1935, only three articles on the subject 
appeared in the Journal‟s pages (see Routh 1989: 286-287). But this does not 
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 After his postgraduate year at Cambridge, Meade returned to Oxford for the Michaelmas Term of 
1931 and remained there until December 1937. 
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represent an accurate picture as Keynes did, in fact, publish a larger number of articles 
on the more general topic of economic fluctuations: between 1930 and 1935, 21 such 
pieces appeared in the Journal, an average of around 0.875 per number. (On a related 
note, Routh (1989: 286) is incorrect in his broader characterisation of economists 
being preoccupied during the first half of the 1930s with perfect and imperfect 
competition on the one hand and cardinal and ordinal utility on the other. The events 
of 1929 led to a veritable explosion in the publication of works dedicated to the study 
of economic fluctuations: in an impressive bibliography, Gordon (1937) details no 
less than 941 books and articles which appeared on the subject between 1930 and 
1936.) 
 
In terms of articles submitted for possible inclusion in the Journal, Keynes would 
sometimes try, but not force, his own ideas on others. Granted, there was his rejection 
of Kalecki‟s submission on technical progress. However, as we saw, this only took 
place after Keynes had carried out an extensive correspondence on the matter with 
Joan Robinson and Nicholas Kaldor. Moreover, in exchanges with Kalecki over his 
submission in early 1942 of a piece on the theory of profits, there is little sign of 
Keynes abusing his position, this despite the fact that his suggested revisions, which 
would have undoubtedly improved Kalecki‟s article, were rejected by the author; in 
the spirit of magnanimity, Keynes published the piece anyway (see CW XII: 837-
841).
77
 In addition, as we saw with the work by Dunlop and Tarshis on the movement 
of money and real wages, Keynes also published research which directly contradicted 
claims he had made in the General Theory. This aside, Keynes, like many editors with 
a vested interest, was not totally immune to the publication of material supportive of 
his own views. For example, the appearance in the Journal of Kahn‟s multiplier 
article in June 1931 gave it the crucial exposure that would help to establish it as a key 
building block of the General Theory. In addition, there was Hicks‟s broadly positive 
review of the General Theory published in June 1936. Finally, Meade and Stone‟s 
article on national incoming accounting in the June/September 1941 Journal (Meade 
and Stone 1941) was an important part in the development of that field of inquiry, one 
which was also heavily integrated with the Keynesian Revolution. 
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 The fact that Kalecki submitted another article to the Economic Journal so soon after his previous 
attempt was rejected says something about his confidence in Keynes‟s fairness as an editor. 
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Even though Keynes would consult others when he could not make up his mind about 
a proposed article, he was not reticent about turning down submissions when he was 
convinced – sometimes wrongly, it has to be said – that they were not appropriate for 
the Journal. One of his first acts as editor was to reject a piece by the economic 
historian, Archdeacon Cunningham. In his typically forthright style, Keynes described 
Cunningham‟s article as „the most complete wash [which] had nothing to do with 
economics‟ (Keynes in Skidelsky 1983: 207). In the majority of cases, Keynes‟s 
judgement in deciding what should appear was correct. However, he did make some 
howlers. In 1923 he rejected what would turn out to be a seminal contribution to the 
theory of international trade from Ohlin and in 1931 he refused to publish a classic 
article on the economics of exhaustible resources by the American economist, Harold 
Hotelling, on the grounds that he considered it to be too mathematical (see Blaug 
1994: 1,209). 
 
Despite the above, Keynes was responsible for giving the Journal a much-needed shot 
in the arm, helping it to keep ahead of the LSE-based Economica. Indeed, the 
reputation that the Journal gained during the years of Keynes‟s stewardship enabled it 
to become one of the most influential and respected publications within the economics 
profession, a point not lost on the young John Hicks, who wrote that in the early 
1930s, „one naturally began by trying to get something published in the E.J., as [it] 
was a source of prestige‟ (Hicks in Coats 1993: 194). The Journal‟s strong reputation 
has been preserved right up to the present day. 
 
Keynes‟s access to book publishers was dominated by his relationship with 
Macmillan, with whom he had a long-standing and close association throughout his 
career. This was founded on his friendship with a fellow old Etonian and partner at 
the company, Daniel Macmillan, brother of Harold, and would have been bolstered by 
Marshall‟s own relationship with Macmillan, which dated back to 1879 when they 
published The Economics of Industry. All of Keynes‟s major books, including the 
Economic Consequences, A Treatise on Money and the General Theory, were 
published by Macmillan. Reflecting his influence within the company, Keynes was 
able to negotiate a contract for the Economic Consequences, whereby he would pay 
for all production costs, the publisher would receive a 10% commission plus 10% of 
net sales, and Keynes would keep the rest. Subsequent adjustments to this 
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arrangement meant that the General Theory could be priced at just five shillings, low 
enough to encourage readership amongst less well off students but also a 
manifestation of Keynes‟s belief that the book was an important one that deserved to 
be read. By means of comparison with other economics books published by 
Macmillan at the time, Joan Robinson‟s The Economics of Imperfect Competition (J. 
Robinson 1933c) was priced at 12s 6d for 352 pages while Lionel Robbins‟s The 
Great Depression (1934) sold for 8s 6d for 238 pages (see Moggridge 2006b: 139). 
Calculated on a cost-per-page basis, the General Theory (404 pages) came out at a 
particularly favourable 0.15 of an old British penny (pre-decimalisation), much 
cheaper than Robinson‟s and Robbins‟s books, both priced at 0.43 of an old British 
penny.
78
 
 
Apart from Macmillan, Keynes had access to various other publication outlets. His 
views frequently appeared in national newspapers. Even before any thoughts of the 
General Theory had started to coalesce in his mind, Keynes was in demand as a man 
who might be able to shape official and popular opinion (even if, in reality, his 
influence in this regard may not always have been significant, at least during the 
1920s). 
 
The Economic Consequences had made Keynes‟s name as a controversialist and it led 
C.P. Scott, editor of the Manchester Guardian (forerunner of The Guardian), to ask 
Keynes to cover the Genoa Conference in April-May 1922, where participants from 
34 countries were due to discuss how they would pull the world economy out of the 
downturn that had struck the previous year. As part of his commission, Keynes edited 
a series of supplements under the general title „Reconstruction in Europe‟, which 
appeared between April 1922 and January 1923. Though they were not directly 
related to the Keynesian Revolution, the supplements helped to maintain and further 
consolidate Keynes‟s profile both within the economics profession and in the public‟s 
psyche. A couple of years later in July 1925, Keynes added further to his profile by 
attacking Churchill‟s decision to return Britain to gold. His position was set out in 
three articles in the Evening Standard and later in The Economic Consequences of Mr 
                                                 
78
 One old British penny is equal to 0.417 of a post-decimalisation (i.e. today‟s) penny. 
 149 
Churchill, printed by Hogarth Press, which was owned and run by his old friends, 
Leonard and Virginia Woolf.
79
 
 
As far as the Keynesian Revolution itself was concerned, most notable amongst 
Keynes‟s non-Macmillan output was Can Lloyd George Do It? (1929), which 
appeared in The Nation and Athenaeum, and four articles penned for The Times in 
March 1933 under the heading „The Means to Prosperity‟, where Keynes argued for 
economic recovery through loan financing. This latter set of ideas also received an 
American audience after The Means to Prosperity was published by Harcourt Brace, 
Keynes‟s publisher in the United States, in pamphlet form later in 1933. Back in 
Britain, Keynes followed up his articles for The Times with a piece for the renamed 
New Statesman and Nation in April 1933, which presented a detailed explanation of 
the multiplier. Post-General Theory, Keynes‟s newspaper contributions included 
„How to avoid a slump‟, which appeared in The Times in mid-January 1937, and his 
articles in November 1939 for The Times which formed the basis for How to Pay for 
the War. 
 
Books aside, Keynes had a certain enthusiasm for publishing his ideas through 
newspapers and/or pamphlets rather than in the pages of an academic journal, where 
the readership was necessarily limited. In fact, he had well-defined beliefs about the 
best and worst means of publishing. Writing about Jevons, Keynes argued that: „An 
economic treatise may have great educational value. Perhaps we require one treatise, 
as a pièce de résistance, for each generation. But…does not the progress and the daily 
usefulness of economic science require that pioneers and innovators should eschew 
the treatise and prefer the pamphlet or the monograph? I depreciated Jevons‟s 
Political Economy…on the ground that it was no more than a brilliant brochure. Yet it 
was Jevons‟s willingness to spill his ideas, to flick them at the world, that won him his 
great personal position and his unrivalled power of stimulating other minds. Every 
one of Jevons‟s contributions to economics was in the nature of a pamphlet… 
Economists must leave to Adam Smith alone the glory of the quarto, must pluck the 
                                                 
79
 Hogarth published only three of Keynes‟s works, all in pamphlet form and all in the mid-1920s: The 
Economic Consequences of Mr Churchill (1925), A Short View of Russia (1925), and The End of 
Laissez-Faire (1926). 
 150 
day, fling pamphlets into the wind, write always sub specie temporis, and achieve 
immortality by accident, if at all‟ (Keynes in CW X: 198-199). It seems likely then 
that Keynes may have got the idea for publishing pamphlets from Jevons: it certainly 
was not from Marshall. As we see, Keynes also makes the case for allowing one book 
in economic theory to become a masterpiece in each generation, an attribute clearly 
met by the General Theory.
80
 
 
The written word was not the only method employed by Keynes in his efforts to find 
outlets for his ideas. He could also employ oral channels of communication. As well 
as the small number of „inspiring‟ lectures he delivered to students at Cambridge each 
year, there were the numerous lectures he gave to various other audiences. A good 
example of this took place in 1931 when Keynes gave two lectures to the New School 
for Social Research in New York. Confirming his reputation in the United States, 
Keynes‟s first lecture was reported by a number of newspapers, including The New 
York Times and The Wall Street Journal. In his second lecture, Keynes made the case 
for government intervention as a means of curing a slump, this in front of an 
estimated 400 people (see Kent 2004: 201). Keynes also had access to the radio waves 
and would often make BBC broadcasts on economics. One of the most notable of 
these again took place in 1931 when Keynes urged Britain‟s housewives to „sally 
out…into the streets and go to the wonderful sales‟ (Keynes 1931a: 46), so that they 
could play their part in the fight against unemployment. 
 
Marshall: 
 
The Economic Journal was a key aspect of the heritage which Keynes enjoyed at 
Cambridge. Marshall had been instrumental in founding the Journal, the first volume 
of which appeared in March 1891. Aware that Britain was dragging its heels when it 
came to establishing and maintaining reputable economics periodicals, Marshall wrote 
in October 1890 that, „The need [for] an economic journal has long been felt in 
England. Every other country in which economic studies are pursued with great 
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activity, offers facilities for the publication of thorough scientific work by persons 
who have not the time, or are unwilling, to write a formal treatise‟ (Marshall in 
Whitaker 1996: 343). 
 
The first academic journal fully dedicated to economics was published in Germany in 
1844 under the title Zeitschrift für die gesamte staatswissenschaft,
81
 with various 
other European countries, including France and Italy, publishing their own journals 
before the appearance of the Economic Journal. Yet it was the October 1886 debut of 
the Harvard-based Quarterly Journal of Economics which really spurred Marshall 
into action as it was the first English-language journal devoted to economic issues; 
Marshall was no doubt put out by the fact that there was no recognised academic 
outlet for his articles in Britain and that, as a result, he had to turn to the Quarterly 
Journal of Economics to get two of his pieces published – the first on the theory of 
business profits and the second on wages and profits – in 1887 and 1888 respectively. 
 
Marshall probably also felt that a Cambridge-based journal would be a useful addition 
to his Organon in terms of providing another channel for conveying his theories to the 
rest of the profession.
82
 His insistence on keeping mathematics out of the Economic 
Journal meant that, in the early years, the articles that appeared were not as 
sophisticated as they would later become. Moreover, the Journal was certainly not the 
bulldozer for his theories which Marshall had maybe wished it to be. Of course, the 
Journal did have its moments, notably the debates over utility and opportunity cost 
that took place in 1894 (see Maloney 1990: 50). But Marshall should take some of the 
blame for the Journal‟s failure during this period to live up to its earlier promise: 
Marshall never really took to publishing articles, his tendency to sit on ideas for long 
periods being a contributory factor. In fact, during his lifetime, Marshall published 
only six articles in the Journal, the first being in March 1892, the last in March 1907. 
 
Meanwhile, in 1908, Marshall had supported Pigou‟s candidature as his successor as 
Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, hoping that Pigou would be the torch-
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bearer for the Organon. There was little doubt that Pigou was one of Marshall‟s 
strongest supporters, his belief that „It‟s all in Marshall‟ becoming part of Cambridge 
economics folklore. But even though Pigou was not as averse as Marshall to 
publishing in journals – he authored 12 articles for the Economic Journal between its 
founding in March 1891 and December 1911 (the last number before which Keynes 
became editor) – he was not as active as he might have been. Perhaps we are being a 
little harsh on Pigou. In his defence, he, along with Edgeworth, contributed a number 
of book reviews to the Journal during its second decade; he was also preoccupied 
with writing his masterpiece, Wealth and Welfare, the first edition of which appeared 
in 1912. But either way, when Edgeworth indicated in 1911 that he wished to step 
down as the Journal‟s editor, Marshall took the view that Pigou should not be his 
successor, sensing that the baton had to be passed to a younger generation if the 
Journal was to fulfil the hopes of its founders. Keynes was the obvious choice and 
Marshall knew it: he made a special effort to attend the October 1911 meeting of the 
Council of the Royal Economic Society in order to support Keynes‟s candidature, 
support which more or less guaranteed Keynes‟s appointment. 
 
Marshall had a good level of access to other publication outlets. For instance, in 1879, 
Henry Sidgwick arranged for the printing and private publication of Marshall‟s 
monographs on The Pure Theory of Foreign Trade and The Pure Theory of Domestic 
Values. Sadly, relations between the two men subsequently deteriorated partly, it 
seems, because of Marshall‟s decision to reverse his earlier support for the promotion 
of women‟s higher education. It is mere speculation, but had they remained on good 
terms, Sidgwick may have been in a position to encourage Marshall to publish his 
ideas more quickly than he did. Apart from the oral tradition, Marshall relied mostly 
on books to get his point across. Granted, there were regular letters to The Times as 
well the evidence he gave to government commissions, but these never came close to 
the theoretical sophistication contained in his treatises. Needless to say, the Principles 
stands out in this respect: not only was it the most important book on economics of its 
generation – nothing came close to rivalling its influence until the General Theory – 
but, on a more esoteric note, it was also the first book to be published under the resale 
price maintenance (RPM) scheme pioneered by Macmillan.
83
 As with Keynes, 
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Marshall enjoyed a long publishing history with Macmillan, beginning, as we saw, 
with The Economics of Industry (1879) and ending with Money, Credit and 
Commerce (1923). At the same time, it is less clear how Marshall‟s very first contact 
with Macmillan came about and to what extent Marshall himself may have played a 
part in encouraging Keynes to publish with Macmillan (notwithstanding Keynes‟s 
existing ties with the Macmillan family). Both of these issues would benefit from 
further treatment. 
 
Hayek: 
 
What the Economic Journal was to Cambridge, Economica was to the LSE. It first 
appeared in January 1921 and was initially home to all the disciplines at the School. 
In 1934 it was split into Economica (New Series),
84,85
 concerned only with 
economics, economic history and statistics, and another journal, Politica. Judging by 
Table 12, in its early years, Economica was far more of a house journal than its 
Cambridge counterpart, this probably being a manifestation, during the late 1920s and 
early 1930s, of Robbins‟s desire to fight Cambridge. 
 
Table 12. Cambridge- and London-based authors of articles in Economic Journal 
and Economica, 1920-69 
   Cambridge      London
Economic Journal Economica Economic Journal Economica
% % % %
1920-29 32.1 6.6 17.3 70.3
1930-39 33.8 4.2 19.3 70.7
1940-49 26.3 8.2 15.7 55.9
1950-59 23.9 10.7 18.2 51.4
1960-69 23.1 3.7 13.8 58.0
Source: Adapted from Coats (1993: 189) 
 
There was also an imbalance between London-based authors publishing in the 
Economic Journal and vice versa. For example, during the 1930s, London economists 
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were responsible for nearly one in five of all articles appearing in the Journal, whilst 
Cambridge economists authored only 4.2% of pieces appearing in Economica during 
the same period. Whether this effect was down to Robbins‟s crusading zeal or 
Keynes‟s generosity or a combination of both is difficult to say. The important point 
is that London economists were seemingly given plenty of opportunity to get their 
views into print via journals. 
 
Almost immediately upon his arrival at the LSE, Hayek found that he could publish 
more or less what he liked in Economica, underpinned by support from Robbins, who 
was acting editor during the 1930s. Hayek‟s first article was „The “Paradox” of 
Saving‟ (Hayek 1931b), which ran to a length of no less than 45 pages.86 Following 
this, Robbins asked Hayek to review Keynes‟s A Treatise on Money, Hayek‟s 
comments appearing in two instalments in the August 1931 (Hayek 1931c) and 
February 1932 (Hayek 1932) editions of Economica. A taste of Hayek‟s opinion of 
the book can be gleaned from the opening paragraph of the first part of his review: 
„[T]he Treatise proves to be so obviously…the expression of a transitory phase in a 
process of rapid intellectual development that its appearance cannot be said to have 
that definitive significance which at one time was expected of it‟ (Hayek 1931c: 270). 
Hayek‟s main point of disagreement was over Keynes‟s alleged failure to pay enough 
attention to the effect that monetary policy has on the structure of production, a key 
plank of Austrian cycle theory. 
 
Keynes was furious. In his private copy of the August 1931 Economica he pencilled 
to himself: „Hayek has not read my book with that measure of „good will‟ which an 
author is entitled to expect of a reader. Until he can do so, he will not see what I mean 
or know whether I am right. He evidently has a passion which leads him to pick on 
me, but I am left wondering what this passion is‟ (Keynes in CW XIII: 243). Keynes 
repeated these sentiments in a reply published in Economica in November 1931, 
stating that, „Dr. Hayek has seriously misapprehended the character of my 
conclusions. He thinks that my central contention is something different from what it 
really is‟ (Keynes 1931b: 387). Later in the same response, Keynes could not resist a 
dig at Prices and Production, claiming that it was „one of the most frightful muddles I 
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have ever read… It is an extraordinary example of how, starting with a mistake, a 
remorseless logician can end up in Bedlam‟ (ibid., 394). A private correspondence 
between Keynes and Hayek lasting from December 1931 to March 1932 failed to 
make any substantive progress towards a reconciliation and neither did a February 
1933 article in Economica by Joan Robinson; Sraffa‟s rather acerbic attack on Prices 
and Production in the Economic Journal of March 1932 could not have helped 
matters. 
 
It would be easy to conclude from the above that relations between Keynes and Hayek 
were rather poor during this period. Keynes, in particular, seems to have been 
somewhat upset by Hayek‟s comments regarding the Treatise. But this exaggerates 
the true picture. To begin with, as noted, Keynes and Hayek still thought it 
worthwhile to carry on a private correspondence for four months to see if they could 
patch up their differences, while Joan Robinson‟s Economica article shows that she 
believed that some consensus could be reached.
87
 Also, despite the ongoing fracas 
between Cambridge and London, Hayek was still able to publish an article in the 
Economic Journal relatively soon after looking at investment and output (Hayek 
1934) where, incidentally, Keynes allowed Hayek to indulge his passion for 
complicated diagrams.
88
 
 
Although Cambridge and London had apparently been able to keep bilateral relations 
on a reasonably even keel, Hayek wrote to Haberler in March 1936 that: „The chance 
exists just now to isolate Keynes and to bring to a stand a common front of other 
Cambridge and London [economists]. These possibilities we would not jeopardize by 
putting Economica in the forefront of the attack. Pigou‟s article will cause enough 
sensation‟ (Hayek to Haberler, 15 March 1936, in Howson 2001: 372). „Pigou‟s 
article‟ refers to the highly critical review that Pigou had written of the General 
Theory which, rather divisively, he had been asked to pen for Economica by Robbins 
and Hayek. Hayek was clearly excited about what was in Pigou‟s piece, with some 
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justification as it turned out, as the following excerpt from its first page demonstrates: 
„Einstein actually did for Physics what Mr. Keynes believes himself to have done for 
Economics. He developed a far-reaching generalisation, under which Newton‟s results 
can be subsumed as a special case. But he [Einstein] did not, in announcing his 
discovery, insinuate, through carefully barbed sentences, that Newton and those who 
had hitherto followed his lead were a gang of incompetent bunglers‟ (Pigou 1936: 
115). In order to maximise its impact, Pigou‟s comments appeared at the beginning of 
the May 1936 number of Economica, occupying 18 pages. But if Hayek and Robbins 
thought that Pigou would bring the Keynesian steamroller to a juddering halt, they 
were very much mistaken. The point has already been made that Hayek, in particular, 
did not anticipate the major impact that the General Theory would have once it 
appeared, one of the results of which was his failure to take advantage of available 
publication outlets – Economica being the main one – through which he might mount 
a counter case. 
 
After Cambridge‟s attack on Prices and Production, it would not have been a surprise 
had Hayek come out fighting in 1936. But he did not. As already alluded to, a host of 
reasons have been suggested as to why this was so (see Caldwell 1998 and Howson 
2001), including Hayek‟s reluctance to enter into further controversy, a preoccupation 
with his own work (including his classic „Economics and Knowledge‟, which 
appeared in Economica in February 1937, as well as his Profits, Interest and 
Investment (1939) and The Pure Theory of Capital (1941)), and the suggestion that 
Hayek regarded the General Theory as just another transitory phase in Keynes‟s 
thinking. Whatever the reason(s), informed readers of Economica in 1936 would have 
been surprised not to see someone from the LSE taking on Keynes. 
 
Finally, Hayek was not one for pamphleteering. As far as books were concerned, he 
was able to get Routledge to publish Prices and Production, a relationship which 
resulted in the same company publishing The Pure Theory of Capital. In the United 
States, Prices and Production appeared in 1932 under the Macmillan imprint and 
received generally positive reviews from Alvin Hansen in the American Economic 
Review and Arthur Marget in the Journal of Political Economy. Closer to home, the 
situation was less comforting. Sraffa‟s attack on Hayek has been noted. In addition, in 
an article which has arguably been overlooked, Hawtrey wrote a far from 
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complimentary review of Prices and Production for none other than Economica 
itself.
89
 There would have been plenty of other reviewers available to Robbins; he 
could even have written a review himself. This, however, would have smacked of 
partiality and so Robbins chose Hawtrey, hoping that the Treasury man‟s views would 
reflect the divergence of opinion on the cycle that had opened up between himself and 
Keynes in the early 1930s. But the decision to have Hawtrey write a review was a bad 
miscalculation. Thus, in his last paragraph, Hawtrey (1932: 125) complained that 
Prices and Production was „so difficult and obscure that it is impossible to understand 
[its] 112 pages except at the cost of many hours of hard work‟, and that, „this is not a 
necessary consequence of the difficulty of the subject, but that [Hayek] has been led 
by so ill-chosen a method of analysis to conclusions which he would hardly have 
accepted if given a more straightforward form of expression‟ (ibid.). Had Keynes 
known how critical Hawtrey was going to be, there is a possibility that he may not 
even have bothered with the Sraffa commission.
90
 
 
Kalecki: 
 
Kalecki had reasonably good access to publication outlets in the early and mid-1930s, 
although, for the most part, they were not of the kind required to launch a „Kaleckian‟ 
Revolution. An early attempt by Kalecki to get his ideas into print was his co-
founding of a newspaper, entitled Koniunktura Wlókiennicza (The Textile Market), a 
doomed project which resulted in only one issue being published (see Kowalik 1966: 
1). Following on from this, he became closely associated with the socialist movement 
and contributed articles to a variety of Polish journals, including Przeglad 
Gospodarczy (The Economic Review), Polska Gospodarcza (Polish Economy), and 
Przeglad Socjalistyczny (The Socialist Review). Concerning the last of these, Kalecki 
was forced to publish his articles under the pseudonym Henryk Braun, reflecting his 
concern that he may attract the wrong kind of attention from the authorities. He also 
published in Ekonomista and it was for this publication that Kalecki penned his 1936 
review of the General Theory. As Harcourt (1992: 1,609) notes, the fact that Kalecki 
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was able to write up and publish his review relatively quickly after the General 
Theory‟s appearance supports the argument that his own ideas had anticipated 
Keynes‟s. 
 
There is still a chronological issue here, however. As a Polish translation of the 
General Theory was presumably not then available to Kalecki, there is a question 
mark over whether he based his review on the English- or the German-language 
version of the book. Keynes only completed the preface to the German-language 
edition of the General Theory on 7 September 1936, and so it seems likely that the 
German version did not appear for at least a couple of months after that. This, in turn, 
suggests that Kalecki would not have had the time to both read the German edition 
and write up his review (it is unclear in which month in 1936 Kalecki‟s review 
appeared). Give this evidence, there is a reasonable chance that Kalecki only had 
access to the English-language edition. If this was indeed the case and if Kalecki‟s 
English writing skills – even if they may only have been rudimentary – in any way 
matched his reading skills, the question has to be asked as to why he never submitted 
his early cycle work to English-language journals, where they would have received 
much more exposure. 
 
It seems, therefore, that Kalecki fell foul of the not uncommon mistake in academic 
publishing of simply submitting his pieces to the wrong journals.
91
 In fact, Kalecki 
made the double error of publishing his early work not only in Polish but also one 
article in French (Kalecki 1935a), this when English was and indeed still is the lingua 
franca of economists. Additionally, Kalecki published what should have been 
relatively simple ideas in a complicated form; to a certain extent, Keynes was also 
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guilty of this in the General Theory, albeit in a different manner. In Kalecki‟s case, he 
„over-mathematised‟ his theories on the cycle, an example being his 1935 article for 
Econometrica. Even though Econometrica had only first been published in 1933, it 
had quickly built up a strong reputation: in the same issue as Kalecki‟s article was a 
piece by Tinbergen, whilst Frisch had appeared in the preceding number. But as we 
saw when we looked at Kalecki‟s research reputation, it seems that even those in 
attendance at the Econometric Society meeting in September-October 1933, where 
Kalecki presented his ideas upon which the Econometrica piece was to be based, 
failed to grasp the significance of what he was saying partly, it would seem, because 
of the excessively technical nature of his analysis. 
 
On a final point, Chapple (1991: 258) maintains that one reason why Kalecki did not 
publish in the leading English-language journals was that his lack of formal training in 
economics meant that he was not „socialised‟ in how to write academic papers and 
where to publish them in order to generate maximum effect. Chapple makes a valid 
point: in addition to his pieces in Polish and French, Kalecki sent a German 
translation of his cycle theory to a publisher in Germany in the early 1930s. However, 
this never came to anything as the publisher had already left the country as a result of 
Hitler‟s rise to power (see A. Kalecki to Kahn, 13 May 1981, JVRP vii/231/5). The 
same translation was also sent to Keynes but was returned to Kalecki with a note 
written by Kahn stating that Keynes could not read German (ibid.). 
 
One point which should be considered alongside this is the fact that Ludwik Landau 
was able to publish an article in English in the March 1931 issue of the respected 
Journal of the American Statistical Association. Granted, the article, which deals with 
the organisation of statistics in Poland, is at times staccato. Nevertheless, it is still 
something of a mystery why Kalecki – who must surely have been aware of Landau‟s 
piece – did not follow suit and submit some of his early work to an English-language 
periodical.
92
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Summary: 
 
Hayek again scores well in this category, even if he sometimes failed to make good 
use of easy access to publications. Keynes and Marshall are able to match Hayek, and 
all three are ahead of Kalecki. 
 
Table 13. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘x. Access to or control of publication outlets’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
x. Access to or control of publication
     outlets + + + -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
The part played by issues related to publishing in the careers of Keynes, Marshall, 
Hayek and Kalecki varied considerably. Keynes was in the privileged position of 
being editor of the Economic Journal. He did not, however, use it to advance his 
revolutionary ideas on the cycle. Of course, he published Kahn‟s multiplier article and 
employed Sraffa to attack Hayek. There was also the cachet that came with the 
editorship itself, a position Keynes had secured with the considerable help of 
Marshall. But Keynes took the decision to rely more on books, pamphlets and 
newspapers to convey his message, aware that these would give his ideas a much 
wider circulation, even if his audience might be less sophisticated when it came to 
understanding technical economics. 
 
With respect to books specifically, Keynes was probably encouraged by the success of 
Marshall‟s Principles – the two men had little else in common when it came to 
„flicking‟ their ideas at the world – and believed, correctly, that he could emulate such 
success. At a more pragmatic level, Keynes‟s close relationship with Macmillan 
meant that the General Theory could be published at a comparatively cheap price. 
 
As soon as he arrived at the LSE from Austria, Hayek, with the editorial support of 
Robbins, was able to publish his ideas at will in Economica. Unfortunately, after his 
very public spat with Keynes over A Treatise on Money, Hayek made some basic 
 161 
errors, most notably not writing a review of the General Theory; while Hayek 
believed that the Pigou review for Economica would do mortal damage to Keynes, 
this turned out not to be the case. 
 
Finally, in the crucial years of the early 1930s, Kalecki was writing predominantly in 
Polish for Polish publications. Even where he succeeded in publishing in non-Polish 
journals, his analysis was still too technical. Had he taken a lead from Landau and 
attempted to publish his work in a top flight English-language journal, his standing in 
the subsequent history of economic theory may have been very different. 
 
 
xi. Students publish early under own names 
 
Geison (1981: 26) states: 
 
„To produce a school that extends beyond himself, the director must 
nurture early independence, self-reliance, and ambition among his 
students, especially by encouraging them to publish under their own 
names at an early stage in their career…‟ 
 
Keynes: 
 
In the years leading up to 1936 and thereafter, the publishing activities of the 
individual members of the Circus and of others who had been Keynes‟s students was 
mixed,
93
 although the bottom line was that a good enough number of those closely 
associated with Keynes published work during the 1930s and 1940s which supported 
the Keynesian Revolution. 
 
Prior to the General Theory, Richard Kahn had published five pieces in the Economic 
Journal, only two of which were full-length articles, one of course being his classic 
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 At the risk of splitting hairs, of the four main members of the Circus, only Kahn was supervised by 
Keynes. Joan Robinson was taught by other members of the Economics Department, Meade was a 
pupil of Dennis Robertson‟s, and Sraffa had long completed his formal education. 
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on the multiplier, the other concerned with welfare economics. The remaining three 
were notes on the financing of public works, decreasing costs, and the elasticity of 
substitution respectively. He also published „Public Works and Inflation‟ in the March 
1933 Journal of the American Statistical Association, an attempt to push the 
multiplier idea to an American audience. Post-1936 Kahn‟s writing was sparser: in a 
note for the Review of Economics and Statistics in August 1936 he batted away 
criticism of his analysis of secondary employment in Kahn (1931) and in the 
December 1937 Economic Journal he defended Keynes‟s theories in his review of 
Haberler‟s Prosperity and Depression. 
 
Kahn‟s reputation for infrequent publishing has been partly driven by the extremely 
long time it took to get his King‟s Fellowship dissertation into the public realm: 
finished in 1929, it was published in Italian only in 1983, with an English version 
following in 1989. In Kahn‟s defence, during the first half of the 1930s, he was busy 
helping Keynes with the preparation of the General Theory as well as playing a key 
role in the imperfect competition revolution at Cambridge.
94
 However, this still does 
not fully explain away his subsequent procrastination with respect to publishing. 
 
We have already alluded to how Joan Robinson benefited from Kahn‟s extensive help 
in her work on imperfect competition during the 1930s. But like Kahn, Robinson was 
heavily involved in assisting Keynes during the first half of the decade, and the 
reputation she acquired as a result of her work on imperfect competition no doubt 
added to the attention that her writings in defence of Keynes received. She penned a 
piece for the Review of Economic Studies (J. Robinson 1933b), which was an update 
on Keynes‟s latest ideas, notably his transition from a focus on price changes to one 
more concerned with variations in output, and wrote two pieces for the Economic 
Journal – „Disguised Unemployment‟ (J. Robinson 1936) and „The Concept of 
Hoarding‟ (J. Robinson 1938) – both of which were a nod in Keynes‟s direction. One 
of her most important book contributions to the Keynesian cause during the 1930s 
was Essays in the Theory of Employment, which appeared in 1937 (J. Robinson 
1937b). 
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 As well as assisting Joan Robinson, Kahn published an important article on duopoly in 1937 (Kahn 
1937). 
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James Meade also made published contributions to the Keynesian Revolution in the 
early years of his career. There were some non-Keynesian articles, such as his „The 
Amount of Money and the Banking System‟ (Meade 1934a) for the Economic Journal 
and two pieces on the elasticity of substitution for the Review of Economic Studies 
(Meade 1934b, 1934c). These aside, before the appearance of the General Theory, 
Meade was advocating Keynesian ideas within political circles. As we saw, there was 
his work for the New Fabian Research Bureau, which acted as an advisory body to the 
Labour Party‟s Finance and Trade Committee, led by Hugh Dalton (see Howson 
2000: F124). As part of this, Meade produced a pamphlet in 1933 called Public Works 
in their International Aspect, where he made a strong case for using countercyclical 
government spending to expand public works, a case founded on the multiplier. 
 
One of the clearest published instances of Meade‟s early Keynesian credentials came 
with the appearance in 1936 of his book An Introduction to Economic Analysis and 
Policy. Published soon after the General Theory, it contained a Keynesian treatment 
of unemployment as well as a chapter on imperfect competition and sections dealing 
with the distribution of income, the supply of the primary factors of production, and 
international trade. Its length (392 pages) was in keeping with that of a textbook and it 
was priced at a reasonably competitive 10s. As such, it held some value for students, 
this at a time when economics textbooks by well-known authors were thin on the 
ground. But despite Meade‟s status as a man close to the unfolding events at 
Cambridge – a fact which helped to secure reviews in a number of the quality journals 
both in Britain and the United States – the book was not a commercial success. A 
number of reasons help to explain this, including Meade‟s own reasoning that the 
intervention of the war meant that minds were distracted in other directions. At the 
same time, however, Meade‟s book did not contain any diagrams and it may also have 
been viewed as being too biased as a result of its extensive treatment of the „new 
economics‟ being pioneered at Cambridge. In addition, Meade was criticised by some 
reviewers for his claim to have written an „introduction‟ to economic theory, the 
sophistication of much of his analysis only really lending itself to study by advanced 
students (see Benham 1937: 238). 
 
Following on from An Introduction to Economic Analysis and Policy, Meade wrote 
„A Simplified Model of Mr. Keynes‟ System‟ (Meade 1937), an article which was one 
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of many published around that time which contributed to the formation of the IS-LM 
framework. Meade‟s piece was undoubtedly in that tradition, even if it had its failings, 
notably not being as readable as say, Hicks‟s treatment which contained less 
mathematics, and being devoid of diagrams. Meade‟s strong publication record within 
the context of the Keynesian Revolution nevertheless continued into the early years of 
the Second World War when his energies were devoted to national income 
accounting. As we have seen, most important in this regard was his and Stone‟s 
„National Income, Saving and Consumption‟, which appeared in the Economic 
Journal in March 1941. 
 
Piero Sraffa was the least productive of the main Circus members in terms of 
publishing material supportive of Keynes‟s theories. This was down to a variety of 
factors, including his inherent lack of commitment to the Keynesian cause, his interest 
in other projects (notably the works of Ricardo and Marx and his related attempt to 
induce a classical revival), and his slowness in getting anything into print (he easily 
surpassed Marshall in this respect). In fact, during the 1930s, his only published 
contributions to the Keynesian cause was his attack on Prices and Production – 
where, importantly, he also developed the theory of own rates of interest, which was 
to be a major influence on chapter 17 of the General Theory (see Roncaglia 1981: 
246) – and one rejoinder to Hayek‟s response, both in the Economic Journal. 
 
Elsewhere, the gradual strengthening of the Economics Tripos together with (selected) 
support for his theories at Oxford meant that Keynes had a number of other 
champions. Four or five of these are worthy of mention here. First was Austin 
Robinson. Robinson was far from being one of Keynes‟s younger protégés by the 
time the General Theory appeared (he was in his late 30s in 1936). He was, however, 
a regular attendee at the Political Economy Club and was assistant editor to Keynes 
on the Economic Journal. Robinson also had an important influence on his wife, Joan, 
and Richard Kahn in the early stages of their explorations into imperfect competition 
(see Cairncross 1994: 907 and Harcourt 2001: 134).
95
 Regarding the Keynesian 
Revolution itself, one of Robinson‟s most important written pieces was his review of 
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 In addition, Austin Robinson made important contributions to the economics of development (see 
Harcourt 2001: 135-136). 
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the General Theory (A. Robinson 1936), which appeared in The Economist just a few 
weeks after the book‟s publication. Robinson used the review to provide strong early 
backing for Keynes, knowing that The Economist‟s wide circulation would ensure that 
his views would reach far beyond the readership of the academic journals. 
 
A second Cambridge student was David Champernowne. „Champ‟ had already 
secured a Double First in the Mathematical Tripos before Keynes persuaded him to 
study economics; another First Class degree quickly followed. With respect to 
published support for Keynes, Champernowne is best known for his June 1936 article 
for the Review of Economic Studies (Champernowne 1936) where, despite his mild 
criticism of certain parts of Keynes‟s analysis in the General Theory – in particular, 
his treatment of the labour market – he identified some of the basic equations which 
helped towards the construction of IS-LM. In the same month, Brian Reddaway, 
another one of the outstanding talents to have studied under Keynes, did much the 
same thing in his review of the General Theory for the Economic Record (Reddaway 
1936), thereby helping to spread the Keynesian gospel in the Antipodes. This was 
followed by a June 1937 piece for the Economic Journal dealing with the obstacles to 
full employment, the first line of which stated that, „The object of this article is to 
continue the work begun by Mr. Keynes in Chapter 22 of his General Theory‟ 
(Reddaway 1937: 297). 
 
Next was Roy Harrod. Harrod worked at Oxford and spent his entire career there. 
However, he had the benefit of spending the Michaelmas Term of 1922 in Cambridge 
where he attended Keynes‟s lectures, took him essays, and participated in the Political 
Economy Club. A close friendship ensued. Harrod was also involved in the ongoing 
discussions on imperfect competition taking place at Cambridge and he published a 
number of articles related to it (see, for instance, Harrod 1931 and 1934a), 
predominantly in the Economic Journal. As well as all of this, Harrod took a deep and 
enduring interest in what Keynes was doing. He still had something of an attachment 
to the „old‟ economics associated with Marshall and Pigou, his review of Pigou‟s The 
Theory of Unemployment in the Economic Journal (Harrod 1934b) being broadly 
complimentary. But Harrod was becoming immersed in and convinced by Keynes‟s 
emerging ideas: as early as 1933 he published International Economics, where he 
made use of the multiplier in the context of foreign trade, while in 1936 The Trade 
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Cycle appeared where the multiplier was again deployed, this time within the setting 
of an open economy. In January 1937 Harrod made his own contribution to the IS-LM 
nexus, although his comment that „Mr. Keynes has not affected a revolution in 
fundamental economic theory but a re-adjustment and a shift of emphasis‟ (Harrod 
1937: 85) again highlighted his strong ties with pre-existing theory. Harrod 
nevertheless continued to be a Keynes loyalist, his article on dynamic economic 
theory in the late 1930s (Harrod 1939) fusing the multiplier and the accelerator and 
forming the basis of subsequent growth theory. 
 
The two Canadians, Lorie Tarshis and Robert Bryce, both of whom attended Keynes‟s 
lectures in the early 1930s as well as meetings of the Political Economy Club, must 
also be mentioned here. Apart from his The Elements of Economics (1947), Tarshis is 
remembered for his work on real and money wages which appeared in the Economic 
Journal (Tarshis 1939). This was preceded by an analysis of changes in real wage 
levels in the United States and Britain in a piece written for the Canadian Journal of 
Economics and Political Science in 1938 (Tarshis 1938). Meanwhile, Bryce‟s (1939) 
analysis of the effects that economic cycles in the United States have on Canada was 
his sole published support for Keynesianism before the Second World War. However, 
he made up for this with his major contribution to the White Paper published by the 
Canadian government in April 1945 which made a strong commitment to maintaining 
full employment, a position which would be the driving force behind macroeconomic 
policy-making in that country for 40 years (see Mollins 1997). 
 
From the above, it is clear that a number of Keynes‟s acolytes made important 
contributions towards increasing the profile of his work during the 1930s and 1940s. 
However, it should be said that they failed to produce a successful Keynesian 
textbook during this period. Furthermore, not all of Keynes‟s students turned out to be 
supporters. Hubert Henderson disowned Can Lloyd George Do It? only a year after its 
appearance and was „barked at‟ at Cambridge when he tried to attack the General 
Theory. The most notable of Keynes‟s „student-critics‟ was Dennis Robertson. 
Robertson had studied under both Keynes and Pigou and at the age of just 25 had 
published his A Study of Industrial Fluctuation (1915), where he stressed the 
importance of real factors in influencing the cycle. During the 1920s, the relative 
closeness of the working relationship between Keynes and Robertson was not far off 
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being as close as that which later developed between Keynes and Kahn, Robertson‟s 
most important book, Banking Policy and the Price Level (1926), being a product of 
this association. Yet, with Keynes beginning to question the old orthodoxy in the late 
1920s, he began to drift away from Robertson, their disagreements often centering on 
the nature of saving. Robertson was vocal in his criticism of Keynes once the General 
Theory had appeared (see Robertson 1936, 1937), but failed to make any significant 
impression. Even though Keynes would later go on to generously acknowledge 
Robertson‟s contribution at Bretton Woods, a misunderstanding over a negotiating 
position meant that the two men never repaired their differences (see Fletcher 2000: 
155). 
 
We have seen how Keynes facilitated the publication of Meade and Stone‟s research 
on national income accounting in 1941. His influence also extended to Macmillan, not 
only because they were more than happy to publish his often very popular books but 
because they would sometimes turn to him for advice on manuscripts they had 
received. For example, his opinion was sought on Hicks‟s The Theory of Wages 
(1932) and Joan Robinson‟s The Economics of Imperfect Competition (1933). 
Regarding the former, Keynes infamously commented that Hicks‟s work was the 
product of an „unoriginal but competent mind‟ (Keynes to H. Macmillan, 27 April 
1932, CW XII: 861). However, given that The Theory of Wages has since become a 
classic in its field, Keynes‟s comment seems tough. On the other hand, as Hicks was 
then at the LSE and may have been regarded by Keynes as part of the Hayek clique, 
his views on Hicks may perhaps be seen in a different light. On a related point, 
Keynes‟s comment on The Theory of Wages does not indicate any interest on his part 
that he may have been interested in recruiting Hicks – who would surely have been of 
some considerable help had he become part of Keynes‟s group at Cambridge – to 
assist with his forthcoming revolution. 
 
Meanwhile, Keynes played a decisive role in persuading Macmillan to publish Joan 
Robinson‟s early masterpiece. He had already become involved in the effort to find a 
publisher for Robinson‟s Economics is a Serious Subject, proposing that she submit it 
to The Political Quarterly and that she mention to the editor that her submission was 
at his [Keynes‟s] suggestion. But for reasons that are unclear, the 14 pages of 
Economics is a Serious Subject ended up appearing as a pamphlet published by 
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Cambridge‟s W. Heffer and Sons.96 Keynes‟s role in the publication of The 
Economics of Imperfect Competition was more decisive. Harold Macmillan,
97
 then 
employed at his family‟s publishing firm, wrote to Keynes in November 1932 asking 
for his comments on the book. Keynes‟s reply, whilst unequivocally supportive of 
publication, also highlighted his confidence in the abilities of one of the other 
members of the Circus, namely Richard Kahn: „I have no doubt that you ought to 
accept this book… I have not read [it] critically, which would be a formidable task. I 
have, however, a good deal of confidence that it is reasonably free from minor slips 
and errors and fallacies because the authoress explains in the preface that it has been 
very elaborately and carefully criticised by R.F. Kahn; indeed, I suspect that he has 
played a very substantial part in getting it to its present form‟ (Keynes to H. 
Macmillan, 25 November 1932, CW XII: 866-867). With Keynes‟s blessing, 
Macmillan published The Economics of Imperfect Competition and Joan Robinson 
commenced a relationship with Macmillan which would last for much of her career. 
Indeed, Macmillan would go on to publish her Introduction to the Theory of 
Employment (J. Robinson 1937a), The Accumulation of Capital (J. Robinson 1956), 
and Essays in the Theory of Economic Growth (J. Robinson 1962b). Later on, 
however, it seems that An Introduction to Modern Economics (1973), written by 
Robinson and John Eatwell, was, in fact, too unorthodox for Macmillan and so found 
a home at McGraw-Hill instead, where the book found a wider audience, particularly 
in the United States. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Marshall oversaw the work of a number of outstanding students, including Neville 
Keynes, Pigou and, of course, Maynard Keynes. Although each of these, to a greater 
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 With his extensive contacts in Cambridge, it seems quite possible that Keynes may also have been 
involved in getting W. Heffer and Sons to publish Economics is a Serious Subject. Either way, the 
work failed to attract as much attention as Robinson may perhaps have wished, this author only being 
able to identify one comment on it, published in The Cambridge Review of November 1932. Harcourt 
(1990) uses Economics is a Serious Subject as the backdrop for a thorough analysis of Robinson‟s early 
views on method. 
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 Macmillan was pro-active in his own support for Keynes‟s ideas. His The Middle Way (1938) drew 
extensively on the General Theory, offering officials a centrist approach to policy-making. 
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or lesser degree, was influenced by Marshall, there is no obvious link between the 
early publication output of Marshall‟s pre-Maynard Keynes students and the 
Keynesian Revolution. Still, we can point to two factors which have an indirect link to 
our discussion. First was the building of Cambridge‟s reputation as a centre of 
excellence for the study of economics. Marshall was the prime mover in this respect, 
his Principles marking the acme of 19th century Cambridge economics. In addition, 
there were other important publications, especially books, which helped to consolidate 
the work started by Marshall. Amongst these was Neville Keynes‟s The Scope and 
Method of Political Economy (1891) – Keynes was well into his career when it 
appeared – Pigou‟s Principles and Methods of Industrial Peace (1905), Bowley‟s 
Wages in the United Kingdom in the Nineteenth Century (1900), and Layton‟s 
Introduction to the Study of Prices (1912).
98
 But there were also disappointments: 
Foxwell is the prime example, his only book, Papers on Current Finance, not 
appearing until 1919, while the rest of his written output only served to highlight his 
distinctly „un-Marshallian‟ interest in historical forces. Meanwhile, the first 
Marshallian textbook, Flux‟s Economic Principles: An Introductory Study, was not 
published until 1904, a revised version only appearing in 1923. A second Marshallian 
textbook – Chapman‟s Outlines of Political Economy – came out in 1911 (see 
Becattini 2006: 612). 
 
In terms of published articles, Marshall‟s students had a mixed record (see Table 14). 
Looking at just the Economic Journal from March 1891 to just before Keynes became 
its editor, the most prolific of Marshall‟s Cambridge students was Alfred Flux, whose 
work appeared 17 times during the period in question, followed by Chapman on 15. 
The least productive of Marshall‟s Cambridge group was Cunningham, with just five 
articles, although he compensated for this by publishing in other journals and by 
authoring a number of books, including his three-volume Principles of Political 
Economy (1893, 1897, 1901), which Marshall was positive about. Gonner, Harrison 
and Price, the three good students Marshall had produced at Oxford between 1883 and 
1884, also had a mixed record in their contributions to the Economic Journal, Price 
comfortably heading the others on 17 articles while Gonner published just four pieces 
in two decades. 
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 Becattini (2006: 611-612) provides a more complete listing. 
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Table 14. Number of articles appearing in the Economic Journal from March 
1891 to December 1911 by selected Marshall and non-Marshall students 
Author University education Number of articles
Edgeworth Dublin & Oxford 34
Bastable Dublin 22
Flux Cambridge 17
Price Oxford 17
Cannan Oxford 15
Chapman Cambridge 15
Pigou Cambridge 12
Giffen None 10
Harrison Oxford 10
Bowley Cambridge 9
Nicholson Cambridge 6
Cunningham Cambridge 5
Gonner Oxford 4
Source: Author‟s research 
 
On a second broad point, there were the supporters of the Marshallian orthodoxy who 
were not Marshall‟s students but had, in fact, been taught by Maynard Keynes. 
Amongst these were Frederick Lavington and Gerald Shove. Lavington‟s first 
academic article appeared in the September 1912 Economic Journal, where his 
consideration of the relationship between uncertainty and the rate of interest was an 
early demonstration of his innovative streak. This was followed by important work on 
monetary theory, encapsulated in The English Capital Market (1921). Sadly, 
Lavington‟s death in 1927 aged just 46 meant that he was denied the chance of 
defending Marshall against the onslaught of the General Theory. Meanwhile, Shove 
may have taken on this defensive task, but in the early 1930s he was caught up in the 
debate over imperfect competition. Moreover, by that time he was into his forties and 
so would have found it harder to take on the role of crusading student. 
 
Hayek: 
 
While Hayek had access to a number of potential disciples at the LSE in the first half 
of the 1930s, the Hayek camp had been deserted by the end of the decade. The 
publication records of Hayek‟s early circle of followers go some way to confirming 
this desertion process. Among those we have already looked at are Hicks, Kaldor, 
Lerner and Shackle. There were others, including Paul Sweezy who, ironically, was 
set on the road to Marxism after hearing Hayek attack Marx in his lectures, and 
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Ursula Hicks, who in 1938 published The Finance of British Government, 1920-1936, 
the first serious study of Britain‟s public finances since the First World War.99 
 
The importance of having access to their own publication outlet was not lost on the 
youngsters at the LSE and, with this in mind they decided to set up the Review of 
Economic Studies in 1933. One of the founders‟ objectives was to minimise the 
influence of older economists; this extended both to excluding recognised names from 
the board of editors – the original managing editors were Ursula Hicks (Webb, as she 
was then), Lerner and Sweezy – and a distinct bias towards publishing articles by 
younger writers. The opportunity was certainly there for the Review‟s editors to use it 
as a vehicle for defending Hayek. However, there is a temporal issue here, namely, 
that the journal was only set up in the latter part of 1933, by which time Keynes was 
already on his way to getting the upper hand over Hayek. 
 
Besides, there was also a seeming determination to steer clear of the business cycle 
debate: between October 1933 and February 1936 the Review contained only two 
articles directly concerned with cycles, one being, as already noted, Joan Robinson‟s 
update of Keynes‟s latest thinking (J. Robinson 1933b) and the other a fairly neutral 
article by Shackle (1933). Instead, the Review became a debating forum for issues 
such as the economics of socialism, the elasticity of substitution, utility functions, and 
index numbers. Granted, between February 1936 and June 1939 there was an increase 
in the number of cycle articles but, in a broader reflection of the times, they were 
almost all written from the point of view of the General Theory and thus to the 
exclusion of Hayek. In fact, in the second half of the 1930s, the Review became 
something of a vehicle for Keynes‟s young supporters at Cambridge. For instance, 
there were the early IS-LM-type articles by Champernowne and Meade, as well as a 
lengthy statistical investigation into the multiplier and the MPC by Richard Stone and 
his then wife, Winifred (Stone and Stone 1938). There were also pieces by non-LSE 
economists on unemployment (Singer 1939), the international propagation of cycles 
(Polak 1939), and money wage rates (Somers 1939). 
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 Given what must have been the relative novelty of Hicks‟s book, it is surprising that it has not been 
considered within the context of the history of national income accounting; Patinkin (1976), for one, 
does not mention it. 
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Kalecki: 
 
Any analysis of the relation between Kalecki‟s theories on the cycle and students 
publishing early under their own names is severely compromised again by the fact 
that Kalecki never had direct access to a university department in the early 1930s. Of 
those to whom he was closest in Poland during this period – namely Landau and Breit 
– we have already argued that he would have had trouble recruiting them not least 
because of issues relating to age gaps or the lack thereof. Even when he was at 
Cambridge, those close to Kalecki published very little: Tew‟s contribution was 
limited to a mathematical piece on trend elimination co-authored with Kalecki for 
Econometrica in April 1940 (Kalecki and Tew 1940) while Hsu seems to have 
published nothing of note in the mainstream economics journals.
100
 Another student at 
Cambridge, who worked under both Kalecki and Dobb, was Fan-Hung. However, his 
publication record as far as the mainstream journals were concerned comprised just 
one article comparing Keynes and Marx on capital accumulation and the rate of 
interest (Fan-Hung 1939), which came down in favour of Marx (see Trescott 1996). 
 
Summary: 
 
„Students publish early under own names‟ is a feature that was positively present 
when we considered Keynes and Marshall. Neither Hayek nor Kalecki secured 
positive scores; in fact, the feature was clearly not present in both cases. 
 
Table 15. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘xi. Students publish early under own names’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
xi. Students publish early under own
     names + + - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
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 Hsu is still of interest, first, because he was one of the first Chinese to receive a Cambridge 
economics doctorate (1940), and second, after the Second World War he started to translate the 
General Theory into Chinese, a project completed in 1957, a year before his death (see Trescott ibid.). 
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Keynes‟s efforts to create a successful research school benefited from the fact that a 
number of his clique published important supporting articles and books relatively 
early on in their careers. In terms of its subsequent importance to the Keynesian 
Revolution, Kahn‟s multiplier article was undoubtedly the most significant of these 
publications. A list of others who also published important Keynesian-inspired work 
included Joan Robinson, James Meade, David Champernowne, Brian Reddaway and 
Roy Harrod. 
 
It has to be said that not all of Keynes‟s students turned out to be ardent supporters of 
his revolutionary ideas; Dennis Robertson was probably the most notable of his 
opponents both amongst those who were once pupils and those who went on to 
become Keynes‟s professional colleagues at Cambridge. But any published opposition 
that Robertson and others had to the General Theory was not nearly strong enough to 
slow the book‟s success. As well as its revolutionary content, part of the General 
Theory‟s success was down to the reputation which Cambridge had secured as a place 
which produced important new economic theory, a reputation built not only by 
Marshall but by his own eminent students, including Neville Keynes and Pigou, both 
of whom published important treatises, the latter at a relatively young age. 
 
When we considered discipleship, we saw that the potential pool of talent available to 
Hayek when he arrived at the LSE was considerable. However, one indicator of his 
failure to convert this potential was the non-existent published support given to his 
theories by this group despite the ready availability of their very own publication 
vehicle. Finally, Kalecki found himself in an even weaker position: without a 
university appointment, his access to students was necessarily limited throughout his 
early career in Poland.
101
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 On a more abstruse note, various articles have looked at the function and performance of economics 
journals. For example, Eagly (1975) examines journals as a communications network whilst Liebowitz 
and Palmer (1984) measure the impact of journals according to citation activity. What analyses of this 
type have not have attempted so far, but which may be of interest, is the testing of the so-called „Price 
Law‟ (see Simonton 1999: 150). This asserts that around half the output in a given domain is more 
often than not attributable to the square root of the total number of „creators‟ in that domain. Thus, in a 
domain with 100 creators, 10 will be responsible for half the output. An analysis of this type might give 
some additional insights not only to patterns of publication within the business cycle literature of the 
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xii. Produced and ‘placed’ significant number of students 
 
It is important that a research school and its director have the ability to produce 
students who can propagate the research that the school has produced. Without this, 
there is a danger that a school becomes dependent on the efforts of just its leader. 
Further, Geison (1981: 26) states: 
 
„[I]f the director has „placement power‟ in his discipline he can do 
much to ensure [his research students‟] employment in a propitious 
academic setting, thereby further extending the reputation and 
influence of his school.‟ 
 
Keynes: 
 
In criterion ix, „Pool of potential recruits (graduate students)‟, we saw that Keynes 
joined the Faculty of Economics and Politics at Cambridge at a time when it was 
growing thanks to the introduction of the new Economics Tripos. The circumstances 
were therefore right for him to have a direct influence on an ever-increasing number 
of students. But even though his overall record of producing students who would go 
on to support his revolution was reasonably good, Keynes did not play a significant 
role in helping to place students in positions of influence outside Cambridge – 
Reddaway‟s appointment as a Research Fellow in Melbourne, Australia, being an 
exception to this (see Matthews 2008) – part function, no doubt, of his belief that his 
Alma Mater was, at least in the 1930s and 1940s, the world‟s premier economics 
institution. 
 
As we saw, of those who made up the core of the Circus, Keynes‟s only formal 
teacher-pupil relationship was with Richard Kahn. He never taught Joan Robinson 
and does not appear to have made any concerted attempt to keep James Meade at 
Cambridge, probably aware of his teaching commitments at Oxford but perhaps also 
sensing that Harrod might need help in spreading the Keynesian gospel at 
 
1930s, but also across other fields within economics, where the publication activity of creators and 
followers may be in need of greater explanation. 
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Cambridge‟s great rival. Moreover, with Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson safely 
ensconced at Cambridge, Keynes may have taken the view that his ideas were already 
in safe hands.
102
 This might also help to explain why the likes of Reddaway and 
Champernowne – both supervisees of Keynes‟s, the latter of whom took up a post at 
the LSE in 1936 – were allowed to „leave‟ Cambridge despite their considerable 
promise.
103
 
 
For their respective parts, Kahn and Robinson seemingly never felt the need to 
permanently cut the umbilical cord that kept them at Cambridge for the rest of their 
careers. This was probably due to a number of factors, including Kahn‟s preference 
for staying out of the limelight (which he could at Cambridge) and the fact that 
Robinson carried out much of her Keynesian crusading through the written word. In 
any case, the General Theory quickly found other support groups in a number of 
foreign outposts, notably the United States, without necessarily having to rely on 
hearing the received gospel from Keynes‟s inner circle, even if some of the members 
of the „outer‟ circle, such as Tarshis, did take on a crusading role once they left 
Cambridge. 
 
On a last point, during the Second World War, when the considerable expansion of 
economic advisory services within the British government represented a natural 
placement opportunity for bright graduates, Keynes‟s record as a recruitment officer 
was not, in actual fact, very good. Granted, Meade was able to secure what turned out 
to be a key role in the ES, where he was joined by Stone, never Keynes‟s pupil but an 
attendee at the Political Economy Club. However, both Meade and Stone were taken 
on by Whitehall as a result of recommendations made by Austin Robinson, not 
Keynes. Meanwhile, Keynes was keen to have both Kahn and Harrod by his side at 
                                                 
102
 Although it requires further research, it is almost unthinkable that Keynes would not have been 
involved in the decisions to appoint Richard Kahn (1933) and Joan Robinson (1934) to positions in the 
Faculty of Economics and Politics. 
103
 As Sraffa was a product of the Italian university system, he does not fit easily into this part of the 
analysis. Nevertheless, it is interesting that Keynes devoted so much effort to keeping him in 
Cambridge, this despite Sraffa‟s lack of commitment to Keynes‟s ideas. This effort, it seems, was an 
implied acknowledgement on Keynes‟s part of Sraffa‟s strong intellect as well as the affection he felt 
for Sraffa based on their close friendship. 
 176 
the Treasury, but Kahn ended up at the Board of Trade while Harrod was recruited by 
Lord Cherwell, Churchill‟s scientific advisor, to serve in S Branch where, apart from 
playing an important part in getting the organisation of national accounts off the 
ground (see Higgins 1989: 299), he failed to make any other significant contribution 
(see Phelps Brown 1980: 20-21). Ironically, both Robertson and Henderson – 
opponents of the General Theory – did end up working with Keynes at the Treasury 
during the war years. 
 
Marshall: 
 
As his efforts to get Neville Keynes to go to Oxford demonstrated, Marshall was 
aware of the importance of placing students as a means of bolstering support for his 
theories and the wider reputation of Cambridge economics. Any relationship between 
Marshall‟s activities in placing students and the Keynesian Revolution is thereby 
centered on reputational effects along with Marshall‟s power to influence 
appointments at Cambridge itself. 
 
Marshall was more active than Keynes in encouraging his students to secure academic 
appointments, even if he was less concerned about postings in Whitehall and 
government. As early as his Inaugural Lecture in 1885, Marshall claimed that, „It will 
be my most cherished ambition…to increase the numbers of those whom Cambridge, 
the great mother of strong men, sends out into the world with cool heads but warm 
hearts‟ (Marshall in Keynes 1924: 367). The Economics Tripos would eventually 
prove to be an important breeding ground for the establishment of Marshall‟s 
„Cambridge stables‟, as he liked to refer to his students. But it was also the case that 
some of his most distinguished protégés were not the product of the new Tripos but 
rather Moral Sciences, History and Mathematics; the triumvirate that immediately 
spring to mind are Neville Keynes, Pigou and Maynard Keynes, respectively. Either 
way, after failing to get Neville Keynes to fly the flag at Oxford, Marshall devoted 
more of his attention, albeit not exclusively so, to consolidating the future of 
Cambridge economics. As part of this, he was instrumental in securing Pigou as his 
successor – despite the disappointment that this caused the ambitious Foxwell – and 
played an important part in Maynard Keynes‟s own appointment to the Cambridge 
Faculty. 
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The point about Marshall‟s failure to persuade Neville Keynes to take up a position at 
Oxford might, at first glance, suggest that he was not successful in his broader effort 
to establish networks of support other than at Cambridge. But this would be wrong. 
Marshall‟s reach was a long one, a point not lost on Maynard Keynes when he wrote 
in 1924 that: „It is through his pupils, even more than his writings, that Marshall is the 
father of Economic Science as it exists in England to-day [sic]. So long ago as 1888, 
Professor Foxwell was able to write: “Half the economic chairs in the United 
Kingdom are occupied by his pupils, and the share taken by them in general economic 
instruction in England is even larger than this.” To-day [sic] through his pupils and 
the pupils of pupils his dominion is almost complete‟ (Keynes ibid., 366-367). Even 
though Keynes chose not to note Foxwell‟s (justified) acknowledgement of Sidgwick 
as an important influence on those Moral Sciences undergraduates reading economics, 
it was clearly the case that Marshall was the pre-eminent economist at Cambridge in 
the latter part of the 19th century and the early 20th century. Examples of Marshall‟s 
pupils (from either Cambridge or Oxford) who would go on to occupy positions in 
British and overseas universities (excluding Oxbridge) included Chapman (Cardiff 
and Manchester), Flux (Manchester and McGill), Gonner (Bristol and Liverpool), and 
Layton (University College, London, but who also taught at Cambridge). 
Additionally, it is important to bear in mind that at the end of the 19th century and in 
the very early years of the 20th, Marshall‟s chances of achieving superiority in British 
economics were made easier by the fact that the number of academic appointments 
available in economics departments was very limited, standing at less than two dozen 
in 1891; Foxwell‟s comment in 1888 about half the economic chairs in the United 
Kingdom being occupied by Marshall‟s students should perhaps be seen in this light. 
 
Table 16. Growth of academic appointments in economics and related subjects in 
British universities, 1891-1969 
1891 1915 1925 1939 1950 1960 1969
Total 20 85 180 286 446 679 1,802
% growth - 325 119 59 56 52 165
Source: Coats (1993: 340) 
 
At the same time, the professionalisation of the subject – brought about in no small 
part by Marshall himself – meant that the number of academic appointments had 
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grown substantially by the time of Marshall‟s death in 1924; Keynes‟s reference to 
Marshall‟s near complete dominion by that time was indeed testament to the success 
of the Economics Tripos. 
 
Hayek: 
 
Various reasons have already been put forward as to why Hayek was unable to 
capitalise on his early popularity at the LSE, including his austere manner and the 
technical demands of his analysis. However, it was also the case that he did not have 
the opportunity to build up his reputation over a number of years at the School, as 
Keynes did at Cambridge. Instead, he was immediately faced with the challenge of 
Keynes and his disciples. Had Hayek already been an established name at the LSE, 
his chances of producing and placing a group of student-believers might have been 
greater. 
 
There was already something of a tradition of former students taking up appointments 
at the School, despite its embryonic status. Examples included Theodore Gregory, 
who was first appointed to a teaching post in 1913 and went on to become Professor 
of Banking and Currency in 1927; Robbins, lecturer from 1925 to 1927 and Professor 
of Economics from 1929 to 1961; and Arnold Plant, Professor of Commerce from 
1930 to 1965.
104
 There were, of course, talented students in Hayek‟s midst when he 
arrived in London, even if it was only Lerner – who had enrolled at the School in 
1929 – who was exceptionally gifted. 
 
The other great LSE economics student of the time was Kaldor, but he had, in fact, 
already graduated with a degree in 1930, and even though he became an Assistant in 
economics in 1932 (later Assistant Lecturer), he quickly turned against Hayek. Hicks 
was the third of the triumvirate of impressive young economists at the LSE during the 
early 1930s, although his days as a student had been completed at Oxford in 1925. 
Moreover, despite taking something of an interest in Hayek‟s theories, he was too 
distracted by his own work on the theory of value. 
                                                 
104
 Less well known former students who were appointed to the Faculty included F.C. Benham, F. 
Brown, and G.L. Schwartz (see Hayek 1946: 24). 
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Thus, despite the success of his first forays in London, Hayek‟s situation actually 
turned out to be rather difficult. It is fair to say that he failed to produce a single 
student of outstanding ability during this time and certainly nobody of the same 
calibre as say, Kahn. The inevitable result was that there was very little, if any, 
activity on Hayek‟s part in terms of the placing of students. 
 
Kalecki: 
 
When we considered Kalecki‟s access to potential recruits, the point was made that 
his lack of a university education and his subsequent employment at the Institute of 
Research on Business Cycles and Prices meant that he never had a natural route into 
the higher education system and that, as a consequence, his ability to attract followers 
was severely limited. Without wanting to labour the point, the same applies to Kalecki 
and the production and placement of students: Landau and Breit would have presented 
the best opportunities to secure disciples who might have been able to carry Kalecki‟s 
message further afield. However, for reasons that have already been noted, such 
opportunities were never really viable and were certainly in no way comparable to 
those available to Keynes, Marshall or Hayek. 
 
Summary: 
 
„Produced and „placed‟ significant number of students‟ is one of only three of the 
Morrell-Geison criteria in which Keynes does not secure a positive outcome. There is 
no such ambiguity with respect to Marshall, where the feature is clearly present. Once 
again, the feature did not figure when we considered Hayek and Kalecki. 
 
Table 17. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘xii. Produced and ‘placed’ significant number of students’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
xii. Produced and 'placed' significant
     number of students ± + - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
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Of our four main protagonists, it was Marshall who was the most active in producing 
and placing students. He produced students of quality at both Cambridge and Oxford, 
the former being the main source of his success in this respect and where he also 
enjoyed considerable placement power. That said, his three most eminent students 
were not the product of the Economics Tripos. Nevertheless, the new Tripos did play 
a key role in cementing Marshall‟s already considerable reach in terms of the presence 
of his former students in important teaching positions in British and overseas 
universities (with, perhaps, the exception of the United States). In turn, this network 
of supporters helped to consolidate Cambridge‟s reputation as a leading centre for 
instruction and research in economics, a reputation which trickled down to the benefit 
of Maynard Keynes and which he, in turn, helped to sustain. Keynes produced many 
students of considerable talent, some of whom would go on to provide strong support 
for his revolution. But he played less of a role in placing them, a reflection perhaps of 
his opinion that Cambridge was head and shoulders above any of its potential rivals. 
Interestingly, during the Second World War, when he took a greater interest in 
securing postings for his protégés, he was unable to exert much influence in 
Whitehall. 
 
Neither Hayek nor Kalecki enjoyed much success in either producing or placing 
students who might have been supporters of their work. A variety of reasons meant 
that Hayek failed to capitalise on initially favourable conditions at the LSE, with 
many students or young staff members actually ending up aligned, in one way or 
another, behind Keynes. Meanwhile, without any direct presence at a university 
during his early career in Poland, Kalecki‟s chances of producing and placing 
supportive students were more or less reduced to zero. 
 
 
xiii. Institutionalization in university setting 
 
Morrell-Geison argues that it is important for a research school to have 
institutionalized commitment for its endeavours within a university; without this, a 
school is likely to become marginalised at the institutional level and, as a result, at the 
intellectual level. In such circumstances, a school‟s failure as a worthwhile research 
project becomes more probable. 
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Keynes: 
 
In a sense, the institutionalization of the Keynesian Revolution at Cambridge was 
made easier because the Keynes name had become an important part of University life 
well before 1936. Neville Keynes was Senior Moralist in 1875, wrote The Scope and 
Method of Political Economy (1891), which became the „standard English treatise on 
the subject‟ (Harrod 1951: 10), and was administrative head of Cambridge University 
for 15 years. Regular visitors to the Keynes household included the philosophers 
Henry Sidgwick and W.E. Johnston and the economist Herbert Foxwell (but not 
Marshall). It must have seemed inevitable to the young and precocious Keynes that 
great things were expected of him. In November 1901, Keynes wrote that he did not 
want to go to Oxford „at any price‟ (Keynes in Skidelsky 1983: 98). This hostility 
coupled with the influence of Samuel Lubbock, his tutor at Eton who had just 
graduated from King‟s (Eton‟s sister foundation), and Keynes‟s existing connections 
with the town, meant that Cambridge became the obvious choice for his 
undergraduate studies. As a student, Keynes‟s love affair with Cambridge was 
cemented by his membership of the Apostles, while one of his first concerted attempts 
to bring his influence to bear on Cambridge economics took place, as we have seen, in 
October 1909 with the establishment of the Political Economy Club. However, 
Keynes‟s stock only began to enjoy a marked uplift 10 years later with the appearance 
of the Economic Consequences, before being further bolstered by various books and 
pamphlets. But this may be overstating the case, especially when we recall Keynes‟s 
own admission in 1931 about how little influence he had exerted on public policy and 
opinion in the 1920s and Kahn‟s comment to Harrod as late as 1934 that the level of 
support for Keynes‟s ideas at Cambridge was, at that time, „vanishingly small‟. 
 
As such, despite the discussions centred on the Circus and Keynes‟s occasional 
lectures at Cambridge where he would outline some of his latest thinking, it seems 
that for a significant proportion of the economics staff and students, the revolutionary 
nature of Keynes‟s emerging theories had not yet taken hold as of late 1934 when 
Kahn wrote to Harrod. In addition, as already noted, some of the more senior figures 
at Cambridge, notably Pigou and Robertson, were not devotees, Pigou in particular 
still a firm Marshallian. Thus, if Kahn‟s comments are accurate, an explanation has to 
be found as to why the General Theory was published with so much anticipation only 
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a little over a year later: What happened in the very late part of 1934 and in 1935 to 
bring about this change? One possible explanation is that Keynes began lecturing 
from the first proof version of the General Theory in the Michaelmas Term of 1934 
(see CW XIII: 485), aware perhaps that this would give a strong taster of what would 
be in his forthcoming book while also helping to simplify the lectures he had 
delivered in 1932 and 1933, where many of the ideas, albeit new, had simply gone 
over students‟ heads (see Rymes 1989: 17-18). But given the subsequent difficulty 
that many readers had with the General Theory, this explanation is not particularly 
convincing. What seems more likely is that students somehow understood that Keynes 
was writing an important book, even if they may not have fully appreciated what he 
was trying to say. Considered alongside Keynes‟s reputation for controversy, this 
seems to have helped to ensure strong interest come February 1936. A similar 
explanation can be posited for the General Theory‟s keen reception at Harvard. Either 
way, in Cambridge, England, Keynes‟s theories had been firmly institutionalized by 
1940, as witnessed by Pigou‟s observation that students were using them to answer 
Tripos questions regardless of relevance. 
 
By the same year, Keynes‟s attention had already turned away from Cambridge and 
towards Whitehall. In fact, his effort to institutionalize the General Theory into the 
government‟s wartime planning provides us with an opportunity to extend the 
institutionalization criterion beyond the university setting originally intended by 
Morrell-Geison and into the political realm. A number of factors help to explain 
Keynes‟s growing sphere of influence in the Treasury and other departments during 
the war, including his charisma, his reputation as a groundbreaking theorist, and, at a 
more practical level, the pre-existing lack of economic advice available to ministers. 
The years after the war were also important in helping to advance the Keynesian 
paradigm: even if the effectiveness of the ES was blunted between 1945 and 1947 due 
to Meade‟s poor health and frustrations with the machinations of Whitehall, the tenure 
of Robert Hall saw it enjoy a new lease of life in the 1950s. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Before Marshall‟s tenure as Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge, the 
standard of instruction in economics at the University was poor to say the least. 
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Although the first set of lectures in political economy at any British university had 
been delivered at Cambridge by George Pryme
105
 in 1816, teaching there continued to 
operate on a fairly informal basis for a number of years. Marshall‟s predecessor, 
Henry Fawcett, had been professor since 1863 and despite being well published, he 
had done little to advance the standing of economics within the Cambridge 
curriculum: Fawcett was still very much an amateur, with time to spare to pursue a 
political career in London. 
 
However, Cambridge was not the only British university where economics failed to 
gain a foothold during the 19th century. At Oxford, Bonamy Price was Professor of 
Political Economy from 1868 to 1888 and even though he published various critical 
expositions on the subject, Price was a man who was „never quite sure whether 
economic theory was impossible or merely undesirable‟ (Maloney 1985: 9).106 
Economics was clearly in a neglected state: Marshall‟s intelligence, his reputation at 
Cambridge, his administrative diligence (helped by six years as Principal at 
University College, Bristol), his crusading zeal – which, as far as establishing the 
Tripos was concerned, seemed to more than offset his dislike of confrontation – and 
the convenient fact that the generally ineffective (albeit popular) Fawcett had died 
prematurely in 1884, meant that he was the ideal man to lead the professionalisation 
of British economics. 
 
There had been some tradition at Marshall‟s undergraduate college, St John‟s, for 
producing good economists (see Collet 1936: 589); apart from Marshall, Cunningham 
and Foxwell were also alumni. Nevertheless, Marshall does not seem to have made 
any special effort to continue this tradition, instead being happy to rely on getting 
good students where he could, irrespective of which college they happened to be 
attached to. As it turned out, both Pigou and Keynes were Kingsmen (as was Kahn). 
As time went by, Pigou must have felt increasingly isolated at King‟s, not only as a 
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 Pryme was the first Professor of Political Economy at Cambridge. Somewhat surprisingly, the 
history of economics at Cambridge has still to be written. 
106
 The personalities involved were not the only hindrance to the advancement of economics at 
university level. Groenewegen (1988: 628, 632) notes that economics teaching was in decline by the 
early 1880s as a result of a hostility to business education, this development outweighing the search for 
replacements for the weakening in religious beliefs that had been taking place since the 1860s. 
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result of Keynes‟s increasing popularity but also because of his own reclusive nature 
which, amongst other things, meant that he was largely unable to carry forward the 
curricular reforms instigated by Marshall. Indeed, the establishment of the Political 
Economy Club just a year after Marshall‟s retirement can be seen as one of the first 
steps in the division of the Economics Faculty into those who, like Pigou, supported 
Marshall and those who sided with Keynes. At the same time, the influence of the 
Cambridge School was still partly dependent on filling in the gaps in the Organon; 
Weintraub‟s (2005: 144) comment that, „Henderson, Robertson, Shove, and Pigou of 
course were just as Cambridge, just as legitimately heirs to Marshall‟s creation, as 
were Keynes, [Joan] Robinson, and Kahn‟, should be considered within this context. 
 
Hayek: 
 
Despite its strong reputation today as a leading institution in the social sciences, the 
LSE is relatively young, having only started issuing degrees in 1902. Conversely, 
Cambridge already had a tradition of teaching and researching political economy well 
before the Economics Tripos, even if this tradition was a generally weak one until 
Marshall‟s appointment as Professor of Political Economy in 1884. Cambridge 
therefore had something of a reputational advantage over London; challenging this 
advantage was arguably one of the reasons behind the LSE‟s founding. Furthermore, 
with the early appointment to the School‟s staff of William Acworth (an expert on the 
economics of railways), Cunningham and, to a lesser extent, Cannan – who remained 
a Marshallian at heart, despite outward appearances – the foundations of the battle 
with Cambridge (read: Marshall to begin with and Keynes later on) were laid. 
 
We have already documented a large part of the role that Hayek played in the 
Cambridge/LSE saga and so there is no need to repeat it here. However, it is worth 
noting that as far as Austrian economics was concerned, Hayek had a number of 
important predecessors, notably Menger and Mises. Eugen von Böhm-Bawerk was 
also a key figure; in fact, at the end of the 19th century he was second only to 
Marshall in worldwide fame (see Caldwell 2004: 81). Unfortunately for the Austrian 
School, Böhm-Bawerk spent his whole career in his home country, thereby severely 
limiting his influence on debates going on in England. Had he created a base in 
England, Hayek might, in turn, have had a greater opportunity to convey his own 
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ideas through a research school at the LSE. This is not to say that the School was 
devoid of good thinkers: the influential Cannan had retired in 1926 and Robbins was 
an important economist in his own right. However, neither man could hold a candle to 
Marshall when it came to theory. As such, the absence of an intellectual challenge 
either from the LSE or any other economics department in the domestic university 
system meant that Marshall and his disciples – including Keynes and his own circle – 
were able to build and enhance Cambridge‟s reputation as the leading economics 
institution in England and the world right up until the 1960s. 
 
On a more practical note, Hayek‟s efforts to institutionalize his ideas at the LSE were 
also made difficult by the previously highlighted lack of intimacy between staff and 
students. Aware of the role played by supervisions at Cambridge as well as the 
Political Economy Club and his own experience of the Mises Seminar in Vienna, 
Hayek may have tried to make up for this lack of contact with students by the seminar 
he set up at the LSE with Robbins. But despite these meetings providing Hayek with 
an excellent opportunity to put his ideas across, he still failed to convert his 
audience.
107
 
 
Kalecki: 
 
In terms of the institutionalization of his theories, the best that Kalecki could have 
achieved in the early part of his career would have been the founding of a school at 
the Institute of Research on Business Cycles and Prices in Warsaw. For various 
reasons, this proved to be a non-starter. It would be unfair to Kalecki to argue that he 
was always inherently resistant to the idea of establishing a presence within a 
university setting (even if he was not pro-active in seeking out disciples). Testament 
to this was his informal leadership, along with Oscar Lange, in the second half of the 
1950s of Polish economists‟ pioneering interest in socialist and development 
economics respectively, an interest that was formalised in the early 1960s with the 
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 Any possibility that Hayek might at some point have returned to the Institute for Business Cycle 
Research in Vienna once his decline at the LSE had set in was out of the question after the Anschluss in 
1938. Under the Nazis, the Institute became a centre for South and East European Studies (Klausinger 
2006: 626-627). Other prominent members of the Austrian School to leave the country during the 
1930s included Haberler, Machlup, and Mises. 
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founding of CRUE, „the [then] Mecca [for these two subject areas] to which students 
and economists flocked from many parts of the world‟ (Eshag 1977: 4). Kalecki did 
exhibit a greater willingness to collaborate with others during his time at CRUE. For 
example, he was one of the co-authors of a collection of essays on planning and 
economic development put out by the Centre in 1963, the other contributors being 
Zofia Dobrska, Ignacy Sachs and Jerzy Tepicht. Had Kalecki had the opportunity in 
the early 1930s to establish something akin to CRUE, his subsequent influence might 
have been much greater. 
 
Summary: 
 
Keynes and Marshall successfully institutionalized their ideas at Cambridge. Both 
men had an advantage in this respect over Hayek and Kalecki, neither of whom was 
able to institutionalize their theories at university level during the 1930s and 1940s. 
 
Table 18. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘xiii. Institutionalization in university setting’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
xiii. Institutionalization in university
     setting + + - -  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
The strong reputation of the Keynes family name was already firmly apparent at 
Cambridge by the time Maynard Keynes began teaching there in the early part of 
1909. Keynes would go on to significantly strengthen this reputation as a result of his 
work and activities at the University, his often controversial and, at times, 
revolutionary written output and, later on, through his work in Whitehall during the 
Second World War. 
 
Notwithstanding all of this, he still did not have it all his own way at Cambridge, both 
Pigou and Robertson being strongly opposed to the General Theory. As far as the 
student body of the 1930s was concerned, they may not all have fully understood 
Keynes‟s ideas as he described them in his lectures, but they did have a sense that 
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they were of the highest importance. Furthermore, Keynes benefited from the 
considerable effort made by Marshall to formalise the teaching of economics at 
Cambridge, and in spite of the serious subsequent disagreements between Keynes and 
his group on the one hand and, again, Pigou and Robertson – to name but two – on the 
other, both sides owed much to their Marshallian heritage. 
 
Marshall‟s success in establishing the Tripos was the crystallisation of a long 
Cambridge tradition in „political economy‟, a tradition which could not be matched by 
the LSE. This meant that Hayek was already at something of a disadvantage when he 
arrived at the School in 1931. He was also hampered by the lack of a supervision 
system – an inbuilt institutional advantage enjoyed by Cambridge – and by infighting, 
some of it directed at him, in the seminar he ran with Robbins. Meanwhile, although 
Kalecki was an integral part of CRUE in the 1960s, he never had the opportunity to 
oversee a similar institutional presence in the 1930s. On a final note, in stark contrast 
to Keynes, both Hayek and Kalecki failed to have any institutional impact at 
governmental level in the 1930s and 1940s, Hayek having to wait until the Thatcher 
years before his theories were revived. 
 
 
xiv. Adequate financial support 
 
According to Morrell-Geison, funding is the final important determinant of a research 
school‟s success or failure. Financing may come from the research director‟s own 
pocket, but more often than not it is sourced from the university or institution in 
which the school exists. Where there is a good provision of money, a research school 
is more likely to flourish, everything else being equal. 
 
Keynes:
108
 
 
The successful establishment of a Keynesian research school was probably less 
dependent on funding compared with the predominantly laboratory-based disciplines 
examined by Morrell-Geison: the research carried out by Keynes and his acolytes was 
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 Parts of the following draw on Cord (2007: 52-54). 
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mostly theoretical, the direct financial cost being no more than a pen and paper. This 
is, however, a somewhat simplistic view, the actual interaction between financial 
considerations and the Keynesian Revolution being a rather interesting one. 
 
In spite of the fact that the professorship of political economy at Cambridge had 
become a salaried position when Fawcett secured the post in 1863 and even though 
the Economics Tripos had become part of the Cambridge curriculum, funding for 
economics was generally poor, with the first University lectureship in the subject only 
being created in 1911 and the second more than a decade later in 1923 (see 
Groenewegen 1988: 648). A flavour of how bad things were can be inferred from the 
fact that Marshall first and Pigou after him had to sometimes resort to using their own 
income in order to finance lectureships. In fact, it was only after Marshall wrote to 
Keynes informing him that Pigou would be prepared to take on the burden of paying 
£100 a year towards the cost of supporting Keynes‟s proposed lectureship that Keynes 
took the decision to leave the India Office in July 1908 and return to Cambridge. 
Without this incentive plus additional money provided by the Worshipful Company of 
Girdlers, it remains uncertain whether Keynes would have gone back to academia at 
that point, even given his well-documented boredom in Whitehall. 
 
Keynes‟s departure from the civil service was the catalyst for a ramping up in his 
personal investment activities as well as providing him with the opportunity to get 
involved in the financial affairs of his old college. At a personal level, Keynes already 
had the benefit of coming from a reasonably wealthy middle-class family. His 
grandfather, John Keynes, had been a successful businessman, and Maynard was keen 
to become financially independent, mindful that this would give him the freedom to 
concentrate on his writing. Some money (albeit rather limited) was to be made from 
lecturing and supervising, and Keynes also derived income from journalism and from 
his appointment to the board of the National Mutual Life Assurance Company in 
1919; the worldwide success of the Economic Consequences meant that Keynes was 
able to call on yet another source of money to, amongst other things, help pay for his 
forays into the stock market. However, the claim by Backhouse and Bateman (2006: 
2) that the book gave Keynes „financial security‟ is accurate only in a narrow sense: 
royalties were indeed significant, but Keynes had to rely on the same money to bail 
him out of difficulty in mid-1920 when a syndicate he had invested in went wrong. 
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Keynes‟s wealth only really began to grow markedly and on a sustainable basis in the 
early years of the 1920s, his net worth standing at nearly £64,000 in 1924 
(approximately £2.7 million in today‟s money), before reaching a high of just over 
£500,000 in 1936 (£25 million). There were bad years, including, of course, 1929. But 
these were more than outweighed by the good, such that by the end of the Second 
World War, Keynes was worth around £411,000 (£13 million).
109
 This level of wealth 
had various implications for Keynes‟s work. First, as alluded to, it gave him more 
time to pursue his research interests (Keynes had resigned his lectureship at 
Cambridge in 1920, albeit prematurely given the financial difficulties he faced that 
year). Although he remained deeply attached to Cambridge, much of his most 
important thinking took place at Tilton, purchased in 1925 on the back of stock 
market profits. Second, Keynes‟s first-hand experience of the financial markets fed 
directly into his work, notably his ideas on futures contracts. Third, Keynes‟s wealth 
opened up new avenues on the publishing front. This manifested itself in two ways. 
To begin with, he was part of a group of investors who took over The Nation and 
Athenaeum in March 1923; Keynes would often use its pages to publicise his theories 
on unemployment. In addition, we have already seen how Keynes was able to 
negotiate the financial terms on which his books were published by Macmillan, the 
most obvious example being the cheaply priced General Theory.
110
 
 
Keynes‟s financial generosity was well known, the main recipients of his regular 
handouts being needy artists. As far as Cambridge was concerned, he was never 
forced – in contrast to Marshall and Pigou – to use his own financial resources to 
support promising talent first, because of the gradually strengthening Economics 
Tripos, and second, because Keynes used his financial acumen in other ways to enrich 
the University, in particular King‟s. With regard to the former, the expansion and 
consolidation of the Tripos meant that Richard Kahn and Joan Robinson were able to 
secure appointments in the Faculty of Economics and Politics without awkward 
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 Once the General Theory had been published, Keynes was aware of the importance of bolstering its 
theoretical claims with empirical support. As part of this, he was able to secure funds from the National 
Institute of Economic and Social Research to help finance investigations into British spending habits 
and used the results to influence Treasury thinking during the Second World War (see Booth 1989: 65). 
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questions having to be asked about funding. Meanwhile, Keynes‟s financial 
involvement with King‟s became almost legendary. His first interest in College 
finances began in 1909 when he was made an Inspector of Accounts. This was 
followed by an appointment as Second Bursar in 1919 and First Bursar in 1924, a post 
which Keynes occupied up until his death. From the beginning, the College gave him 
extensive leeway in placing its money, and during the period 1920-36 he turned 
£30,000 into £200,000, a near sevenfold increase. It does not seem unreasonable to 
suggest that this new-found wealth played some part in making King‟s a more popular 
choice for those students wanting to study economics at Cambridge, in turn helping to 
maintain the College‟s strong tradition in the subject. 
 
Marshall: 
 
Marshall was not a natural fundraiser. His preference for avoiding controversy meant 
that he probably felt averse to getting involved in what he no doubt regarded as the 
messy business of securing financial resources for the Economics Tripos. This may 
explain why, in its early years, the Tripos was characterised by a distinct element of 
pecuniary self-sufficiency: apart from Marshall and Pigou using their own income to 
finance lectureships, Marshall put in place financial incentives to entice some of the 
best students into economics well before 1903. Thus, in March 1886, he set up a £15 
prize which was awarded to the best student performance in the political economy 
papers of the Moral Sciences Tripos (see Groenewegen 1988: 638). 
 
There were additional factors at work. Cambridge University was not a wealthy 
institution in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, having to increasingly rely on 
unstable agricultural rents (ibid., 649). There was also little financial help available 
from the government, the prevailing orthodoxy being an emphasis on private 
patronage as opposed to state support for higher education (see Kushner 1993: 222). 
Moreover, despite its prestige, Cambridge found it difficult to compete with the 
growing threat from the new civic universities and colleges – notably Birmingham, 
the LSE and Manchester – whenever attracting private money was at stake: around the 
same time as the Economics Tripos was created, Cambridge had failed in an attempt 
to secure significant private funding, losing out to more recently established 
institutions (see Whitaker 1996: xix-xx). Marshall‟s attitude to private money was 
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ambiguous: he was concerned that Cambridge might find it problematic to retain its 
independence if it relied too much on private support, but he was also aware that it 
would suffer financially (with regard to both private and state funding) if it failed to 
reform (see Groenewegen ibid., 643). The creation of the Tripos can be seen as 
Marshall‟s contribution to this reform process. 
 
Apart from contributing towards the cost of lectureships and offering prizes, Marshall 
also compensated for Cambridge‟s financial difficulties by his „at homes‟. These were 
provided free of charge, in stark contrast to common practice across the rest of the 
University, where students were more or less obliged to seek out the services of a 
costly private tutor in order to have a better chance of securing a good degree, 
aspiring Wranglers in the Mathematical Tripos being the obvious example (see 
Warwick 2003). As well as the „at homes‟, the more able economics students were 
given the run of Marshall‟s extensive library, Keynes (1924: 366) describing how he 
and his contemporaries would labour along the Madingley Road under the weight of 
books that Marshall had picked out for them to read. Upon his death, Marshall 
donated his library to the University and requested that all royalties from future sales 
of his books should go towards strengthening the Economics Tripos (ibid., 368). 
 
Hayek: 
 
Given the laissez-faire attitude towards the financing of higher education in Britain 
towards the end of the Victorian age, those attempting to put the teaching of 
economics on to a firmer footing had to try even harder than their counterparts in 
more mainstream subjects in their efforts to raise money. Summing up the views of 
William Hewins, the first director of the LSE, Coats (1967: 409) writes that prior to 
1895, „scarcely any branch of English higher education was so ill provided for as 
economics. Scientific work had usually been subordinated to the study of practical 
questions, and economics had been neglected by existing educational institutions and 
starved of both state and private funds.‟ While Hewins may have been correct in his 
claim of a general lack of financial support for economics, this was not entirely true in 
the LSE‟s case. Indeed, the School may never have got off the ground had it not been 
for a generous bequest from the estate of solicitor Henry Hutchinson to the Fabian 
Society. There was also support from the London Chamber of Commerce and the 
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Royal Society of Arts, whilst within only five years of its foundation, the LSE was 
receiving half of its revenue from London County Council (see Cole 1963: 763).
111
 
 
For many years, it remained the case that the LSE could only operate as a relatively 
small college, this being down, to some extent, to the part-time status of many of its 
students. But this all changed in 1919 with the arrival of William Beveridge as 
director.
112
 From the beginning, Beveridge set himself the task of rapidly expanding 
the School, accompanying this with a strengthening of the quality of the teaching 
staff, not only within economics but across the social sciences. In both endeavours, 
Beveridge was singularly successful, his initial triumphs being underpinned by funds 
made available by institutions such as the Rockefeller Foundation (see Harris 2008). 
With reference to the teaching staff, a number of prominent names taught at the LSE 
during the 1920s and 1930s, including Harold Laski, Bronislaw Malinowski, R.H. 
Tawney and, of course, Hayek. Furthermore, the Economics Department was spoilt 
for choice because of an abundance of talented young students, Robbins (1971: 131) 
commenting that „it was not difficult…to make very suitable appointments.‟ This 
favourable situation would continue after the Hicks-Kaldor-Lerner generation, with 
later luminaries including Ronald Coase and Arthur Lewis. In Hayek‟s particular case, 
financial factors operated in at least two ways in getting him to take up a post at the 
LSE: first was the easy availability of money at the School‟s disposal already noted. 
Second, for a talented young man looking to make his way in the world, Hayek must 
have been concerned by his job prospects, this against a background of deteriorating 
economic conditions in Austria caused by the Depression which, in its turn, had set in 
motion the displacement of parliamentary democracy and replaced it with corporatism 
or Ständestaat (Klausinger 2006: 621-622). 
 
Kalecki:
113
 
 
Kalecki‟s life and career was unconventional and eventful, and this reflected itself in 
questions of money. As far as his family background was concerned, we might be 
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 The following two paragraphs draw on Harcourt (2006a: 160-161). 
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forgiven for thinking that financial issues would not be of any great worry given that 
Kalecki‟s father was the owner of a textile manufacturing company. However, any 
hopes that young Michal‟s progress through university would be a serene one were 
dashed after the failure of his father‟s business in 1923, the result being that Kalecki 
was unable to finish his university studies.
114
 
 
Even if these events turned out to be „sources of strength‟ (Steindl 1981: 590) for 
Kalecki, his lack of a degree effectively ruled out any chance he had of securing the 
university appointment which may have otherwise put him in a much stronger 
position from which to launch a research school in the 1930s. Instead, he was forced 
to make a living by writing about the creditworthiness of small businesses. Granted, 
his financial position would have been made a little more secure after he began work 
at the Polish Institute of Research on Business Cycles and Prices in 1929, but due to 
the many factors already identified, he was unable to build a school either at the 
Institute or anywhere else during his early professional career. 
 
Summary: 
 
„Adequate financial support‟ is one of only four of the Morrell-Geison criteria where 
Keynes and Hayek both score positively. It also one of only three criteria in which 
each of our four protagonists scored a rating which was either ambiguous or better. 
 
Table 19. Performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against Morrell-
Geison criterion ‘xiv. Adequate financial support’ 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
xiv. Adequate financial support + ± + ±  
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
The broad focus of the Morrell-Geison analysis is on laboratory-orientated disciplines. 
Nevertheless, its identification of the potential importance of funding to the relative 
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Polish army. 
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success of research schools is, to a degree, also applicable to non-laboratory subjects, 
such as economics. Whether directly or indirectly, finance played a role in helping to 
establish the Keynesian School at Cambridge, some of it the product of Keynes‟s own 
actions – most importantly, his stock market activities – and some of it that of his 
predecessors, notably Marshall and Pigou, who were instrumental in „rescuing‟ 
Keynes from Whitehall. Also, given the relative poverty of Cambridge University in 
the late 19th and early 20th centuries, Marshall, in particular, had to make extra 
provision to promote the study of economics, including giving free supervisions at his 
home. 
 
Meanwhile, upon his arrival at the LSE, Hayek found his new employer to be in a 
relatively prosperous position, underpinned by Beveridge‟s successful fundraising 
activities during the 1920s; Hayek‟s appointment to the LSE staff, along with those of 
a number of other rising stars, was only made possible by this increase in wealth, 
Hayek all the time aware that the prospects for career development in Depression-hit 
Austria were highly uncertain. As such, it was not a lack of funding provision which 
compromised Hayek‟s ability to establish a successful research school at the LSE, but 
rather other factors. Finally, Kalecki‟s lack of a university degree and, as a 
consequence, his inability to obtain a post in a university in Poland in the early 1930s 
meant that the outlets for his work and influence were constrained from the beginning. 
At the same time, he was rather unlucky as his failure to graduate was largely 
attributable to the fact that his parents could not afford to pay for him to finish his 
engineering degree after the collapse of his father‟s business, although his securing of 
a research position later on (in 1929) would have made him financially more 
comfortable. 
 
 
Section 5. Summary and Conclusion 
 
A range of explanations have been proposed by historians of economic theory to 
explain the success of the General Theory. This thesis has attempted to bring together 
these explanations under one overarching framework, namely the methodology 
pioneered by Jack Morrell and Gerald Geison in the history of science literature 
examining the success and failure of research schools. In addition, we have looked at 
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why what took place in the 1930s and 1940s was specifically a „Keynesian‟ 
Revolution rather than one led by Hayek or Kalecki, and to what extent Marshall had 
a hand in laying some of the foundations for Keynes‟s success. 
 
The main message to emerge is that Keynes met a good majority of the Morrell-
Geison criteria required for a successful research school and that this success was of a 
sustained nature (see Table 20 on the next page).
115
 Even of the two or three criteria 
over which there is a question mark, Keynes was able to secure some measure of 
potency. For example, when we considered „Invasion of new field of research‟ we 
saw that Keynes made use of a number of extant ideas, notably effective demand. But 
to his credit, he was able to synthesise these ideas with new ones in a manner which 
offered a fresh approach to addressing the problem of mass and sustained 
unemployment; in this respect, the General Theory was without doubt an 
improvement on the „veritable morass of contending explanations of the periodicity of 
business fluctuations‟ (Blaug 1991: 180) which had been doing the rounds prior to 
1936. 
 
Indeed, the General Theory was able to successfully establish a new and lasting 
paradigm in economics, one which, although it also utilised some aspects of theory 
associated with the classicals
116
 – the very tradition which Keynes was trying to 
displace – provided, for the first time, a convincing theoretical rationale as to why 
equilibrium can occur and persist at levels below full employment. In a Kuhnian 
world, many theories can compete during the crisis phase which follows the 
realisation that old theory has been shown to be deficient and which precedes the 
emergence of the new paradigm. This competition is what happened during the 1930s 
and 1940s in macroeconomics, with Keynes emerging as the winner, at least during 
the period in question. Compared to Kuhn, the Morrell-Geison framework arguably 
provides a broader set of explanatory factors which help to throw light on why one 
particular theory is able to secure the new paradigm while contemporaneous theories 
fail. 
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Table 20. Overall performance of Keynes, Marshall, Hayek and Kalecki against 
the Morrell-Geison criteria
1
 
Criterion Keynes Marshall Hayek Kalecki
i. 'Charismatic' leader(s) + ± - -
ii. Leader with research reputation + + + ±
iii. 'Informal' setting and leadership style + ± - -
iv. Leader with institutional power ± + ± -
v. Social cohesion, loyalty, esprit de
    corps , 'discipleship' + + - -
vi. Focused research program + + ± ±
vii. Simple and rapidly exploitable
    experimental techniques + + - -
viii. Invasion of new field of research ± ± ± +
ix. Pool of potential recruits (graduate
    students) + ± + -
x. Access to or control of publication
     outlets + + + -
xi. Students publish early under own
     names + + - -
xii. Produced and 'placed' significant
     number of students ± + - -
xiii. Institutionalization in university
     setting + + - -
xiv. Adequate financial support + ± + ±
Total of '+'s 11 9 4 1
Note: 1 „+‟ means that this feature is present; „-‟ means that this feature is absent; and „±‟ means that this feature is partly present 
and partly absent. 
Source: Adapted from Geison (1981: 24) 
 
A large part of Keynes‟s success was the force of his personality, a major advantage 
over the more austere Hayek and Kalecki. But this was not the only factor. There were 
also the many advantages which Keynes accrued from being at Cambridge and 
through his association with Marshall, including the establishment of the Economics 
Tripos overseen by Marshall which (eventually) provided Keynes with a stream of 
disciples. Meanwhile, in Britain and the United States, the controversial nature of the 
General Theory (especially its attack on the classicals) and the opportunities it opened 
up by way of empirical research – national income accounting being but one example 
– helped to attract the interest of younger economists in particular; indeed, the 
doggedness of some of the young in promoting Keynesian ideas at governmental level 
was testament to their support for the new paradigm. Neither Hayek nor Kalecki was 
able to influence official policy-making in either the 1930s or the 1940s. 
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Over time, there also accumulated a large degree of published support for the General 
Theory, much of it again emanating from Britain and the United States. To his credit, 
even if Keynes could have made more of his editorship of the Economic Journal to 
promote his revolution, he was, for the most part, restrained. Granted, there was 
Kahn‟s article on the multiplier, the attack on Hayek‟s Prices and Production, and the 
publication of Meade and Stone‟s work on national income. But Keynes was 
conscious of his privileged position and instead sought to promote his ideas largely 
through newspaper articles, pamphlets, and, most importantly, books. Prices and 
Production was, of course, published as a book, but there was little support from the 
younger generation of staff and students at the LSE, despite the founding of the 
Review of Economic Studies in 1933. Meanwhile, Kalecki made the fatal mistake of 
publishing his theories on the cycle in non-English-language journals. 
 
Aside from the Morrell-Geison criteria, some mention does have to be made of the 
temporal relevance of the General Theory. It was published in 1936, only a short time 
after the Great Depression had reached its peak. With classical theory failing to 
provide a convincing explanation as to why unemployment had occurred, the timing 
of the General Theory‟s publication has been held by some to be opportune. Although 
this argument does have some compelling aspects, it fails to account for various other 
important factors as set out in Section 2, including the point that the Great Depression 
had more or less been ridden out by 1936. In addition, the temporal argument does not 
explain why the General Theory stood out amongst so many competing accounts of 
the Depression, including Kalecki‟s which, although technically more demanding, 
was more dynamic than Keynes‟s static model. The Morrell-Geison analysis provides 
some relief here. Its basic aim is to explain the success or failure of research schools. 
If then we are to employ it to explain what happened with respect to cycle theory 
during the 1930s and 1940s and, within this, new views on the determination of 
output levels over the short period, a simple question arises: Are we justified in 
employing Morrell-Geison when neither Hayek nor Kalecki in fact established a 
recognisable research school during this period? After all, Morrell‟s 1972 paper was a 
comparison of two pre-existing schools. However, a trick may have been missed here. 
More specifically, Hayek and Kalecki were at a distinct disadvantage precisely 
because they did not establish research schools and Keynes did; had either of them 
founded a school, the playing field might have been levelled to an extent that their 
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chances of ultimately being successful would have been enhanced, if not necessarily 
guaranteed. This may seem unsympathetic towards Kalecki in particular. In response, 
however, it is worth recalling Geison‟s (1993: 234) comment that the work of 
research schools has „a better chance of surviving and flourishing in the crowded 
environment of modern intellectual life than do the ideas put forth by individual 
“mutant” scientists, whether cranks or geniuses.‟ Although the 1930s and 1940s may 
not have been as crowded as „modern intellectual life‟, Geison‟s point is surely still 
relevant to that period. 
 
But even this is not enough. As Brock (2003: 25) points out about Morrell‟s original 
paper, it „identified the necessary and sufficient conditions for the creation of a 
successful research school.‟ With respect to Keynes, et al., we have just looked at the 
necessary aspect above. In terms of sufficiency, a research school created by Hayek or 
Kalecki would have had to have met a similar number or more of the Morrell-Geison 
criteria in order to have properly competed with the Keynesians. We are not, of 
course, saying that an economist or any other academic has to have a research school 
in order to be successful. Rather, in terms of the events that took place during the 
1930s and 1940s within the field of business cycle theory, any successful challenge to 
Keynes by Hayek, Kalecki or any other economist for that matter would have had to 
at least match, if not surpass, Keynes in the research school stakes. Put another way, 
the General Theory and the research school built around it was the necessary aspect of 
Keynes‟s revolution; Keynes‟s success in meeting most of the Morrell-Geison criteria 
was the sufficient part. 
 
There are a number of related issues which are relevant to the Keynesian Revolution. 
To begin with, the claim by some historians of economic theory that biographical 
information is useful in helping to explain why the ideas of some economists are 
successful and others are not receives some considerable support from our analysis.
117
 
Similarly, research school analysis also gives backing to what has been dubbed „thick‟ 
history, which embraces both the internal and external influences on a thinker and his 
thought, in contrast to „thin‟ history, which stresses just internal factors (see Runde 
and Mizuhara 2003: 6). Given the important role played by a number of different 
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schools of thought throughout the history of economic theory – to take an extreme 
example, Schumpeter (1946: 515) points to the Physiocrats and the Marxists as being 
the only rivals to the Keynesians with respect to the speed of success – the potential 
for further thick histories would appear to be significant. 
 
A further potential area of interest concerns the so-called „Planck Principle‟. In his 
autobiography, Max Planck (1950: 33-34) argued that, „A new scientific truth does 
not triumph by convincing its opponents and making them see the light, but rather 
because its opponents eventually die, and a new generation grows up that is familiar 
with it.‟ It is unclear whether Shackle (1967: 296) was aware of the Planck Principle 
when he made reference to the fact that a number of the great Victorian economists – 
including Marshall, Menger, and Wicksell – all died within a few years of each other 
in the 1920s and that this left the way open for a new start to be made on, amongst 
other things, cycle theory, „without these giants peering over men‟s shoulders.‟ 
Granted, in Kalecki‟s case, the relevance of the Planck Principle is less clear given his 
lack of exposure to classical theory. However, a stronger case can be made in relation 
to Keynes, especially given Marshall‟s passing in 1924, whilst Cannan‟s retirement 
from the LSE in 1926 perhaps also helps to explain the onset of Robbins‟s subsequent 
attack on Cambridge.
118
 
 
On a final, more esoteric note, there has so far been little attempt by historians of 
economic theory to examine the specific personality traits of eminent economists 
within the context of creativity studies conducted by psychologists. Two examples 
will give a flavour of the potential for such analyses. First, Simonton (2004: 111) 
points out that creative individuals often exhibit particular behaviours which help to 
make their thoughts less predictable and thus supportive of chance combinations. 
Simonton highlights openness to experience as being the most important of these 
traits, manifested, as it can sometimes be, in a diversity of interests, a preference for 
novelty, and a tolerance of ambiguity. Keynes, for one, fits the bill on all three counts. 
Related to openness to experience is what Simonton refers to as defocused attention, 
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characterised by an individual‟s ability to conceive of two or more associations which 
are then employed to construct new combinations. Again, Keynes‟s use of concepts 
such as the multiplier, animal spirits, and liquidity preference to produce a theory of 
underemployment equilibrium seems to be a good fit. 
 
Second are the various investigations which have been performed on the family 
backgrounds of creative individuals. By way of example, Roe (1952) (cited in 
Simonton 1988: 108) looks at the family histories of 64 eminent scientists. She finds 
that he was typically the first-born child of a middle-class family, the son of a 
professional man, suffered periods of poor health when he was young, had a very high 
IQ, and was a bookworm. All of these factors ring true of Keynes‟s early life. The 
only factor which Roe identifies as regularly being present in creative individuals, but 
which was not a feature of Keynes‟s childhood, was the loss of a parent. Rather, 
Keynes‟s parents enjoyed a long and happy marriage, both outliving their eminent 
son. 
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